State argues claim in Nebraska

2025KRUGER Cite as 320 Neb. 361 circumstances of the incident, and their testimony at times was inconsistent with prior statements they had given. 103 The State argues that this claim is meritless because the witnesses’ testimony was largely consistent with Kruger’s own testimony, and their testimony provided strong corroboration of the fact that Kruger’s father consistently aggressed against Kruger, that Kruger did not aggress against his father, and, ultimately, that Kruger did not stab his father.

2025KRUGER Cite as 320 Neb. 361 circumstances of the incident, and their testimony at times was inconsistent with prior statements they had given. 103 The State argues that this claim is meritless because the witnesses’ testimony was largely consistent with Kruger’s own testimony, and their testimony provided strong corroboration of the fact that Kruger’s father consistently aggressed against Kruger, that Kruger did not aggress against his father, and, ultimately, that Kruger did not stab his father.

2026Although the State acknowledges that State v. Nelson, 318 Neb. 484 , 16 N.W.3d 883 (2025), requires credit for time served to be applied to the aggregate of all terms imposed, the State argues that this error does not rise to the level of plain error, noting: For an appellate court to find plain error, the error must be plainly evident from the record, and it must be such that it prejudicially affects a litigant’s substantial right and, if uncorrected, would result in damage to the integrity reputation, and fairness of the judicial process.

2026Flores argues that the district court did not make an individ- ualized sentencing decision as required by section § 28‑105.02 36 State v. Jones, 318 Neb. 840 , 19 N.W.3d 499 (2025). 37 State v. Ezell, supra note 17 . - 298 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. FLORES Cite as 321 Neb. 284 because it stated on the record, “I think it’s important to remember when I impose a sentence[,] which is going to be the same sentence that I gave to [White].” The State argues that the factors listed under § 28‑105.02(2) were included in the forensic evaluation of Flores, whic

2026Flores argues that the district court did not make an individ- ualized sentencing decision as required by section § 28‑105.02 36 State v. Jones, 318 Neb. 840 , 19 N.W.3d 499 (2025). 37 State v. Ezell, supra note 17 . - 298 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. FLORES Cite as 321 Neb. 284 because it stated on the record, “I think it’s important to remember when I impose a sentence[,] which is going to be the same sentence that I gave to [White].” The State argues that the factors listed under § 28‑105.02(2) were included in the forensic evaluation of Flores, whic

2025State v. Cox, 314 Neb. 104 , 989 N.W.2d 65 (2023).

2025State v. Cox, 314 Neb. 104 , 989 N.W.2d 65 (2023).

2023First, it contends the Legislature intended to treat DUI/serious bodily injury and motor 8 See Blockburger, supra note 3 . 9 Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S. Ct. 250 , 56 L.

2023First, it contends the Legislature intended to treat DUI/serious bodily injury and motor 8 See Blockburger, supra note 3 . 9 Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S. Ct. 250 , 56 L.

2022Alternatively, the State argues that the claim “has not been stated with sufficient speci- ficity to preserve it.” Id. [23,24] In State v. Abdullah, 289 Neb. 123, 133 , 853 N.W.2d 858 , 866 (2014), the Supreme Court clarified that ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal must be presented “with enough particularity for (1) an appellate court to make a determination of whether the claim can be decided upon the - 87 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 31 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. ROEBUCK Cite as 31 Neb.

2021The State argues that the rule in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 , 104 S. Ct. 3194 , 82 L.

2021The State argues that the rule in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 , 104 S. Ct. 3194 , 82 L.

2015The State argues that violation of § 28-813.01 is a “general intent” crime and that the Court of Appeals inaccurately classified it as a “specific intent” crime.7 The State is con- cerned that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 28-813.01 requires the State to prove, in a child pornography case, that the defendant intentionally “sought out” child pornography and “exclude[s] from the statute’s reach any person who comes into possession of child pornography unintentionally but nevertheless decides to keep it.”8 6 State v. Lasu, 278 Neb. 180 , 768 N.W.2d 447 (2009). 7 Memorandum brief for a

2015The State argues that violation of § 28-813.01 is a “general intent” crime and that the Court of Appeals inaccurately classified it as a “specific intent” crime.7 The State is con- cerned that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 28-813.01 requires the State to prove, in a child pornography case, that the defendant intentionally “sought out” child pornography and “exclude[s] from the statute’s reach any person who comes into possession of child pornography unintentionally but nevertheless decides to keep it.”8 6 State v. Lasu, 278 Neb. 180 , 768 N.W.2d 447 (2009). 7 Memorandum brief for a

2015The State argues that violation of § 28-813.01 is a “general intent” crime and that the Court of Appeals inaccurately classified it as a “specific intent” crime.7 The State is con- cerned that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 28-813.01 requires the State to prove, in a child pornography case, that the defendant intentionally “sought out” child pornography and “exclude[s] from the statute’s reach any person who comes into possession of child pornography unintentionally but nevertheless decides to keep it.”8 6 State v. Lasu, 278 Neb. 180 , 768 N.W.2d 447 (2009). 7 Memorandum brief for a

2014The State argues that this claim is not cognizable in state habeas proceedings, citing State v. Kuehn, 258 Neb. 558 , 604 N.W.2d 420 (2000).

2014The State argues that this claim is not cognizable in state habeas proceedings, citing State v. Kuehn, 258 Neb. 558 , 604 N.W.2d 420 (2000).

2000In State v. Salamon, 241 Neb. 878 , 491 N.W.2d 690 (1992), we held that testimony by an officer concerning the victim’s out-of-court assertion that the defendant was the robber was hearsay and erroneously admitted.

2000In State v. Salamon, 241 Neb. 878 , 491 N.W.2d 690 (1992), we held that testimony by an officer concerning the victim’s out-of-court assertion that the defendant was the robber was hearsay and erroneously admitted.

1987That language appears in State v. Longa, 211 Neb. 356 , 318 N.W.2d 733 (1982), in a quotation from United States v. *326 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 64 L.

1987That language appears in State v. Longa, 211 Neb. 356 , 318 N.W.2d 733 (1982), in a quotation from United States v. *326 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 64 L.

1987That language appears in State v. Longa, 211 Neb. 356 , 318 N.W.2d 733 (1982), in a quotation from United States v. *326 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 64 L.

1987That language appears in State v. Longa, 211 Neb. 356 , 318 N.W.2d 733 (1982), in a quotation from United States v. *326 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 64 L.