16 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blake v. Stategreen2 sentences2018In evaluating a hostile work environment claim, "the trier of fact" must evaluate "all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id 123 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Blake v. State, 2005 ME 32, 19 , 868 A.2d 234 ("When analyzing a hostile work environment claim, the court must detem1ine whether the environment was subjectively abusive to the employee, and, in addition, w 2018In evaluating a hostile work environment claim, "the trier of fact" must evaluate "all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id 123 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Blake v. State, 2005 ME 32, 19 , 868 A.2d 234 ("When analyzing a hostile work environment claim, the court must detem1ine whether the environment was subjectively abusive to the employee, and, in addition, w | 2 | 3 |
Doyle v. Department of Human Servicesgreen2 sentences2010A hostile work environment claim requires an examination of "all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Doyle v. Dep' t ~f HIl771nll Servs., 2003 ME 61 , ~ 23, 824 A.2d 48, 56 (quotation marks omitted). 2010A hostile work environment claim requires an examination of "all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Doyle v. Dep' t ~f HIl771nll Servs., 2003 ME 61 , ~ 23, 824 A.2d 48, 56 (quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Faragher v. City of Boca Ratongreen2 sentences2018To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1 based on isolated incidents of harassment, such incidents must be "extreme" or "egregious," and the Supreme Court has cautioned that "simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment." Faragher v. City a/Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998); Ponte v. Steelcase, Inc., 741 F.3d 310,320 (1st Cir. 2014). 2001O’Rourke v. City of Providence, Nos. 99-2346, 00-1008, 2001 WL 8598, at *13 (1st Cir. Jan. 8, 2001) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-789 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20-23 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-73 (1986)). | 2 | 2 |
Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc.green2 sentences2009Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 395 (1st Cir.2002)). 4 [¶ 23] A hostile work environment claim requires an examination of “all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Doyle v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ¶ 23 , 824 A.2d 48, 56 (quotation marks omitted). 2005See Crowley, 303 F.3d at 395 ; O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 728 . | 2 | 2 |
Nadeau v. Rainbow Rugs, Inc.green2 sentences2005Nadeau v. Rainbow Rugs, Inc., 675 A.2d 973, 976 (Me.1996). [¶ 10] We have not yet addressed whether a hostile work environment claim can constitute an adverse employment action pursuant to the WPA, see Doyle, 2003 ME 61 , ¶ 24 n. 14, 824 A.2d at 57 . 2003Nadeau v. Rainbow Rugs, Inc., 675 A.2d 973, 976 (Me.1996) (involving a hostile work environment claim based upon one incident of sexual harassment brought pursuant to MHRA). *57 [¶ 24] Viewing the evidence properly presented in accordance with Rule 56 in the light most favorable to Doyle, the primary evidence for an actionable hostile work environment claim is Kiesow’s comment that Doyle should go to the restroom because Kiesow did not want to “clean it up.” According to Doyle, this comment was offensive and caused her anguish. | 2 | 2 |
Watt v. UniFirst Corp.green2 sentences2017In reviewing the :tvIHRC's interpretation of this rule, the Law Court upheld the standard that employers are liable for co-worker sexual harassment under a hostile work environment claim when "the employer knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action." 1 Watt, 2009 ME 47 , <_[[ 27. 2010Hostile Work Environment "A hostile work environment claim requires an examination of 'all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'" Watt, 2009 ME 47 , <f[ 23, 969 A.2d 897, 903 (quoting Doyle v. Dept of Human Servs., 2003 NIE 61, <f[ 23, 824 A.2d 48,56 (citation omitted)). | 1 | 4 |
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.green2 sentences2005When determining whether a hostile work environment claim exists, the court must “look to ‘all *238 the circumstances,’ including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ ” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 , 114 S.Ct. 367 , 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal quotations omitted)). [¶ 9] The type of harassment shown must be “severe enough to cause the workplace to become hostile or abusive.” Do 2005When determining whether a hostile work environment claim exists, the court must “look to ‘all *238 the circumstances,’ including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ ” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 , 114 S.Ct. 367 , 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal quotations omitted)). [¶ 9] The type of harassment shown must be “severe enough to cause the workplace to become hostile or abusive.” Do | 1 | 2 |
Julia M. O'ROuRke v. City of Providencegreen2 sentences2005See Crowley, 303 F.3d at 395 ; O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 728 . 2001O’Rourke v. City of Providence, Nos. 99-2346, 00-1008, 2001 WL 8598, at *13 (1st Cir. Jan. 8, 2001) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-789 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20-23 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-73 (1986)). | 1 | 2 |
Rother v. NYS Department of Corrections & Community Supervisiongreen1 sentence2018Rother v. NYS DOCCS, 970 F. Supp. 2d 78, 93 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) ("the standard for constructive discharge is even higher than that required to prevail on a hostile work environment claim.") "In order for a resignation to constitute a constructive discharge, it must be 'void of choice or free will-[the] only option was to quit."' Sullivan, 2016 ME 107 , j 21; citing EEOC v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 134 (1st Cir. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Ponte v. Steelcase Inc.green1 sentence2018To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1 based on isolated incidents of harassment, such incidents must be "extreme" or "egregious," and the Supreme Court has cautioned that "simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment." Faragher v. City a/Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998); Ponte v. Steelcase, Inc., 741 F.3d 310,320 (1st Cir. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc.green1 sentence2018Rother v. NYS DOCCS, 970 F. Supp. 2d 78, 93 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) ("the standard for constructive discharge is even higher than that required to prevail on a hostile work environment claim.") "In order for a resignation to constitute a constructive discharge, it must be 'void of choice or free will-[the] only option was to quit."' Sullivan, 2016 ME 107 , j 21; citing EEOC v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 134 (1st Cir. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Tony Cerros v. Steel Technologies, Inc.green1 sentence2017Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1046 (7th Cir. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Lisa Ann BURNS, Appellant, v. McGREGOR ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES, INC., Appelleegreen1 sentence2015Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 966 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that, under circumstances of the case "for a co-employee to refer to a woman employee as a 'bitch' or 'cunt' in the work place is 6 The isolated incidents involving the vendor and the temporary employee are insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim. | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. City of South Portland, Me.green1 sentence2015Berry v. City of S. Portland, 525 F. Supp. 2d 214, 232 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Bodman v. Maine, Department of Health & Human Servicesgreen1 sentence2010Constructive Discharge The "constructive discharge standard is more onerous than the hostile work environment standard." Bodman v. Me., Dep't of HHS, 720 F. Supp. 2d 115, 123 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del Caribe Inc.green1 sentence2008See Lee-Crespo, 354 F.3d at 46-47 . | 1 | 1 |
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgangreen1 sentence2005Id. at 116 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinsongreen1 sentence2001O’Rourke v. City of Providence, Nos. 99-2346, 00-1008, 2001 WL 8598, at *13 (1st Cir. Jan. 8, 2001) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-789 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20-23 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-73 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Danielle Sullivan v. St. Joseph's Rehabilitation and Residence
green
1 sentence2018Rother v. NYS DOCCS, 970 F. Supp. 2d 78, 93 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) ("the standard for constructive discharge is even higher than that required to prevail on a hostile work environment claim.") "In order for a resignation to constitute a constructive discharge, it must be 'void of choice or free will-[the] only option was to quit."' Sullivan, 2016 ME 107 , j 21; citing EEOC v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 134 (1st Cir. 2014). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp.
green
1 sentence2017On the other hand, a hostile work environment claim involves a series of separate acts that together constitute the unlawful employment practice (the federal term for adverse 1 The Law Court has utilized the Morgan statute of limitations analysis in deciding WPA claims in LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2006 ME 130 , ,r 12. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Stanley v. Hancock County Commissioners
green
2 sentences2008Because she has not opposed the motion on this issue, and because she has not established the requisite the reasonable standard set out by the Law Court in Stanley v. Hancock County Commissioners, 2004 ME 157 , <j[<j[ 27,28, 864 A.2d 169, 178-179 , and suggests that it was folly to seek summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim. 11 elements for a retaliation claim, summary judgment must be granted for the Tavern on this claim. 2008Because she has not opposed the motion on this issue, and because she has not established the requisite the reasonable standard set out by the Law Court in Stanley v. Hancock County Commissioners, 2004 ME 157 , <j[<j[ 27,28, 864 A.2d 169, 178-179 , and suggests that it was folly to seek summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim. 11 elements for a retaliation claim, summary judgment must be granted for the Tavern on this claim. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.