14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bailey v. the Stategreen2 sentences2016Although the State argues that the analysis in Williams, 296 Ga. 817 , is inapplicable because the opinion was issued after Stoica *488 was convicted, “[u]nder the pipeline rule, ... a new rule of criminal procedure will be applied to pending cases, so long as the issue was preserved for appellate review.” Bailey v. State, 338 Ga. App. 428, 432 (2) (a) ( 790 SE2d 98 ) (2016). 2016Although the State argues that the analysis in Williams, 296 Ga. 817 , is inapplicable because the opinion was issued after Stoica *488 was convicted, “[u]nder the pipeline rule, ... a new rule of criminal procedure will be applied to pending cases, so long as the issue was preserved for appellate review.” Bailey v. State, 338 Ga. App. 428, 432 (2) (a) ( 790 SE2d 98 ) (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Gibson v. Stategreen2 sentences2015That the agreement was silent as to the specific sentences for each of the charges, in the absence of any agreement that any of the charges would be dropped or reduced, does not render the agreement unenforceable.11 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003), citing Glover, 258 Ga. App. at 529 ; Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 135 (1) ( 570 SE2d 437 ) (2002); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (b) ( 501 SE2d 562 ) (1998). 10 Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 834 (2) ( 681 SE2d 263 ) (2009). 11 The State argues that defense counsel’s con 2015That the agreement was silent as to the specific sentences for each of the charges, in the absence of any agreement that any of the charges would be dropped or reduced, does not render the agreement unenforceable.11 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003), citing Glover, 258 Ga. App. at 529 ; Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 135 (1) ( 570 SE2d 437 ) (2002); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (b) ( 501 SE2d 562 ) (1998). 10 Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 834 (2) ( 681 SE2d 263 ) (2009). 11 The State argues that defense counsel’s con | 1 | 1 |
Sparks v. Stategreen2 sentences2015That the agreement was silent as to the specific sentences for each of the charges, in the absence of any agreement that any of the charges would be dropped or reduced, does not render the agreement unenforceable.11 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003), citing Glover, 258 Ga. App. at 529 ; Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 135 (1) ( 570 SE2d 437 ) (2002); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (b) ( 501 SE2d 562 ) (1998). 10 Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 834 (2) ( 681 SE2d 263 ) (2009). 11 The State argues that defense counsel’s con 2015That the agreement was silent as to the specific sentences for each of the charges, in the absence of any agreement that any of the charges would be dropped or reduced, does not render the agreement unenforceable.11 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003), citing Glover, 258 Ga. App. at 529 ; Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 135 (1) ( 570 SE2d 437 ) (2002); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (b) ( 501 SE2d 562 ) (1998). 10 Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 834 (2) ( 681 SE2d 263 ) (2009). 11 The State argues that defense counsel’s con | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2015That the agreement was silent as to the specific sentences for each of the charges, in the absence of any agreement that any of the charges would be dropped or reduced, does not render the agreement unenforceable.11 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003), citing Glover, 258 Ga. App. at 529 ; Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 135 (1) ( 570 SE2d 437 ) (2002); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (b) ( 501 SE2d 562 ) (1998). 10 Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 834 (2) ( 681 SE2d 263 ) (2009). 11 The State argues that defense counsel’s con 2015That the agreement was silent as to the specific sentences for each of the charges, in the absence of any agreement that any of the charges would be dropped or reduced, does not render the agreement unenforceable.11 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003), citing Glover, 258 Ga. App. at 529 ; Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 135 (1) ( 570 SE2d 437 ) (2002); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (b) ( 501 SE2d 562 ) (1998). 10 Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 834 (2) ( 681 SE2d 263 ) (2009). 11 The State argues that defense counsel’s con | 1 | 1 |
Rushin v. Usserygreen2 sentences2015That the agreement was silent as to the specific sentences for each of the charges, in the absence of any agreement that any of the charges would be dropped or reduced, does not render the agreement unenforceable.11 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003), citing Glover, 258 Ga. App. at 529 ; Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 135 (1) ( 570 SE2d 437 ) (2002); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (b) ( 501 SE2d 562 ) (1998). 10 Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 834 (2) ( 681 SE2d 263 ) (2009). 11 The State argues that defense counsel’s con 2015That the agreement was silent as to the specific sentences for each of the charges, in the absence of any agreement that any of the charges would be dropped or reduced, does not render the agreement unenforceable.11 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003), citing Glover, 258 Ga. App. at 529 ; Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 135 (1) ( 570 SE2d 437 ) (2002); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (b) ( 501 SE2d 562 ) (1998). 10 Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 834 (2) ( 681 SE2d 263 ) (2009). 11 The State argues that defense counsel’s con | 1 | 1 |
Hood v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See generally Hood v. State, 282 Ga. 462, 463 ( 651 SE2d 88 ) (2007). 2008See generally Hood v. State, 282 Ga. 462, 463 ( 651 SE2d 88 ) (2007). | 1 | 1 |
Goddard v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See also Jenkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) ( 477 SE2d 910 ) (1996). 3 Citing to Goddard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 730, 733 (1) ( 536 SE2d 160 ) (2000), the state argues that the rule set out in Carranza does not apply in this case because the defendants were arrested outside the trailer. 2007See also Jenkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) ( 477 SE2d 910 ) (1996). 3 Citing to Goddard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 730, 733 (1) ( 536 SE2d 160 ) (2000), the state argues that the rule set out in Carranza does not apply in this case because the defendants were arrested outside the trailer. | 1 | 1 |
Jenkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See also Jenkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) ( 477 SE2d 910 ) (1996). 3 Citing to Goddard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 730, 733 (1) ( 536 SE2d 160 ) (2000), the state argues that the rule set out in Carranza does not apply in this case because the defendants were arrested outside the trailer. 2007See also Jenkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) ( 477 SE2d 910 ) (1996). 3 Citing to Goddard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 730, 733 (1) ( 536 SE2d 160 ) (2000), the state argues that the rule set out in Carranza does not apply in this case because the defendants were arrested outside the trailer. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1996In reliance upon Johnson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 747, 749 (3) ( 431 SE2d 737 ) (1993), the State argues in error that Carter lacks standing to challenge any search or seizure of the package. 1996In reliance upon Johnson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 747, 749 (3) ( 431 SE2d 737 ) (1993), the State argues in error that Carter lacks standing to challenge any search or seizure of the package. | 1 | 1 |
Hutto v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Hutto v. State, 198 Ga. App. 325, 327 (1) ( 401 SE2d 339 ) (1991). 1994See, e.g., Hutto v. State, 198 Ga. App. 325, 327 (1) ( 401 SE2d 339 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Meredithgreen1 sentence1988The state argues that the privilege was not violated because (1) Flanagan himself did not testify, (2) Flanagan would have been guilty of a crime had he not revealed the location of the body, and (3) the defendant failed to show that Flanagan learned of the location of the *285 body as a consequence of a privileged communication from Williams. (a) While the state is likely correct that Flanagan had a positive obligation to reveal the location of the body to law enforcement officers, (see OCGA § 16-10-50; compare People v. Meredith, 631 P2d 46 (Cal. 1981)), it does not follow of necessity that | 1 | 1 |
Corson v. Hamesgreen2 sentences1982See Corson v. Hames, 239 Ga. 534 ( 238 SE2d 75 ). 1982See Corson v. Hames, 239 Ga. 534 ( 238 SE2d 75 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mikell v. State
green
2 sentences2014Citing Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 722 ( 690 SE2d 858 ) (2010), the State argues that the error in the trial court’s charge did not violate Easter’s due process rights, as it was cured by the trial court’s instruction that the State bore the burden of proving “every material allegation in the Bill of Indictment... beyond a reasonable doubt” and by providing the jury with a copy of the indictment. 2014Citing Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 722 ( 690 SE2d 858 ) (2010), the State argues that the error in the trial court’s charge did not violate Easter’s due process rights, as it was cured by the trial court’s instruction that the State bore the burden of proving “every material allegation in the Bill of Indictment... beyond a reasonable doubt” and by providing the jury with a copy of the indictment. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
1 sentence2016Stoica’s motion to suppress citedMcNeely, 133 SCt 1552 , upon which Williams relied, and “was sufficient to put the [S]tate on notice that the seizure of his blood . . . was at issue and that it was necessary to present evidence to justify the warrantless search.” Bailey, 338 Ga. App. at 432 (2) (a). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Williams v. State
green
1 sentence2016Although the State argues that the analysis in Williams, 296 Ga. 817 , is inapplicable because the opinion was issued after Stoica *488 was convicted, “[u]nder the pipeline rule, ... a new rule of criminal procedure will be applied to pending cases, so long as the issue was preserved for appellate review.” Bailey v. State, 338 Ga. App. 428, 432 (2) (a) ( 790 SE2d 98 ) (2016). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Glover v. State
green
1 sentence2015That the agreement was silent as to the specific sentences for each of the charges, in the absence of any agreement that any of the charges would be dropped or reduced, does not render the agreement unenforceable.11 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 582 SE2d 13 ) (2003), citing Glover, 258 Ga. App. at 529 ; Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 135 (1) ( 570 SE2d 437 ) (2002); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (b) ( 501 SE2d 562 ) (1998). 10 Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 834 (2) ( 681 SE2d 263 ) (2009). 11 The State argues that defense counsel’s con | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Edgell v. State
green
1 sentence2010And in this case, the officer did not even testify that these signs made him fear for his safety or suspect Molina might be dangerous, only that they gave him “a little bit of a heightened state of awareness.” The State argues that the analysis differs somewhat in this case from similar cases in which we have held the State failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome a motion to suppress, such as Milby v. State, supra, 258 Ga. App. at 431, and Edgell v. State, supra, 253 Ga. App. at 775 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Harris v. State
green
2 sentences1989However, the Georgia Supreme Court aban *419 doned the rule espoused by the State and held that a defendant’s “failure to exhaust his peremptory strikes before the twelfth juror was impaneled does not render the error [the trial court’s refusal to strike an unqualified juror] harmless.” Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 464 (2) ( 339 SE2d 712 ) (1986). 1989However, the Georgia Supreme Court aban *419 doned the rule espoused by the State and held that a defendant’s “failure to exhaust his peremptory strikes before the twelfth juror was impaneled does not render the error [the trial court’s refusal to strike an unqualified juror] harmless.” Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 464 (2) ( 339 SE2d 712 ) (1986). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Satterfield v. State
green
2 sentences1985The state argues that this rule is inapplicable here since the felony murder and the underlying felony were committed on different victims, citing Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. 538 ( 285 SE2d 3 ) (1981). 1985The state argues that this rule is inapplicable here since the felony murder and the underlying felony were committed on different victims, citing Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. 538 ( 285 SE2d 3 ) (1981). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Waller v. Florida
green
1 sentence1979In Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387 (90 SC 1184, 25 LE2d 435) (1970) the Supreme Court considered the asserted power of two courts within one state to place the accused on trial for the same alleged crime. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.