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14 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Haberleingreen2 sentences2018See Williams, 295 Kan. at 610 . 21 Legal Appropriateness In considering whether a second-degree intentional murder instruction would have been legally appropriate we begin by recognizing that "second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder." Knox, 301 Kan. at 680 ; see State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 204 , 290 P.3d 640 (2012) ("The instruction . . . would have been legally appropriate here, because second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder."). 2018See Williams, 295 Kan. at 610 . 21 Legal Appropriateness In considering whether a second-degree intentional murder instruction would have been legally appropriate we begin by recognizing that "second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder." Knox, 301 Kan. at 680 ; see State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 204 , 290 P.3d 640 (2012) ("The instruction . . . would have been legally appropriate here, because second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder."). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2018See Williams, 295 Kan. at 610 . 21 Legal Appropriateness In considering whether a second-degree intentional murder instruction would have been legally appropriate we begin by recognizing that "second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder." Knox, 301 Kan. at 680 ; see State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 204 , 290 P.3d 640 (2012) ("The instruction . . . would have been legally appropriate here, because second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder."). 2018See Williams, 295 Kan. at 610 . 21 Legal Appropriateness In considering whether a second-degree intentional murder instruction would have been legally appropriate we begin by recognizing that "second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder." Knox, 301 Kan. at 680 ; see State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 204 , 290 P.3d 640 (2012) ("The instruction . . . would have been legally appropriate here, because second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder."). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Knoxgreen2 sentences2018See Williams, 295 Kan. at 610 . 21 Legal Appropriateness In considering whether a second-degree intentional murder instruction would have been legally appropriate we begin by recognizing that "second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder." Knox, 301 Kan. at 680 ; see State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 204 , 290 P.3d 640 (2012) ("The instruction . . . would have been legally appropriate here, because second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder."). 2018See Williams, 295 Kan. at 610 . 21 Legal Appropriateness In considering whether a second-degree intentional murder instruction would have been legally appropriate we begin by recognizing that "second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder." Knox, 301 Kan. at 680 ; see State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 204 , 290 P.3d 640 (2012) ("The instruction . . . would have been legally appropriate here, because second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder."). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Abbottgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 277 Kan. 161 , Syl. ¶ 5, 83 P.3d 794 (2004); see also PIK Crim. 4th 57.040 (2020 Supp.) (providing nonexhaustive list of factors that may be relevant to determine whether defendant possessed controlled substance). 2021See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 277 Kan. 161 , Syl. ¶ 5, 83 P.3d 794 (2004); see also PIK Crim. 4th 57.040 (2020 Supp.) (providing nonexhaustive list of factors that may be relevant to determine whether defendant possessed controlled substance). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hurleygreen1 sentence2020See Hurley, 303 Kan. at 583-84 (holding defendant's revocation did not follow statutory provisions, including the written notice provision required by due process). 8 Not Harmless Error The State argues that this error was harmless because Kendrick admitted during his testimony that he violated conditions of his probation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Trujillogreen2 sentences2014If there is no unified defense, we do not tolerate verdict uncertainty in these cases.” Voyles, 284 Kan. at 253 ; see also State v. Trujillo, 296 Kan. 625, 631 , 294 P.3d 281 (2013) (after refining language of clearly erroneous test, court noted that it did “not discern a practical difference” between the Voyles formulation and the refined language). *600 The State argues the error is not reversible because De La Torre presented a unified defense that turned the case into a “credibility contest between the forensic evidence . . . and the Defendant’s explanations of the accident.” It contends t 2014If there is no unified defense, we do not tolerate verdict uncertainty in these cases.” Voyles, 284 Kan. at 253 ; see also State v. Trujillo, 296 Kan. 625, 631 , 294 P.3d 281 (2013) (after refining language of clearly erroneous test, court noted that it did “not discern a practical difference” between the Voyles formulation and the refined language). *600 The State argues the error is not reversible because De La Torre presented a unified defense that turned the case into a “credibility contest between the forensic evidence . . . and the Defendant’s explanations of the accident.” It contends t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2026In support of this contention, the State argues that the factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L. 2026In support of this contention, the State argues that the factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Allen
green
1 sentence2023Our Supreme Court has warned, "[a]n appellate court abuses its discretion when invoking an exception to the general rule against addressing an issue for the first time on appeal if consideration of the unpreserved issue would require 5 the court to make factual findings." State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280 , Syl. ¶ 5, 497 P.3d 566 (2021). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Maggard
green
2 sentences2021The State argues that to rule differently from the district court "would allow similarly situated defendants to avoid prosecution by manipulating the MDDA." The State cites State v. Maggard, 16 Kan. 2021App. 2d 743 , 829 P.2d 591 (1992), to support its argument. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Winston v. Kansas Dept. of SRS
green
2 sentences2021"Res judicata (claim preclusion) prevents relitigation of previously litigated claims and consist of the following four elements: (1) same claim; (2) same parties; (3) claims were or could have been raised; and (4) a final judgment on the merits." Winston v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 274 Kan. 396, 413 , 49 P.3d 1274 (2002). 2021"Res judicata (claim preclusion) prevents relitigation of previously litigated claims and consist of the following four elements: (1) same claim; (2) same parties; (3) claims were or could have been raised; and (4) a final judgment on the merits." Winston v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 274 Kan. 396, 413 , 49 P.3d 1274 (2002). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gaudina v. State
green
2 sentences2016For example, in Gaudina v. State, 278 Kan. 103, 106 , 92 P.3d 574 (2004), we noted that Kansas follows "the same rule for finality [for purposes of the retroactive applicability of a new rule] set forth in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , [328, 107 S. Ct. 708 , 93 L. 2016For example, in Gaudina v. State, 278 Kan. 103, 106 , 92 P.3d 574 (2004), we noted that Kansas follows "the same rule for finality [for purposes of the retroactive applicability of a new rule] set forth in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , [328, 107 S. Ct. 708 , 93 L. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Griffith v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2016For example, in Gaudina v. State, 278 Kan. 103, 106 , 92 P.3d 574 (2004), we noted that Kansas follows "the same rule for finality [for purposes of the retroactive applicability of a new rule] set forth in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , [328, 107 S. Ct. 708 , 93 L. 2016For example, in Gaudina v. State, 278 Kan. 103, 106 , 92 P.3d 574 (2004), we noted that Kansas follows "the same rule for finality [for purposes of the retroactive applicability of a new rule] set forth in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , [328, 107 S. Ct. 708 , 93 L. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Voyles
green
1 sentence2014If there is no unified defense, we do not tolerate verdict uncertainty in these cases.” Voyles, 284 Kan. at 253 ; see also State v. Trujillo, 296 Kan. 625, 631 , 294 P.3d 281 (2013) (after refining language of clearly erroneous test, court noted that it did “not discern a practical difference” between the Voyles formulation and the refined language). *600 The State argues the error is not reversible because De La Torre presented a unified defense that turned the case into a “credibility contest between the forensic evidence . . . and the Defendant’s explanations of the accident.” It contends t | 1 | 2014–2014 |
McPherson v. State
green
2 sentences2012The State argues that the error was harmless based on McPherson v. State, 38 Kan. 2012App. 2d 276 , Syl. ¶ 1, 163 P.3d 1257 (2007). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Neer
green
2 sentences2006Where a defendant's claim has not been raised at trial or on direct appeal, such a default prevents the defendant from raising the claim in a second appeal or a collateral proceeding." State v. Neer, 247 Kan. 137, 140-41 , 795 P.2d 362 (1990). 2006Where a defendant's claim has not been raised at trial or on direct appeal, such a default prevents the defendant from raising the claim in a second appeal or a collateral proceeding." State v. Neer, 247 Kan. 137, 140-41 , 795 P.2d 362 (1990). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Wilcox
green
2 sentences1993The State argues the rule of law stated in Williams is not new law in Kansas, citing State v. Wilcox, 245 Kan. 76 , Syl. ¶ 1, 775 P.2d 177 (1989), and State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743, 748 , 576 P.2d 666 (1978). 1993The State argues the rule of law stated in Williams is not new law in Kansas, citing State v. Wilcox, 245 Kan. 76 , Syl. ¶ 1, 775 P.2d 177 (1989), and State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743, 748 , 576 P.2d 666 (1978). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Makin
green
2 sentences1993The State argues the rule of law stated in Williams is not new law in Kansas, citing State v. Wilcox, 245 Kan. 76 , Syl. ¶ 1, 775 P.2d 177 (1989), and State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743, 748 , 576 P.2d 666 (1978). 1993The State argues the rule of law stated in Williams is not new law in Kansas, citing State v. Wilcox, 245 Kan. 76 , Syl. ¶ 1, 775 P.2d 177 (1989), and State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743, 748 , 576 P.2d 666 (1978). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Wilson
red
2 sentences1987In the recent case of State v. Wilson, 240 Kan. 606 , 731 P.2d 306 (1987), it was held that an information which omits one of the essential elements of the crime it attempts to charge is jurisdictionally and fatally defective, and any conviction of that offense must be reversed. 1987In the recent case of State v. Wilson, 240 Kan. 606 , 731 P.2d 306 (1987), it was held that an information which omits one of the essential elements of the crime it attempts to charge is jurisdictionally and fatally defective, and any conviction of that offense must be reversed. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.