hostile work environment claim in Texas

2025A hostile work environment claim “entails ongoing harassment, based on the plaintiff’s protected characteristic, so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.” Donaldson v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging and Disability Servs., 495 S.W.3d 421, 445 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (quoting Bartosh v. Sam Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2008, pet. denied)).

2024A hostile work environment claim “entails ongoing harassment, based on the plaintiff’s protected characteristic, so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.” Bartosh, 259 S.W.3d at 324 (citing Meritor Savs.

2024Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986))); Twigland Fashions, Ltd. v. Miller, 335 S.W.3d 206, 225 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that the purpose of a hostile-work-environment claim “is not to combat sexual harassment as an end in itself, however reprehensible such harassment may be, but to provide a remedy when sexual harassment rises to a level so ‘extreme’ and ‘abusive’ that it deprives the victim of equal opportunity in the workplace”).

2024Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).

2024“Because a hostile-work-environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice,’ it does not matter that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period.” Bartosh v. Sam Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 ).

2022Rather than discrete acts, a hostile work environment claim alleges related and sustained harassment so that the unlawful employment practice 6 “cannot be said to occur on any particular day.” Id. at 115 . (explaining that hostile work environment claims are “different in kind” and “in direct contrast to discrete acts”).

2009More important, “[t]ermination does not qualify as a predicate act supporting the hostile-work-environment claim; termination is not itself harassing conduct.” Bartosh v. Sam Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. filed); see also Cooper-Day, 121 S.W.3d at 86 (plaintiff must show organized scheme such that cumulative effect of discrimination, not any discrete occurrence, gives rise to claim; assertion of discrete instance of discrimination such as termination does not sufficiently raise issue as to continuing violation).

2009More important, "[t]ermination does not qualify as a predicate act supporting the hostile-work-environment claim; termination is not itself harassing conduct." Bartosh v. Sam Houston State Univ. , 259 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2008, pet. filed); see also Cooper-Day , 121 S.W.3d at 86 (plaintiff must show organized scheme such that cumulative effect of discrimination, not any discrete occurrence, gives rise to claim; assertion of discrete instance of discrimination such as termination does not sufficiently raise issue as to continuing violation).

2024Co., 203 F.3d 904, 913 (5th Cir. 2000)).

2008Co., 203 F.3d 904, 913 (5th Cir.2000); cf. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 239-40 (5th Cir.1998) (“demotion is a different sort of discrimination from the day-to-day harassment that makes his workplace a hostile environment”); Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 980-81 (5th Cir.1983) (discrete act of discharge not included in continuing violation; alleged acts must involve the same type of discrimination); Cooper-Day v. RME Petroleum Co., 121 S.W.3d 78, 86-87 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (discrete acts independently put a plaintiff on notice of a claim and do not r

2021See generally Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 806 (Tex. 2010) (discussing hostile work environment claims).

2015To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate “ongoing harassment” based on the protected characteristic, such as race or gender, that is “so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.” Bartosh, 259 S.W.3d at 324 ; see also Waffle House, 313 S.W.3d at 806 (noting that courts look to all circumstances, including frequency of discriminatory conduct and whether conduct unreasonably interfered with work performance).

2013Both constitute “separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice[s],’” see Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 280 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 ), and even if based on discriminatory criteria, “cannot properly be characterized as part of a continuing hostile work environment.” Sasse, 409 F.3d at 783 ; accord Huckabay, 142 F.3d at 240 ; Santi, 312 S.W.3d at 805–06.

2008Co., 203 F.3d 904, 913 (5th Cir.2000); cf. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 239-40 (5th Cir.1998) (“demotion is a different sort of discrimination from the day-to-day harassment that makes his workplace a hostile environment”); Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 980-81 (5th Cir.1983) (discrete act of discharge not included in continuing violation; alleged acts must involve the same type of discrimination); Cooper-Day v. RME Petroleum Co., 121 S.W.3d 78, 86-87 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (discrete acts independently put a plaintiff on notice of a claim and do not r

2010Del Mar College Dist. , 218 S.W.3d at 860 (citing Garcia v. Schwab , 967 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (discussing hostile work environment as a form of sexual harassment); Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods Corp. , 878 S.W.2d 653, 659 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (setting out the elements of a hostile work environment claim)). 3.

2010Similarly, our sister court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant on a hostile work environment claim in Garcia v. Schwab, 967 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).

2024“The availability of a hostile work environment claim is intended to prohibit and prevent conduct that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected class member’s opportunity to succeed in the workplace.” City of Hous. v. Fletcher, 166 S.W.3d 479, 490 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied) (quotations omitted); see also Harris Cnty.

2023“The availability of a hostile work environment claim is intended to prohibit and prevent conduct that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected class member’s 31 opportunity to succeed in the workplace.” City of Houston v. Fletcher, 166 S.W.3d 479, 490 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied) (quotations omitted).

2025A hostile work environment claim “entails ongoing harassment, based on the plaintiff’s protected characteristic, so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.” Donaldson v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging and Disability Servs., 495 S.W.3d 421, 445 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (quoting Bartosh v. Sam Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2008, pet. denied)).

2024We consider the totality of the circumstances when reviewing a hostile work environment claim, including: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work performance.” Donaldson, 495 S.W.3d at 445 .

2023Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Facially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of gender animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly gender-discriminatory conduct.”).

2018Servs., Inc. , 185 F.3d 1093 , 1097 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Facially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of gender animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly gender-discriminatory conduct."); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc. , 79 F.3d 996 , 1000 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Although some of the incidents were gender neutral, i.e., the invasion of plaintiff's desk, the blocking of the doors, the door slamming, the hood slamming, and the spiked drink, the other incidents occurred only because plaintiff was a woman.").

2020See Soto, 942 S.W.2d at 678 .

2000Soto v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. , 942 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, writ denied).

2010Del Mar College Dist. , 218 S.W.3d at 860 (citing Garcia v. Schwab , 967 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (discussing hostile work environment as a form of sexual harassment); Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods Corp. , 878 S.W.2d 653, 659 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (setting out the elements of a hostile work environment claim)). 3.

2007See Garcia v. Schwab, 967 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (discussing hostile work environment as a form of sexual harassment); Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods, Corp., 878 S.W.2d 653, 659 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (setting out the elements of a hostile work environment claim).

2026Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 806 (Tex. 2018) (summarizing quid-pro-quo harassment as “the harasser demand[ing] sexual favors as a condition for granting employment or its benefits”); City of Pasadena v. Poulos, No. 01-22-00676-CV, 2023 WL 7134974 , at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that, for a hostile work environment claim, “the employee must show that the workplace was ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or abusive working envir

2025See Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 771 (providing that a hostile work environment claim requires the plaintiff to prove that “the harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile work environment”).

2008Co., 203 F.3d 904, 913 (5th Cir.2000); cf. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 239-40 (5th Cir.1998) (“demotion is a different sort of discrimination from the day-to-day harassment that makes his workplace a hostile environment”); Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 980-81 (5th Cir.1983) (discrete act of discharge not included in continuing violation; alleged acts must involve the same type of discrimination); Cooper-Day v. RME Petroleum Co., 121 S.W.3d 78, 86-87 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (discrete acts independently put a plaintiff on notice of a claim and do not r

2008Co. , 203 F.3d 904, 913 (5th Cir. 2000); cf. Huckabay v. Moore , 142 F.3d 233, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1998) ("demotion is a different sort of discrimination from the day-to-day harassment that makes his workplace a hostile environment"); Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U. , 715 F.2d 971, 980-81 (5th Cir. 1983) (discrete act of discharge not included in continuing violation; alleged acts must involve the same type of discrimination); Cooper-Day v. RME Petroleum Co. , 121 S.W.3d 78, 86-87 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (discrete acts independently put a plaintiff on notice of a claim and

2018Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Facially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of gender animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly gender-discriminatory conduct.”); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Although some of the incidents were gender neutral, i.e., the invasion of plaintiff’s desk, the blocking of the doors, the door slamming, the hood slamming, and the spiked drink, the other incidents occurred only because plaintiff was a woman.”).

2018Servs., Inc. , 185 F.3d 1093 , 1097 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Facially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of gender animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly gender-discriminatory conduct."); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc. , 79 F.3d 996 , 1000 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Although some of the incidents were gender neutral, i.e., the invasion of plaintiff's desk, the blocking of the doors, the door slamming, the hood slamming, and the spiked drink, the other incidents occurred only because plaintiff was a woman.").

2018See Harvill v. Westward Communications, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (outlining elements of a hostile-work-environment claim).

2018See Harvill v. Westward Communications, L.L.C. , 433 F.3d 428 , 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (outlining elements of a hostile-work-environment claim).

2014Id.; Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, pet. denied).

2010See Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398, 407-08 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (upholding a jury verdict on a hostile work environment claim where a supervisor pressed up against an employee on many occasions so that the employee could feel the supervisor’s penis; made sexually suggestive remarks; stuck his tongue in the plaintiff’s mouth; 9 … The City acknowledged during oral argument that we may consider the incidents at Negrete’s apartment during our assessment of Negrete’s hostile work environment claim. -13- 04-08-00737-CV flirted with male customers; called the p

2011It merely stated an objective inquiry: ―Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee‘s position would have felt compelled to resign?‖ 82 But the Court did make clear that a constructive discharge claim ―entails something more‖ than what is required to establish a hostile work environment claim; whereas a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim is established by showing that ―harassing behavior ‗sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the plaintiff‘s] employment,‘‖ a constructive discharge claim requires a further showing th

2011It merely stated an objective inquiry: ―Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee‘s position would have felt compelled to resign?‖ 82 But the Court did make clear that a constructive discharge claim ―entails something more‖ than what is required to establish a hostile work environment claim; whereas a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim is established by showing that ―harassing behavior ‗sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the plaintiff‘s] employment,‘‖ a constructive discharge claim requires a further showing th

2011See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 , 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2352 (2004). 38 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751–53, 118 S. Ct. at 2264 . 14 purpose: to determine the threshold question of whether the conduct in question constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII.39 In ―quid pro quo harassment,‖ because employment benefits are conditioned on sexual favors and the employee is retaliated against for denying those favors, the ―discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of employment [is] explicit.‖40 In ―hostile work environment harassment,‖ when threats to retaliate against an emp

2011See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 , 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2352 (2004). 38 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751–53, 118 S. Ct. at 2264 . 14 purpose: to determine the threshold question of whether the conduct in question constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII.39 In ―quid pro quo harassment,‖ because employment benefits are conditioned on sexual favors and the employee is retaliated against for denying those favors, the ―discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of employment [is] explicit.‖40 In ―hostile work environment harassment,‖ when threats to retaliate against an emp

2009See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 , 67 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)) (harassment rises to level of hostile work environment if it unreasonably interferes with work performance or creates intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment; “not all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment”); Beaumont, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 918-21 (general allegations that colleague “was not as nice” to plaintiff does not satisfy burden; plaintiff must show intimidation, ridicule, or insults so severe or pervasive as to alter conditions of employment

2009See Vinson , 477 U.S. at 65 , 67 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)) (harassment rises to level of hostile work environment if it unreasonably interferes with work performance or creates intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment; "not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment"); Beaumont , 468 F. Supp. 2d at 918-21 (general allegations that colleague "was not as nice" to plaintiff does not satisfy burden; plaintiff must show intimidation, ridicule, or insults so severe or pervasive as to alter conditions of employmen

2009See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 , 67 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)) (harassment rises to level of hostile work environment if it unreasonably interferes with work performance or creates intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment; “not all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment”); Beaumont, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 918-21 (general allegations that colleague “was not as nice” to plaintiff does not satisfy burden; plaintiff must show intimidation, ridicule, or insults so severe or pervasive as to alter conditions of employment

2009See Vinson , 477 U.S. at 65 , 67 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)) (harassment rises to level of hostile work environment if it unreasonably interferes with work performance or creates intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment; "not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment"); Beaumont , 468 F. Supp. 2d at 918-21 (general allegations that colleague "was not as nice" to plaintiff does not satisfy burden; plaintiff must show intimidation, ridicule, or insults so severe or pervasive as to alter conditions of employmen

2008See Cozby, 110 S.W.3d at 35-36 ; Hefner v. Grievance Comm. for Dist. 1-A, 708 S.W.2d 43, 44-45 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, no writ). (2) Bartosh’s Hostile-Work-Environment Claim Was Not Preserved by a Timely Administrative Complaint Citing Any Event Supporting that Claim A hostile-work-environment claim entails ongoing harassment, based on the plaintiffs protected characteristic, so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.

2008See Cozby , 110 S.W.3d at 35-36 ; Hefner v. Grievance Comm. for Dist. 1-A , 708 S.W.2d 43, 44-45 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1986, no writ). (2) Bartosh's Hostile-Work-Environment Claim Was Not Preserved by a Timely Administrative Complaint Citing Any Event Supporting that Claim A hostile-work-environment claim entails ongoing harassment, based on the plaintiff's protected characteristic, so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.

2008See Cozby, 110 S.W.3d at 35-36 ; Hefner v. Grievance Comm. for Dist. 1-A, 708 S.W.2d 43, 44-45 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, no writ). (2) Bartosh’s Hostile-Work-Environment Claim Was Not Preserved by a Timely Administrative Complaint Citing Any Event Supporting that Claim A hostile-work-environment claim entails ongoing harassment, based on the plaintiffs protected characteristic, so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.

2008See Cozby , 110 S.W.3d at 35-36 ; Hefner v. Grievance Comm. for Dist. 1-A , 708 S.W.2d 43, 44-45 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1986, no writ). (2) Bartosh's Hostile-Work-Environment Claim Was Not Preserved by a Timely Administrative Complaint Citing Any Event Supporting that Claim A hostile-work-environment claim entails ongoing harassment, based on the plaintiff's protected characteristic, so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.

2015WC & M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d at 399 .

2011See EEOC v. WC & M Enters., Inc. , 496 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2007); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 979 S.W.2d at 41 .

2010Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999).

2005The availability of a hostile work environment claim is intended to prohibit and prevent conduct “that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected class member’s opportunity to succeed in the workplace.” Lacher v. West, supra at 544 (citing Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts, supra; Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corporation, 84 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.1996), cert. den’d, 519 U.S. 1055 , 117 S.Ct. 682 , 136 L.Ed.2d 607 (1997)).

2026A hostile work environment claim under Title VII requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff “belongs to a protected group;” (2) she “was subjected to unwelcome harassment;” (3) “the harassment complained of was based on” her protected status; (4) “the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment;” and (5) “the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002).

2024Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986))); Twigland Fashions, Ltd. v. Miller, 335 S.W.3d 206, 225 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that the purpose of a hostile-work-environment claim “is not to combat sexual harassment as an end in itself, however reprehensible such harassment may be, but to provide a remedy when sexual harassment rises to a level so ‘extreme’ and ‘abusive’ that it deprives the victim of equal opportunity in the workplace”).