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16 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Quakenbush v. Lackeygreen2 sentences2025Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3 (a)(8) (“Section 3(a)(8)”). [18] The immunity provided by Section 3(a)(8) “extends well beyond ‘traditional law enforcement activities such as the arrest or pursuit of suspects by police.’” Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. 1994) (quoting Quakenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284 1287 n.3 (Ind. 1993)). 2006Our opinion expressly notes the statutory duty regarding the operation of emergency vehicles and explains that the ITCA’s law enforcement immunity does not apply to a police officer who, “having decided to respond to the report of a law being broken, ... owes a duty of driving with reasonable care to other travelers on the highway.” Id. at 1290 . | 1 | 4 |
Tittle v. Mahangreen2 sentences2001In Tittle, the court explained that by enacting the ITCA's law enforcement immunity provision, the legislature intended to include "only those activities attendant to effecting the arrest of those who may have broken the law." Id. at 801 . 1992In Tittle v. Mahan (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 796 , and City of Wakarusa v. Holdeman (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 802 , our supreme court sharply limited the scope of the law enforcement exception to the Indiana Tort Claims Act holding that "unless the injuries for which a plaintiff seeks recovery arose out of the actual attempts to effect an arrest ... there is no immunity to be found in Section 3(7) [of the Tort Claims Act]." City of Wakarusa, supra, at 803 (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
Patrick v. Miressogreen2 sentences2026Our supreme court has made clear that the law enforcement immunity provision in INDIANA CODE § 34-13-3-3(a)(8) “does not shield governmental entities and personnel from liability resulting from a breach of the statutory duty [in INDIANA CODE § 9-21-1-8(d)(1)] to operate emergency vehicles with due regard for the safety of all persons.” Patrick, 848 N.E.2d at 1087 (internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted). 2020However, the City’s officers were never able to get Keith to the point where he was medically stable enough to be incarcerated in the Johnson County jail as he had three medical emergency situations after his arrest that necessitated that he be taken to the hospital. [18] In Patrick v. Miresso, 848 N.E.2d 1083 (Ind. 2006), our Supreme Court held that the ITCA’s law enforcement immunity “does not shield governmental entities and personnel from liability resulting from a breach of the statutory duty to operate emergency vehicles ‘with due regard for the safety of all persons.’” Id. at 1087 (quot | 1 | 2 |
Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bendgreen1 sentence2025Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3 (a)(8) (“Section 3(a)(8)”). [18] The immunity provided by Section 3(a)(8) “extends well beyond ‘traditional law enforcement activities such as the arrest or pursuit of suspects by police.’” Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. 1994) (quoting Quakenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284 1287 n.3 (Ind. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Bushong v. Williamsongreen1 sentence2025Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). “[G]overnmental liability for tortious conduct is the rule while immunity is the exception.” Ladra, 177 N.E.3d at 416. “‘The purpose of immunity is to ensure that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.’” Savieo v. City of New Haven, 824 N.E.2d 1272 , Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CT-1871 | March 12, 2025 Page 9 of 17 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting | 1 | 1 |
John W. Schoettmer & Karen Schoettmer v. Jolene C. Wright & South Central Community Action Program, Inc.green1 sentence2025Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). “[G]overnmental liability for tortious conduct is the rule while immunity is the exception.” Ladra, 177 N.E.3d at 416. “‘The purpose of immunity is to ensure that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.’” Savieo v. City of New Haven, 824 N.E.2d 1272 , Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CT-1871 | March 12, 2025 Page 9 of 17 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting | 1 | 1 |
Row v. Holtgreen1 sentence2010In reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment ruling, an appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court and thus affirms summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); see Row v. Holt, 864 N.E.2d 1011, 1013 (Ind.2007). | 1 | 1 |
King Ex Rel. King v. Northeast Security, Inc.green1 sentence2004Our supreme court recently stated that case law has held that the [Act] expresses a legislative policy to protect the State's finances and also to ensure "'that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment."" King v. Northeast Security, Inc., 790 N.E.2d 474, 483 (Ind.2003) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Belding v. Town of New Whitelandgreen1 sentence1994See Kemezy v. Peters (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1296, 1297 (legislature intended that immunity be conferred “only when the plaintiff seeks recovery for the breach of a public duty, but provides no refuge to governmental entities or their employees for the breach of a private duty”); Fries v. Fincher (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1294, 1295 (immunity for law enforcement officer discharging public duty to enforce law, but no immunity for breach of private duty “to use ordinary care under the circumstances while traveling on a public roadway”); Belding v. Town of New Whiteland (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1 | 1 | 1 |
Fries v. Finchergreen1 sentence1994See Kemezy v. Peters (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1296, 1297 (legislature intended that immunity be conferred “only when the plaintiff seeks recovery for the breach of a public duty, but provides no refuge to governmental entities or their employees for the breach of a private duty”); Fries v. Fincher (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1294, 1295 (immunity for law enforcement officer discharging public duty to enforce law, but no immunity for breach of private duty “to use ordinary care under the circumstances while traveling on a public roadway”); Belding v. Town of New Whiteland (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1 | 1 | 1 |
Kemezy v. Petersgreen1 sentence1994See Kemezy v. Peters (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1296, 1297 (legislature intended that immunity be conferred “only when the plaintiff seeks recovery for the breach of a public duty, but provides no refuge to governmental entities or their employees for the breach of a private duty”); Fries v. Fincher (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1294, 1295 (immunity for law enforcement officer discharging public duty to enforce law, but no immunity for breach of private duty “to use ordinary care under the circumstances while traveling on a public roadway”); Belding v. Town of New Whiteland (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1 | 1 | 1 |
City of Wakarusa v. Holdemangreen2 sentences1992In Tittle v. Mahan (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 796 , and City of Wakarusa v. Holdeman (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 802 , our supreme court sharply limited the scope of the law enforcement exception to the Indiana Tort Claims Act holding that "unless the injuries for which a plaintiff seeks recovery arose out of the actual attempts to effect an arrest ... there is no immunity to be found in Section 3(7) [of the Tort Claims Act]." City of Wakarusa, supra, at 803 (emphasis added). 1992In Tittle v. Mahan (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 796 , and City of Wakarusa v. Holdeman (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 802 , our supreme court sharply limited the scope of the law enforcement exception to the Indiana Tort Claims Act holding that "unless the injuries for which a plaintiff seeks recovery arose out of the actual attempts to effect an arrest ... there is no immunity to be found in Section 3(7) [of the Tort Claims Act]." City of Wakarusa, supra, at 803 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rendleman
green
2 sentences2017In holding that the law enforcement immunity section of the Act was a constitutional exercise of legislative authority, the Court stated: “That [the law enforcement immunity section] may result in Rendleman bearing the full economic burden of his injuries and damages without the ability to insure himself against such losses, is a matter of policy for the legislature, not this Court, to address.” Id. 2015Id. | 2 | 2015–2017 |
City of Valparaiso v. Edgecomb
green
2 sentences1992The supreme court repeated its interpretation of the law enforcement exception about three months later in City of Valparaiso v. Edgecomb (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 96 . 1992The supreme court repeated its interpretation of the law enforcement exception about three months later in City of Valparaiso v. Edgecomb (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 96 . | 2 | 1992–1993 |
City of Indianapolis v. Earl
green
2 sentences2026Indeed, “a governmental unit and its police officer are not immune from liability for injuries caused by the officer’s negligent operation of [a] police vehicle while pursuing a fleeing suspect.” Earl, 960 N.E.2d at 870 (citing Patrick, 848 N.E.2d at 1084 ). [67] In Earl, an Indianapolis police officer engaged in a high speed chase with a suspect. 2026Relying on those cases, our Court explained the law enforcement immunity provision in INDIANA CODE § 34-13-3-3 did “not act as blanket immunity, and the issue of whether [the officer] acted ‘with due regard for the safety of all persons’ is one for the trier of fact to decide after taking into consideration the totality of the facts.” Earl, 960 N.E.2d at 870 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Savieo v. City of New Haven
green
1 sentence2025Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). “[G]overnmental liability for tortious conduct is the rule while immunity is the exception.” Ladra, 177 N.E.3d at 416. “‘The purpose of immunity is to ensure that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.’” Savieo v. City of New Haven, 824 N.E.2d 1272 , Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CT-1871 | March 12, 2025 Page 9 of 17 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Benton v. City of Oakland City
green
1 sentence2006The appellants’ brief does not, however, challenge or even discuss Quakenbush , which is mentioned only in their reply brief, where they declare that the rationale of Quakenbush “was abandoned in Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.1999).” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Seymour National Bank v. State
green
1 sentence2005The Quakenbush court noted that the first case interpreting the ITCA's law enforcement immunity provision was Seymour National Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind.1981), modified on reh'g, 428 N.E.2d 203 , in which a state trooper collided with a vehicle while pursuing a car that had fled from a traffic stop. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Seymour National Bank v. State
red
1 sentence2005The Quakenbush court noted that the first case interpreting the ITCA's law enforcement immunity provision was Seymour National Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind.1981), modified on reh'g, 428 N.E.2d 203 , in which a state trooper collided with a vehicle while pursuing a car that had fled from a traffic stop. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Patrick v. Miresso
green
1 sentence2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
McFarlin v. State
green
2 sentences1992The Tittle court further explained that the dicta contained in Seymour was the basis for a number of cases decided by this court which expanded the law enforcement exception to such a degree that Judge Sullivan's statement in McFarlin v. State (1988), Ind.App., 524 N.E.2d 807 , "to the effect that any action taken by a law enforcement official within the scope of his employment is immune [from suit]," appeared to be an accurate assessment of the state of the law. 1992The Tittle court further explained that the dicta contained in Seymour was the basis for a number of cases decided by this court which expanded the law enforcement exception to such a degree that Judge Sullivan's statement in McFarlin v. State (1988), Ind. App., 524 N.E.2d 807 , "to the effect that any action taken by a law enforcement official within the scope of his employment is immune [from suit]," appeared to be an accurate assessment of the state of the law. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.