State argues defense in Montana

2025Alternatively, if the Court were to address the claims, the State argues that defense counsel could not have established on this record that Arvidson reasonably believed it was necessary to shoot at officers to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm, and thus there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different had an alternate defense been presented. ¶18 When considering an IAC claim this Court applies the United States Supreme Court’s two-prong test as articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

2025Alternatively, if the Court were to address the claims, the State argues that defense counsel could not have established on this record that Arvidson reasonably believed it was necessary to shoot at officers to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm, and thus there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different had an alternate defense been presented. ¶18 When considering an IAC claim this Court applies the United States Supreme Court’s two-prong test as articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

2025Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 10 , 343 Mont. 90 , 183 P.3d 861 (citing U.S. Const. amend.

2025Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 10 , 343 Mont. 90 , 183 P.3d 861 (citing U.S. Const. amend.

2025State v. Bryson, 2024 MT 315 , ¶ 29, 419 Mont. 490 , 560 P.3d 1270 (citing Oliphant v. State, 2023 MT 43, ¶ 37 , 411 Mont. 250 , 525 P.3d 1214 ).

2025State v. Bryson, 2024 MT 315 , ¶ 29, 419 Mont. 490 , 560 P.3d 1270 (citing Oliphant v. State, 2023 MT 43, ¶ 37 , 411 Mont. 250 , 525 P.3d 1214 ).

2024Rather, the State argues that standard conditions of probation are included as part of a probationary sentence unless the sentencing court finds “in the exercise of its discretion, that a standard condition is inappropriate under the sentence it is imposing.” State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341, ¶ 7 , 353 Mont. 111 , 220 P.3d 25 . ¶31 Sentencing judges have “sweeping authority to impose any ‘reasonable restrictions or conditions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society.’” State v. Green, 2012 MT 87, ¶ 10 , 364 Mont. 515 , 276 P.3d 929 (quoting § 46-18-

2024Rather, the State argues that standard conditions of probation are included as part of a probationary sentence unless the sentencing court finds “in the exercise of its discretion, that a standard condition is inappropriate under the sentence it is imposing.” State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341, ¶ 7 , 353 Mont. 111 , 220 P.3d 25 . ¶31 Sentencing judges have “sweeping authority to impose any ‘reasonable restrictions or conditions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society.’” State v. Green, 2012 MT 87, ¶ 10 , 364 Mont. 515 , 276 P.3d 929 (quoting § 46-18-

2024“On appeal, the Appellant has the burden to present legal authority that establishes error on the part of the district court.” Hartsoe v. Christopher, 2013 MT 57, ¶ 16 , 369 Mont. 223 , 296 P.3d 1186 . 14 ¶32 During sentencing, the District Court listed 49 “terms and conditions” that Welch would be required to comply with during the suspended portion of his sentence.

2024“On appeal, the Appellant has the burden to present legal authority that establishes error on the part of the district court.” Hartsoe v. Christopher, 2013 MT 57, ¶ 16 , 369 Mont. 223 , 296 P.3d 1186 . 14 ¶32 During sentencing, the District Court listed 49 “terms and conditions” that Welch would be required to comply with during the suspended portion of his sentence.

2024Rather, the State argues that standard conditions of probation are included as part of a probationary sentence unless the sentencing court finds “in the exercise of its discretion, that a standard condition is inappropriate under the sentence it is imposing.” State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341, ¶ 7 , 353 Mont. 111 , 220 P.3d 25 . ¶31 Sentencing judges have “sweeping authority to impose any ‘reasonable restrictions or conditions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society.’” State v. Green, 2012 MT 87, ¶ 10 , 364 Mont. 515 , 276 P.3d 929 (quoting § 46-18-

2024Rather, the State argues that standard conditions of probation are included as part of a probationary sentence unless the sentencing court finds “in the exercise of its discretion, that a standard condition is inappropriate under the sentence it is imposing.” State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341, ¶ 7 , 353 Mont. 111 , 220 P.3d 25 . ¶31 Sentencing judges have “sweeping authority to impose any ‘reasonable restrictions or conditions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society.’” State v. Green, 2012 MT 87, ¶ 10 , 364 Mont. 515 , 276 P.3d 929 (quoting § 46-18-

2014In State v. Van Kirk, 2001MT 184, ¶ 37, 306 Mont. 215 , 32 P.3d 735 , this Court adopted a two-step analysis to be used when determining whether an alleged error prejudiced a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and is thus reversible. ¶21 First, error must be categorized as either “structural” or “trial” error.

2014In State v. Van Kirk, 2001MT 184, ¶ 37, 306 Mont. 215 , 32 P.3d 735 , this Court adopted a two-step analysis to be used when determining whether an alleged error prejudiced a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and is thus reversible. ¶21 First, error must be categorized as either “structural” or “trial” error.

2014State v. Harlson, 2006 MT 312, ¶ 21 , 335 Mont. 25 , 150 P.3d 349 .

2014State v. Harlson, 2006 MT 312, ¶ 21 , 335 Mont. 25 , 150 P.3d 349 .

2012The State argues that the rule of lenity is inapplicable to his situation because the definitions within the MMA are not ambiguous. ¶21 ‘It is well settled that a statute must be specific enough to give fair notice of the conduct prohibited and to provide a meaningful differentiation between culpable and innocent conduct.” State v. Stanko, 1998 MT 323, ¶ 59 , 292 Mont. 214 , 974 P.2d 1139 .

2012The State argues that the rule of lenity is inapplicable to his situation because the definitions within the MMA are not ambiguous. ¶21 ‘It is well settled that a statute must be specific enough to give fair notice of the conduct prohibited and to provide a meaningful differentiation between culpable and innocent conduct.” State v. Stanko, 1998 MT 323, ¶ 59 , 292 Mont. 214 , 974 P.2d 1139 .

2007Thus, the State argues that any evidentiary inquiries by the court into Smith’s “facially groundless motion” would be redundant and would controvert the well established legal maximum that “the law neither does nor requires idle acts.” In re Marriage of Pfeifer, 1998 MT 228, ¶ 18 , 291 Mont. 23, ¶ 18 , 965 P.2d 895, ¶ 18 . ¶5 We review a criminal sentence for legality only.

2007Thus, the State argues that any evidentiary inquiries by the court into Smith’s “facially groundless motion” would be redundant and would controvert the well established legal maximum that “the law neither does nor requires idle acts.” In re Marriage of Pfeifer, 1998 MT 228, ¶ 18 , 291 Mont. 23, ¶ 18 , 965 P.2d 895, ¶ 18 . ¶5 We review a criminal sentence for legality only.

2004Bearchild points to the case of State v. Blem (S.D. 2000), 610 N.W.2d 803 , where the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s decision granting a prosecutor’s request to remove two jurors prior to voir dire. ¶10 The State argues the test for structural error was not met in this case and that Bearchild failed to establish presumptive prejudice as required by State v. Good, 2002 MT 59, ¶ 59 , 309 Mont. 113, ¶ 59 , 43 P.3d 948, ¶ 59 .

2004Bearchild points to the case of State v. Blem (S.D. 2000), 610 N.W.2d 803 , where the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s decision granting a prosecutor’s request to remove two jurors prior to voir dire. ¶10 The State argues the test for structural error was not met in this case and that Bearchild failed to establish presumptive prejudice as required by State v. Good, 2002 MT 59, ¶ 59 , 309 Mont. 113, ¶ 59 , 43 P.3d 948, ¶ 59 .

2004Bearchild points to the case of State v. Blem (S.D. 2000), 610 N.W.2d 803 , where the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s decision granting a prosecutor’s request to remove two jurors prior to voir dire. ¶10 The State argues the test for structural error was not met in this case and that Bearchild failed to establish presumptive prejudice as required by State v. Good, 2002 MT 59, ¶ 59 , 309 Mont. 113, ¶ 59 , 43 P.3d 948, ¶ 59 .

2004Bearchild points to the case of State v. Blem (S.D. 2000), 610 N.W.2d 803 , where the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s decision granting a prosecutor’s request to remove two jurors prior to voir dire. ¶10 The State argues the test for structural error was not met in this case and that Bearchild failed to establish presumptive prejudice as required by State v. Good, 2002 MT 59, ¶ 59 , 309 Mont. 113, ¶ 59 , 43 P.3d 948, ¶ 59 .

1991The State argues that the doctrine of res judicata applies to this issue as this Court has already determined this issue in the State’s favor in Coleman II, 605 P.2d at 1008 -10 (citing, inter alia, Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 ).

1991The State argues that the doctrine of res judicata applies to this issue as this Court has already determined this issue in the State’s favor in Coleman II, 605 P.2d at 1008 -10 (citing, inter alia, Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 ).

1991The State argues that the doctrine of res judicata applies to this issue as this Court has already determined this issue in the State’s favor in Coleman II, 605 P.2d at 1008 -10 (citing, inter alia, Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 ).