law enforcement exception in California

2014The Invasion of Privacy Act, enacted in 1967 13 (Stats. 1967, ch. 1509, p. 3584, § 1), regulates wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, and prohibits the electronic eavesdropping or recording of any “confidential communication” absent consent of all parties to the communication.4 (Kight v. CashCall, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1388 ; People v. Chavez (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1148 .) With specified exceptions, the statute bars admission of any recorded confidential communication in a judicial proceeding. (§ 632, subd. (d).) Two exceptions are pertinent here: the law enforcement exce

2014The Invasion of Privacy Act, enacted in 1967 13 (Stats. 1967, ch. 1509, p. 3584, § 1), regulates wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, and prohibits the electronic eavesdropping or recording of any “confidential communication” absent consent of all parties to the communication.4 (Kight v. CashCall, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1388 ; People v. Chavez (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1148 .) With specified exceptions, the statute bars admission of any recorded confidential communication in a judicial proceeding. (§ 632, subd. (d).) Two exceptions are pertinent here: the law enforcement exce

2014The Invasion of Privacy Act, enacted in 1967 13 (Stats. 1967, ch. 1509, p. 3584, § 1), regulates wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, and prohibits the electronic eavesdropping or recording of any “confidential communication” absent consent of all parties to the communication.4 (Kight v. CashCall, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1388 ; People v. Chavez (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1148 .) With specified exceptions, the statute bars admission of any recorded confidential communication in a judicial proceeding. (§ 632, subd. (d).) Two exceptions are pertinent here: the law enforcement exce

2014The Invasion of Privacy Act, enacted in 1967 13 (Stats. 1967, ch. 1509, p. 3584, § 1), regulates wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, and prohibits the electronic eavesdropping or recording of any “confidential communication” absent consent of all parties to the communication.4 (Kight v. CashCall, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1388 ; People v. Chavez (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1148 .) With specified exceptions, the statute bars admission of any recorded confidential communication in a judicial proceeding. (§ 632, subd. (d).) Two exceptions are pertinent here: the law enforcement exce

2006The Privacy Act Includes an Exception for Law Enforcement Practices That Were Lawful When the Act Became Effective Section 633, the law enforcement exception, provides that section 631 does not prohibit law enforcement officers from overhearing or recording any communication they could lawfully overhear or record before November 8, 1967, the effective date of the Privacy Act. 5 (People v. Carbonie (1975) 48 *890 Cal.App.3d 679, 684 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 831 ].) In order to faithfully construe the law enforcement exemption then, we must consider what was lawful before the effective date of the act.

2006The Privacy Act Includes an Exception for Law Enforcement Practices that Were Lawful When the Act Became Effective Section 633, the law enforcement exception, provides that section 631 does not prohibit law enforcement officers from overhearing or recording any communication they could lawfully overhear or record before November 8, 1967, the effective date of the Privacy Act. [5] ( People v. Carbonie (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 679, 684 , 121 Cal. Rptr. 831 .) In order to faithfully construe the law enforcement exemption, then, we must consider what was lawful before the effective date of the act.

2026Conversely, where law enforcement is unwilling or unable to afford these protections and services, an injunction may lie.” (United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 566, 580 .) Here, the primary purpose for which Southern Counties wanted police assistance was the maintenance of timely ingress and egress of vehicles through its own and its customers’ facilities.

2026(Ralphs, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1113 .) The inclusion of the law enforcement requirement in the statute was, the court continued, “ ‘ “based upon a recognition of the fact that the preservation of order and the protection of property in labor disputes is in the first instance a police problem.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Our colleagues in Division Three, in interpreting subdivision (a)(5) of section 1138.1, have held: “[W]here law enforcement has been summoned, responds in a timely fashion, protects persons from injury and property from damage, and ensures ingress and egress to and from the premises, there

2015The court determined the law enforcement exception under section 633 applied even though Conroy used his home telephone and personal tape recorder to record the conversations, which occurred without a police officer present when a recording was made. ( Towery, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1126-1127.) The court noted it was reasonable to permit Conroy to make the recordings at home versus the police station because a sudden change in the telephone number might create suspicion.

2006As we discuss, a recording of a conversation of a pretrial detainee like Windham and the defendant in Kelley is lawful if the inmate consents. [3] Other circuits have relied on a law enforcement exception to Title III. ( 18 U.S.C. § 2510 , subd. (5)(a)(ii).) Those courts reason that when prison and jail officials monitor and record inmate calls pursuant to an established policy, they are law enforcement personnel acting within the ordinary scope of their duties. ( Smith v. U.S. Dept. of Justice (D.C.Cir.2001) 251 F.3d 1047, 1049-1050 ; United States v. Daniels (7th Cir.1990) 902 F.2d 1238, 124

2006As we discuss, a recording of a conversation of a pretrial detainee like Windham and the defendant in Kelley is lawful if the inmate consents. [3] Other circuits have relied on a law enforcement exception to Title III. ( 18 U.S.C. § 2510 , subd. (5)(a)(ii).) Those courts reason that when prison and jail officials monitor and record inmate calls pursuant to an established policy, they are law enforcement personnel acting within the ordinary scope of their duties. ( Smith v. U.S. Dept. of Justice (D.C.Cir.2001) 251 F.3d 1047, 1049-1050 ; United States v. Daniels (7th Cir.1990) 902 F.2d 1238, 124

2006As we discuss, a recording of a conversation of a pretrial detainee like Windham and the defendant in Kelley is lawful if the inmate consents. [3] Other circuits have relied on a law enforcement exception to Title III. ( 18 U.S.C. § 2510 , subd. (5)(a)(ii).) Those courts reason that when prison and jail officials monitor and record inmate calls pursuant to an established policy, they are law enforcement personnel acting within the ordinary scope of their duties. ( Smith v. U.S. Dept. of Justice (D.C.Cir.2001) 251 F.3d 1047, 1049-1050 ; United States v. Daniels (7th Cir.1990) 902 F.2d 1238, 124

2002Under Title III, “[i]t shall not be unlawful . . . for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where . . . one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.” ( 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c).) “The legislative history of [Title III] shows that Congress intended the consent requirement to be construed broadly.” (U.S. v. Amen, supra, 831 F.2d at p. 378 ; see Sen.Rep.

2001The existence of a law enforcement purpose, including the purpose of gathering evidence against a suspect, is not sufficient to bring taping of phone conversations within the law enforcement exception. ( Bunnell v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1821 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 819 .) Here neither institutional security or protection of the public was advanced in justification of the interception—both of which I take to be encompassed within those "legitimate penological interests" presently described by Penal Code section 2600.

2001The existence of a law enforcement purpose, including the purpose of gathering evidence against a suspect, is not sufficient to bring taping of phone conversations within the law enforcement exception. ( Bunnell v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1821 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 819 .) Here neither institutional security or protection of the public was advanced in justification of the interception—both of which I take to be encompassed within those "legitimate penological interests" presently described by Penal Code section 2600.