canvass defense in Connecticut

2016Justice Palmer, writing for the court, explained in Holness that "[t]o conclude otherwise would require the trial court to canvass defense counsel with respect to counsel's understanding of the relevant constitutional principles before accepting counsel's agreement on how to proceed ... [and] there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement." 14 State v. Holness , supra, 289 Conn. at 544 , 958 A.2d 754 .

2016Justice Palmer, writing for the court, explained in Holness that "[t]o conclude otherwise would require the trial court to canvass defense counsel with respect to counsel's understanding of the relevant constitutional principles before accepting counsel's agreement on how to proceed ... [and] there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement." 14 State v. Holness , supra, 289 Conn. at 544 , 958 A.2d 754 .

2025Nor does the defendant claim that the availability requirement means something different under Whelan than it does under the confrontation clause. 24 JUNE, 2025 352 Conn. 183 State v. Hinton Whelan, asking, ‘‘[u]nder State v. Whelan, anything?’’ Rather than arguing that Rivera’s lack of recollection rendered him functionally unavailable for cross-exami- nation, defense counsel agreed to the admission of the videos into evidence, responding that, ‘‘[u]nder that [ground], no, Your Honor,’’ and, ‘‘[n]o objection.’’ The court, again on its own initiative, confirmed that defense counsel did not obj

2023To demand more would require the trial court to canvass defense counsel with respect to counsel’s understanding of the relevant constitutional principles before accepting counsel’s agreement on how to proceed . . . [and] there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Culbreath, 340 Conn. 167 , 181-82, 263 A.3d 350 (2021); see State v. Bellamy, supra, 323 Conn. 418-19.

2023To demand more would require the trial court to canvass defense counsel with respect to counsel’s understanding of the relevant constitutional principles before accepting counsel’s agreement on how to proceed . . . [and] there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Culbreath, 340 Conn. 167 , 181-82, 263 A.3d 350 (2021); see State v. Bellamy, supra, 323 Conn. 418-19.

2023Nevertheless, ‘‘when the law governing a defendant’s constitutional claim has changed after the defendant’s trial, counsel acting under binding precedent in effect at the time of the trial cannot make a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights affected by the later decision changing the law.’’ State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174 , 188-89, 283 A.3d 477 (2022).

2023Nevertheless, ‘‘when the law governing a defendant’s constitutional claim has changed after the defendant’s trial, counsel acting under binding precedent in effect at the time of the trial cannot make a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights affected by the later decision changing the law.’’ State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174 , 188-89, 283 A.3d 477 (2022).

2016The respondent claims, and the Appellate Court concluded, that application of the three part test for nonretroactive application of judicial decisions discussed in Neyland v. Board of Education , 195 Conn. 174 , 179, 487 A.2d 181 (1985), 7 compels retroactive application of the canvass rule to the present case.

2016The respondent claims, and the Appellate Court concluded, that application of the three part test for nonretroactive application of judicial decisions discussed in Neyland v. Board of Education , 195 Conn. 174 , 179, 487 A.2d 181 (1985), 7 compels retroactive application of the canvass rule to the present case.

2016This court also stated that the burden is on the respondent to show the harm of a noncompliant canvass. 13 Id., at 63 , 141 A.3d 1000 .

2016In doing so, this court addressed the contours of what constitutes compliance with the canvass rule: "Although this was not the procedure envisioned by our Supreme Court, and, accordingly should be avoided, if any concerns arose regarding the respondent's understanding of his trial rights, the trial court could have reopened the evidence to allow for additional proceedings if necessary." Id., at 64 , 141 A.3d 1000 .

2016This court also stated that the burden is on the respondent to show the harm of a noncompliant canvass ." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Raymond B. , supra, 166 Conn.App. at 867 , 142 A.3d 475 .

2016This court also stated that the burden is on the respondent to show the harm of a noncompliant canvass ." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Raymond B. , supra, 166 Conn.App. at 867 , 142 A.3d 475 .

2016The court observed that, "[t]he canvass rule helps ensure that a plea is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, but the requirement that plea be knowing, voluntary and intelligent represents an independent constitutional imperative, regardless whether the specific canvass rule is required." (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 384 .

2016The court observed that, ‘‘[t]he canvass rule helps ensure that a plea is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, but the requirement that plea be knowing, voluntary and intelligent repre- sents an independent constitutional imperative, regard- less whether the specific canvass rule is required.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 384 .

2008For good reason, there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement. 8 Accordingly, the defendant cannot prevail on his claim under Crawford because that claim has been waived as a result of *545 defense counsel’s agreement with the trial court’s limiting instruction. 9 II The defendant next contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the trial court permitted the state to introduce into evidence Smith’s prior inconsistent statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2008For good reason, there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement. 8 Accordingly, the defendant cannot prevail on his claim under Crawford because that claim has been waived as a result of *545 defense counsel’s agreement with the trial court’s limiting instruction. 9 II The defendant next contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the trial court permitted the state to introduce into evidence Smith’s prior inconsistent statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2008For good reason, there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement. 8 Accordingly, the defendant cannot prevail on his claim under Crawford because that claim has been waived as a result of *545 defense counsel’s agreement with the trial court’s limiting instruction. 9 II The defendant next contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the trial court permitted the state to introduce into evidence Smith’s prior inconsistent statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2008For good reason, there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement. 8 Accordingly, the defendant cannot prevail on his claim under Crawford because that claim has been waived as a result of *545 defense counsel’s agreement with the trial court’s limiting instruction. 9 II The defendant next contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the trial court permitted the state to introduce into evidence Smith’s prior inconsistent statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2008For good reason, there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement. 8 Accordingly, the defendant cannot prevail on his claim under Crawford because that claim has been waived as a result of *545 defense counsel’s agreement with the trial court’s limiting instruction. 9 II The defendant next contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the trial court permitted the state to introduce into evidence Smith’s prior inconsistent statement under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.