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16 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Kincaidgreen2 sentences2025"We [also] summarize the trial evidence only to the extent relevant to the postverdict inquiry." Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 382 (2005).[4] 1. 2014See Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 386 (2005). 7 “A trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether a postverdict inquiry of a juror is warranted and is under no duty to conduct such an inquiry unless the defendant makes a ‘colorable showing’ that extraneous matters may have affected a juror’s impartiality.” Commonwealth v. Guisti, supra at 251 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra at 152 . “[T]here must be something more than mere speculation,” and here, the defendant has not provided any more. | 6 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Fidlergreen2 sentences2025Being fair and impartial requires that you can, and you will, put aside any experiences or anything you may have read, or heard, or thought about [the] relevant subject matter and that you will decide the facts of this case based solely on the evidence that will be presented in the trial of this case." [7] On appeal, the defendants do not directly challenge juror no. 15's failure to disclose her own prior experience with the law. [8] In Fidler, 377 Mass. at 201-204 , this court established the procedure by which a judge may conduct a postverdict inquiry into a juror's exposure to extraneous ma 2014Generally, a postverdict inquiry of a juror may be conducted only if the court finds that extraneous matters became part of the jury’s deliberations, Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 193 (1979), or where a reasonable basis of racial or ethnic prejudice, see Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97 (1991), or some other personal bias is raised, see Commonwealth v. Guisti , 434 Mass, at 253. | 5 | 9 |
Commonwealth v. Dixongreen2 sentences2014See Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 386 (2005). 7 “A trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether a postverdict inquiry of a juror is warranted and is under no duty to conduct such an inquiry unless the defendant makes a ‘colorable showing’ that extraneous matters may have affected a juror’s impartiality.” Commonwealth v. Guisti, supra at 251 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra at 152 . “[T]here must be something more than mere speculation,” and here, the defendant has not provided any more. 2014“Where a case is close, ... a judge should exercise discretion in favor of conducting a judicial inquiry.” Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Dixon, 395 Mass. 149, 153 (1985). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Laguergreen2 sentences2014Generally, a postverdict inquiry of a juror may be conducted only if the court finds that extraneous matters became part of the jury’s deliberations, Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 193 (1979), or where a reasonable basis of racial or ethnic prejudice, see Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97 (1991), or some other personal bias is raised, see Commonwealth v. Guisti , 434 Mass, at 253. 2001See Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97 (1991); Commonwealth v. Amirault, 399 Mass. 617, 625 (1987); Commonwealth v. Grant, 391 Mass. 645, 653 (1984). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Tavaresgreen2 sentences2021See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140 , 155 n.24, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982) ("The questioning of jurors prior to the verdict is no different from a postverdict inquiry and is governed by the same principles, including judicial supervision"). [Note 12] If a report is made, the judge may ask what statements were made, and if statements denoting racial or ethnic bias were made. 2005“There is no reason to give a judge’s finding of fact less weight in a postverdict context than we ordinarily would, i.e., we accept his finding unless clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Ciminera, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 101, 109 , S.C., 384 Mass. 807 (1981). “[A] finding of fact by the trial judge will not be deemed ‘clearly erroneous’ unless the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 156 , cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), quoting New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, | 1 | 2 |
Tavares v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2021See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140 , 155 n.24, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982) ("The questioning of jurors prior to the verdict is no different from a postverdict inquiry and is governed by the same principles, including judicial supervision"). [Note 12] If a report is made, the judge may ask what statements were made, and if statements denoting racial or ethnic bias were made. 2005“There is no reason to give a judge’s finding of fact less weight in a postverdict context than we ordinarily would, i.e., we accept his finding unless clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Ciminera, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 101, 109 , S.C., 384 Mass. 807 (1981). “[A] finding of fact by the trial judge will not be deemed ‘clearly erroneous’ unless the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 156 , cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), quoting New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Chatmangreen2 sentences2016See id. 2016The postverdict test, on the other hand, requires that the defendant establish “by a preponderance of the evidence that the Commonwealth would not have prevailed had the issue been raised at trial,” Chatman, 466 Mass. at 336 , meaning that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that, had the issue been raised before or during trial, the Commonwealth could not have proved either the first or the second prong of the competency test. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Guistigreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 386 (2005). 7 “A trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether a postverdict inquiry of a juror is warranted and is under no duty to conduct such an inquiry unless the defendant makes a ‘colorable showing’ that extraneous matters may have affected a juror’s impartiality.” Commonwealth v. Guisti, supra at 251 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra at 152 . “[T]here must be something more than mere speculation,” and here, the defendant has not provided any more. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Zinsergreen1 sentence2014Cf. Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 811-812 (2006). 7 If the defendant meets the burden of showing that the extraneous matter came to the jury’s attention, “the burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to show beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] was not prejudiced by the extraneous matter.” Commonwealth v. Fidler, supra at 201 . 8 In assessing the relationship between juror and witness, while the court could no doubt properly consider that Shapiro stated that he did not recognize the juror, that fact would not be dispositive of the juror’s possible familiarity with Shapiro. 9 T | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Womackgreen1 sentence2012It’s a serious situation.” The defendant’s reliance on cases such as Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 392 (2005), and Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 200-201 (1979), is misplaced, as those cases “involve a postverdict inquiry into a jury’s exposure to extraneous information during the jury deliberation process.” Commonwealth v. Womack, 457 Mass. 268, 280 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bresnahangreen1 sentence2012See Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 353, 364 (2011). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Caseygreen1 sentence2010His reliance on cases such as Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 392 (2005); Commonwealth v. Casey (No. 1), 442 Mass. 1, 5-6 (2004); and Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 200-201 (1979), is misplaced because they involve a postverdict inquiry into a jury’s exposure to extraneous information during the jury deliberation process. | 1 | 1 |
New England Canteen Service, Inc. v. Ashleygreen1 sentence2005“There is no reason to give a judge’s finding of fact less weight in a postverdict context than we ordinarily would, i.e., we accept his finding unless clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Ciminera, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 101, 109 , S.C., 384 Mass. 807 (1981). “[A] finding of fact by the trial judge will not be deemed ‘clearly erroneous’ unless the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 156 , cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), quoting New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Amiraultgreen2 sentences2001See Com monwealth v. Amirault, supra (postverdict hearing required if defendant raises “reasonable claim” of juror bias). 2001See Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97 (1991); Commonwealth v. Amirault, 399 Mass. 617, 625 (1987); Commonwealth v. Grant, 391 Mass. 645, 653 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Grantgreen1 sentence2001See Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97 (1991); Commonwealth v. Amirault, 399 Mass. 617, 625 (1987); Commonwealth v. Grant, 391 Mass. 645, 653 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. McCowen
green
1 sentence2025When the judge decided to simply reinstruct the jury, neither party objected. [16] We also reject the Commonwealth's suggestion that we remand the case to the Superior Court for a postverdict hearing pursuant to McCowen, 458 Mass. at 494-497 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Emanuel Barshov and James E. Ross
green
1 sentence2014Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra, quoting from United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 851 , cert denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Barshov v. United States
green
1 sentence2014Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra, quoting from United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 851 , cert denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Ciminera
neutral
1 sentence2005“There is no reason to give a judge’s finding of fact less weight in a postverdict context than we ordinarily would, i.e., we accept his finding unless clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Ciminera, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 101, 109 , S.C., 384 Mass. 807 (1981). “[A] finding of fact by the trial judge will not be deemed ‘clearly erroneous’ unless the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 156 , cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), quoting New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Commonwealth v. Ciminera
green
1 sentence2005“There is no reason to give a judge’s finding of fact less weight in a postverdict context than we ordinarily would, i.e., we accept his finding unless clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Ciminera, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 101, 109 , S.C., 384 Mass. 807 (1981). “[A] finding of fact by the trial judge will not be deemed ‘clearly erroneous’ unless the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 156 , cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), quoting New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.