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16 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc.green1 sentence2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodation to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, "[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiff's claim in the present | 1 | 1 |
Sastrom v. Psychiatric Security Review Boardgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present 2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present | 1 | 1 |
Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc.green2 sentences2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present 2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garnergreen2 sentences2005See State v. Garner, 270 Conn. 458, 468-69 , 853 A.2d 478 (2004). “[I]t is well established that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate to a challenge under the due process clause .... 2005See State v. Garner, 270 Conn. 458, 468-69 , 853 A.2d 478 (2004). “[I]t is well established that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate to a challenge under the due process clause .... | 1 | 1 |
State v. Morrillgreen2 sentences1986See, e.g., State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 542 , 498 A.2d 76 (1985). 1986See, e.g., State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 542 , 498 A.2d 76 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Springdale Donuts, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
2 sentences2000A necessary predicate to this rule of construction, however, is a determination that the terms of the insurance policy are indeed ambiguous. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Springdale Donuts, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co. , 247 Conn. 801 , 805-06 , 724 A.2d 1117 (1999). 2000A necessary predicate to this rule of construction, however, is a determination that the terms of the insurance policy are indeed ambiguous. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Springdale Donuts, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co. , 247 Conn. 801 , 805-06 , 724 A.2d 1117 (1999). | 5 | 2000–2002 |
State v. Holliman
green
2 sentences2026Even if the defendant is correct that the police had an oppor- tunity to attempt to obtain an identification prior to the time that DeSantis shared the newspaper article with Mongero, such inaction by the state did not taint the identification that occurred by means of a private actor. “[I]t is well established that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate to a challenge under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution.” Id., 45 . 2002C First Identification The defendant claims that Robinson's identification as the defendant was being led out of 300 Winthrop Avenue "was the product of an impermissible show-up identification procedure. . . ." (Defendant's Motion, p. 1.) Specifically, the defendant contends that once the police laid their hands upon him, they committed an impermissible state action that violated his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. "[I]t is well established that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate to a challenge under | 3 | 2000–2026 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2008If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 59 Conn. App. 762, 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001). “ [E]ven if the defendant’s claim has no constitutional underpinning, [however,] the criteria established for determining the admissibility of identifications in the due process context are appropriate guidelines by which to determine the admissibil 2005If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 59 Conn. App. 762, 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001). | 3 | 2002–2008 |
State v. Lockhart
green
2 sentences2008If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 59 Conn. App. 762, 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001). “ [E]ven if the defendant’s claim has no constitutional underpinning, [however,] the criteria established for determining the admissibility of identifications in the due process context are appropriate guidelines by which to determine the admissibil 2005If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 59 Conn. App. 762, 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001). | 3 | 2002–2008 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2008If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 59 Conn. App. 762, 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001). “ [E]ven if the defendant’s claim has no constitutional underpinning, [however,] the criteria established for determining the admissibility of identifications in the due process context are appropriate guidelines by which to determine the admissibil 2008If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 59 Conn. App. 762, 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001). “ [E]ven if the defendant’s claim has no constitutional underpinning, [however,] the criteria established for determining the admissibility of identifications in the due process context are appropriate guidelines by which to determine the admissibil | 3 | 2002–2008 |
Kelly v. Figueiredo
green
2 sentences1997Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 770 , 653 A.2d 122 (1995). “ ‘A necessary predicate to this rule of construction, however, is a determination that the terms of the [exclusion clause] are indeed ambiguous.’ ” Kelly v. Figueiredo, 223 Conn. 31, 37 , 610 A.2d 1296 (1992). 1997Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 770 , 653 A.2d 122 (1995). “ ‘A necessary predicate to this rule of construction, however, is a determination that the terms of the [exclusion clause] are indeed ambiguous.’ ” Kelly v. Figueiredo, 223 Conn. 31, 37 , 610 A.2d 1296 (1992). | 2 | 1997–1999 |
State v. Miranda
green
2 sentences2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present 2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co.
green
2 sentences2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present 2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Miranda
green
2 sentences2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present 2010See, e.g., Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403-404 , 944 A.2d 925 (2008) (addressing question of whether provision of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., imposes same duty on employers to provide reasonable accommoda tion to disabled individuals that is required under federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., despite fact that parties were in agreement for purposes of appeal that same duty applied, “[b]ecause this question is an essential predicate to our analysis of the plaintiffs claim in the present | 1 | 2010–2010 |
O'Brien v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
green
1 sentence2002The fact that the parties advocate different meanings of the [insurance policy] does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." See also; QSP, Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343 , 351-52 (2001); O'Brien v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 235 Conn. 837 , 842-43 (1996). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
1 sentence2002The fact that the parties advocate different meanings of the [insurance policy] does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." See also; QSP, Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343 , 351-52 (2001); O'Brien v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 235 Conn. 837 , 842-43 (1996). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2000The due process clause requires the exclusion of evidence concerning a pretrial identification when the identification procedure used “was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of an irreparable misidentification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, 178 Conn. 287, 291 , 422 A.2d 323 (1979). 2 “[I]t is well established that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate to a challenge under the due process clause . . . .” State v. Holliman, 214 Conn. 38, 45 , 570 A.2d 680 (1990). 2000The due process clause requires the exclusion of evidence concerning a pretrial identification when the identification procedure used “was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of an irreparable misidentification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, 178 Conn. 287, 291 , 422 A.2d 323 (1979). 2 “[I]t is well established that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate to a challenge under the due process clause . . . .” State v. Holliman, 214 Conn. 38, 45 , 570 A.2d 680 (1990). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1997Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 770 , 653 A.2d 122 (1995). “ ‘A necessary predicate to this rule of construction, however, is a determination that the terms of the [exclusion clause] are indeed ambiguous.’ ” Kelly v. Figueiredo, 223 Conn. 31, 37 , 610 A.2d 1296 (1992). 1997Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 770 , 653 A.2d 122 (1995). “ ‘A necessary predicate to this rule of construction, however, is a determination that the terms of the [exclusion clause] are indeed ambiguous.’ ” Kelly v. Figueiredo, 223 Conn. 31, 37 , 610 A.2d 1296 (1992). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1991Hammer v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 583-84 , 573 A.2d 699 (1990). 1991Hammer v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 583-84 , 573 A.2d 699 (1990). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.