hostile work environment claim in New York

2025Auth., 61 AD3d 62, 80 [1 st Dept 2009] [citation omitted]; accord Parham v City of New York, 84 Misc 3d 1204[A] , 2024 NY Slip Op 51360[U], * 7 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024] ["Isolated remarks that a reasonable person would consider 'nothing more than petty slights and trivial inconveniences' cannot support a hostile work environment claim under the NYCHRL"], quoting Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP, 120 AD3d 18, 26 [Pt Dept 2014]; see e.g.

2024Isolated remarks that a reasonable person would consider "nothing more than petty slights and trivial inconveniences" cannot support a hostile work environment claim under the NYCHRL ( Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP , 120 AD3d 18 , 26 [1st Dept 2014]).

2025Auth., 61 AD3d 62, 80 [1 st Dept 2009] [citation omitted]; accord Parham v City of New York, 84 Misc 3d 1204[A] , 2024 NY Slip Op 51360[U], * 7 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024] ["Isolated remarks that a reasonable person would consider 'nothing more than petty slights and trivial inconveniences' cannot support a hostile work environment claim under the NYCHRL"], quoting Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP, 120 AD3d 18, 26 [Pt Dept 2014]; see e.g.

2024That said, conduct amounting to “no more than petty slights and trivial inconveniences” cannot support a hostile work environment claim (Williams, 61 AD3d at 80 ).

2026While the hostile work environment claim does not survive under the NYSHRL, this does not dispose of the question under the NYCHRL of whether plaintiff was treated "less well" based on her gender, and thus, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to that claim was properly denied ( see Hernandez , 103 AD3d at 114; see also Bond v New York City Health & Hosps.

2026While the hostile work environment claim does not survive under the NYSHRL, this does not dispose of the question under the NYCHRL of whether plaintiff was treated "less well" based on her gender, and thus, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to that claim was properly denied ( see Hernandez , 103 AD3d at 114 ; see also Bond v New York City Health & Hosps.

2025Church , 375 F3d 951, 965 [9th Cir 2004] [where a Presbyterian minister brought a claim for hostile work environment against her employer church, the court held that in the absence of a religious justification, the hostile work environment claim "survives the ministerial exception" defense raised in defendant's motion to dismiss]; cf. Skrzypczak v Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa , 611 F3d 1238, 1246 [10th Cir 2010], cert denied 565 US 1155 [2012] [holding that the ministerial exception bars hostile work environment claims because "any Title VII action brought against a church by one of its min

2025Church , 375 F3d 951, 965 [9th Cir 2004] [where a Presbyterian minister brought a claim for hostile work environment against her employer church, the court held that in the absence of a religious justification, the hostile work environment claim "survives the ministerial exception" defense raised in defendant's motion to dismiss]; cf. Skrzypczak v Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa , 611 F3d 1238, 1246 [10th Cir 2010], cert denied 565 US 1155 [2012] [holding that the ministerial exception bars hostile work environment claims because "any Title VII action brought against a church by one of its min

2018Although we applied the Bennett burden-shifting test in Chin to the plaintiff's failure to promote claim, the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim failed because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that she was treated less well than other employees because of her protected status or that discrimination was one of the motivating factors for the defendant's conduct ( Chin , 106 AD3d at 444-445).

2018Auth. , 106 AD3d at 444-445 [City HRL retaliation and hostile work environment claims], where, as here, no evidence is presented to rebut any of defendants' proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions, plaintiff's discrimination claims must fail ( see Arifi , 147 AD3d at 551 [the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence of discriminatory animus in response to the defendant corporation's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its actions was "fatal" to the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, citing Cadet-Legros at 202 ; Bennett at 39-40 ]; see also Chin , 106 AD3d at 444-44

2022A hostile work environment claim requires proof of a workplace "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive working environment" ( Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 310 [2004] [internal quotation marks, citations and brackets omitted]; see Bilitch v New York City Health & Hosps.

2022Turning to the merits of the hostile work environment claim, we find that defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing this claim by demonstrating that the conduct and remarks that plaintiff complained of were not so severe or pervasive as to permeate the workplace and alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment ( see Pawson v Ross , 137 AD3d at 1537 ; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d at 310 ; Reynolds v State of New York , 180 AD3d at 1117-1118 ).

2017However, a hostile work environment claim, by its very nature, is predicated on a series of separate acts that collectively constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice (see National Railroad Passenger Corporation v Morgan, 536 US 101, 117 [2002]).

2008A hostile work environment claim “is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice’ ” (National Railroad Passenger Corporation v Morgan, 536 US at 117 ).

2026In <i>Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook &amp; Ladder Co. No. 1</i> ( 151 AD3d 860, 861 ), this Court held that the continuing violation doctrine applied to a hostile work environment claim because that claim, by its very nature, was predicated on a series of separate acts that constituted an unlawful discriminatory practice.

2025In the context of a hostile work environment claim “[a] continuing violation may be found where there is proof of specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices, or where specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice” (Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook & Ladder Co. No. 1, 151 AD3d 860, 861-862 [2d Dept 2017]). “[T]he statute of limitations requires that only one [discriminatory] act … occur within [the statutory period] and that once that is shown, a court . . . may consi

2025Auth., 204 AD3d 542, 544 [1st Dept 2022] ["[t]he complaint cannot fairly be read to include a separate hostile work environment claim based on plaintiff's post- complaint treatment, and plaintiff cannot properly raise one in opposition to summary judgment"]).

2024Here, the complaint plausibly pleads hostile work environment claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL ( see Kwong , 204 AD3d at 445 ; Alshami v City Univ. of NY , 203 AD3d 592, 592-593 [1st Dept 2022]).

2024Here, the complaint plausibly pleads hostile work environment claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL ( see Kwong , 204 AD3d at 445 ; Alshami v City Univ. of NY , 203 AD3d 592, 592-593 [1st Dept 2022]).

2024He points to Alshami v City Univ. of N.Y. ( 203 AD3d 592, 592-593 [1st Dept 2022]), in which the First Department found that the plaintiff’s allegations about a “coworker's multiple derogatory remarks about [his national origin], sometimes made in the presence of plaintiff's supervisors, along with the allegedly unfounded write-ups, unfavorable assignments, and denial of a promotion, were sufficiently severe and pervasive to support” a hostile work environment claim.

2024Plaintiffs' employment discrimination claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws and hostile work environment claim under the New York City Human Rights Law were improperly dismissed for failure to sufficiently allege discriminatory animus ( see Harrington v City of New York , 157 AD3d 582 , 584 [1st Dept 2018]; Reichman v City of New York , 179 AD3d 1115, 1118 [2d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 904 [2021]).

2024Plaintiffs' employment discrimination claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws and hostile work environment claim under the New York City Human Rights Law were improperly dismissed for failure to sufficiently allege discriminatory animus ( see Harrington v City of New York , 157 AD3d 582 , 584 [1st Dept 2018]; Reichman v City of New York , 179 AD3d 1115, 1118 [2d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 904 [2021]).

2024Corp., 194 AD3d 999, 1003 [2d Dept 2021]). 158467/2023 FERNSMITH, ALEX vs.

2022Corp. , 194 AD3d 999, 1003 [2021]; Pawson v Ross , 137 AD3d 1536, 1537 [2016]).

2018The absence of evidence of a [*5]supervisor's direct pressure for sexual favors as a condition of employment does not negate indirect pressure or doom the claim (see Gallagher v Delaney , 139 F3d 338, 346 [2d Cir 1998] [jury must decide whether the plaintiff experienced a hostile work environment in violation of federal and state law where the plaintiff's supervisor never directly asked her to engage in sexual relations and never specifically conditioned her employment on accepting his gifts, offers, and signs of affection]).

2018The absence of evidence of a [*5]supervisor's direct pressure for sexual favors as a condition of employment does not negate indirect pressure or doom the claim (see Gallagher v Delaney , 139 F3d 338, 346 [2d Cir 1998] [jury must decide whether the plaintiff experienced a hostile work environment in violation of federal and state law where the plaintiff's supervisor never directly asked her to engage in sexual relations and never specifically conditioned her employment on accepting his gifts, offers, and signs of affection]).

2018Auth. , 106 AD3d at 444-445 [City HRL retaliation and hostile work environment claims], where, as here, no evidence is presented to rebut any of defendants' proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions, plaintiff's discrimination claims must fail ( see Arifi , 147 AD3d at 551 [the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence of discriminatory animus in response to the defendant corporation's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its actions was "fatal" to the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, citing Cadet-Legros at 202 ; Bennett at 39-40 ]; see also Chin , 106 AD3d at 444-44

2018In Arifi , the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim failed because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that age discrimination was one of the motivating factors for the employer's hostile conduct ( Arifi , 147 AD3d at 551 ).

2017Based upon this doctrine and the nature of a hostile work environment claim, “[i]n the case of a hostile work environment claim, the statute of limitations requires that only one sexually harassing act demonstrating the challenged work environment occur within [the statutory period]” and that “once that is shown, a court. . . may consider the entire time period of the hostile environment in determining liability” (Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 69 [2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Petrosino v Bell Atl., 385 F3d 210, 220 [2d Cir 2004]).

2005As an initial matter, we are unpersuaded by Drago’s argument on appeal that plaintiffs claims are barred by title VII’s 300-day limitations period (see 42 USC § 2000e-5 [e] [1]). “[I]n the case of a hostile work environment claim, the statute of limitations requires that only one sexually harassing act demonstrating the challenged work environment occur within 300 days of filing; once that is shown, a court and jury may consider ‘the entire time period of the hostile environment’ in determining liability” (Petrosino v Bell Atl., 385 F3d 210, 220 [2d Cir 2004], quoting National R.R.

2016In order to establish a claim of a hostile work environment in violation of Executive Law § 296, a plaintiff must show that the workplace was “ ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment’ ” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at 310 , quoting Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993]).

2008A hostile work environment claim exists “ ‘[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment’ ” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 310 [2004], quoting Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993] [citation omitted]; Matter of Anagnostakos v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 46 AD3d 992 [2007]).

2014To the extent plaintiff alleges acts that occurred more than one year before he commenced this action (see Education Law § 3813 [2-b]), it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that these acts, if proven, were not part of a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extend ing into the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint (see Ain v Glazer, 257 AD2d 422, 423 [1st Dept 1999]).

2014To the extent plaintiff alleges acts that occurred more than one year before he commenced this action (see Education Law § 3813 [2-b]), it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that these acts, if proven, were not part of a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extend ing into the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint (see Ain v Glazer, 257 AD2d 422, 423 [1st Dept 1999]).

2007(Alfano v Costello, 294 F3d 365, 374 [2d Cir 2002]; see also Hawkins v City of New York, 2005 WL 1861855 , *15, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 15898 , *41 [SD NY 2005] [a single isolated instance of harassment is insufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim unless it was “extraordinarily severe”].) Here, the facts alleged do not support a hostile work environment claim. “[C]onduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” (Faragher v Boca Raton, 524 US 775, 788 [1998].) The allegations on which Khalil relies are the same discrete acts, all unrelated, w

2004Since plaintiff has failed to establish the elements of a hostile work environment claim with respect to either her state or city causes of action, we need not address the affirmative defense to such a claim against an employer— that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly discriminatory conduct committed by its supervisory personnel, such as by promulgating an antidiscrimination policy with complaint procedure, and that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid

2026In so doing, this Court noted that "'[a] continuing violation may be found where there is proof of specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices, or where specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice'" (<i>id.</i> at 861-862, quoting <i>Clark v State of New York</i>, 302 AD2d 942, 945 ).</p> <p>Similarly, in the context of an employment discrimination action, the Appellate Division, First Department, has held that claims sounding in negligent supervision begin to acc

2017Thus, under the “continuing violation”, doctrine, even though one of those acts might have occurred outside of the limitations period, the claim will be considered to be timely as long as one of the acts occurred within the limitations period (id. at 117-118). “[A] continuing violation may be found where there is proof of specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices, or where *862 specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice” (Clark v State of New York, 302 AD2d 942

2025To establish a hostile work environment claim even a single act can meet the threshold if, by itself, it can and does work a transformation of the plaintiff's workplace (Alfano v Costello, 294 F3d 365 , [2d Cir 2002]).

2007(Alfano v Costello, 294 F3d 365, 374 [2d Cir 2002]; see also Hawkins v City of New York, 2005 WL 1861855 , *15, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 15898 , *41 [SD NY 2005] [a single isolated instance of harassment is insufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim unless it was “extraordinarily severe”].) Here, the facts alleged do not support a hostile work environment claim. “[C]onduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” (Faragher v Boca Raton, 524 US 775, 788 [1998].) The allegations on which Khalil relies are the same discrete acts, all unrelated, w

2026Corp. , 215 AD3d 469, 469-470 [1st Dept 2023]). [*2] As for the retaliation claim, plaintiff's refusal to kiss Piliere while filming a movie in 2015 does not constitute "protected activity," because she admittedly refused to kiss him due to a "health concern" ( see e.g.

2026Corp. , 215 AD3d 469, 469-470 [1st Dept 2023]). [*2] As for the retaliation claim, plaintiff's refusal to kiss Piliere while filming a movie in 2015 does not constitute "protected activity," because she admittedly refused to kiss him due to a "health concern" ( see e.g.

2025Church , 375 F3d 951, 965 [9th Cir 2004] [where a Presbyterian minister brought a claim for hostile work environment against her employer church, the court held that in the absence of a religious justification, the hostile work environment claim "survives the ministerial exception" defense raised in defendant's motion to dismiss]; cf. Skrzypczak v Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa , 611 F3d 1238, 1246 [10th Cir 2010], cert denied 565 US 1155 [2012] [holding that the ministerial exception bars hostile work environment claims because "any Title VII action brought against a church by one of its min

2025Church , 375 F3d 951, 965 [9th Cir 2004] [where a Presbyterian minister brought a claim for hostile work environment against her employer church, the court held that in the absence of a religious justification, the hostile work environment claim "survives the ministerial exception" defense raised in defendant's motion to dismiss]; cf. Skrzypczak v Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa , 611 F3d 1238, 1246 [10th Cir 2010], cert denied 565 US 1155 [2012] [holding that the ministerial exception bars hostile work environment claims because "any Title VII action brought against a church by one of its min

2025This aligns with prior judicial findings that so long as one act contributing to the hostile work environment claim falls within the statute of limitations, the entire scope of the claim may be considered (see Bermudez v. City of New York, 783 F. Supp. 2d 560, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

2025Med Ctr., 230 AD3d 1284 , 2024 NY Slip Op 04539, *2 [2d Dept 2024]; see Suri v Grey Global Group, Inc., 164 AD3d 108 , 115 [1st Dept 2018], appeal dismissed32 NY3d 1138 [2019]).

2025At this stage, “it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the facts alleged by plaintiff, if proven, would not constitute discrimination, retaliation and a hostile work environment in violation of the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws” (Ferraro, 115 AD3d at 497).