hostile work environment claim in California

2026Guiding Principles The FEHA makes it an unlawful for an employer to harass an employee based on membership in a protected class, including an employee’s “sex.” 12 (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1)–(4)(C).) “ ‘[T]he prohibition against sexual harassment includes protection from a broad range of conduct, [including] the creation of a work environment that is hostile or abusive on the basis of sex.’ ” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 277 (Lyle).) A hostile work environment claim requires a showing the plaintiff “was subject to harassing conduct that was (1) unwelcome, (

2025(Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 291 .) To the extent Barrie contends there was evidence of other acts of harassment by Meeks that supported a hostile work environment claim, such as failure to promote, we are unpersuaded.

2015(Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under FEHA, an employee must show that the harassing conduct was "severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex." ( Miller, supra, at p. 462 .) There is no recovery "for harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial." (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283 (Lyle).) Courts that have construed California employment discriminatio

2015(Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under FEHA, an employee must show that the harassing conduct was "severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex." ( Miller, supra, at p. 462 .) There is no recovery "for harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial." (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283 (Lyle).) Courts that have construed California employment discriminatio

2023One such clarification, codified in subdivision (b), stated that “[a] single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” ( § 12923, subd. (b).) The Legislature therefore explicitly rejected Brooks v. City of San Mateo (2000) 229 F.3d 917, 926 [holding that “If a single incident can ever suffice to support a hostile work environment claim, the incident must b

2014Polk acknowledges that “ ‘the required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.’ [Citations.] If a single incident can ever suffice to support a hostile work environment claim, the incident must be extremely severe.” (Brooks v. City of San Mateo (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 917, 926 (Brooks).) Polk argues that the racial remark made by Bal, who 7 was his supervisor, coupled with the physical and psychological damage he suffered, was severe enough to support a hostile work environment claim on its own.5 Polk dis

2015(Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under FEHA, an employee must show that the harassing conduct was "severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex." ( Miller, supra, at p. 462 .) There is no recovery "for harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial." (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283 (Lyle).) Courts that have construed California employment discriminatio

2015(Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under FEHA, an employee must show that the harassing conduct was "severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex." ( Miller, supra, at p. 462 .) There is no recovery "for harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial." (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283 (Lyle).) Courts that have construed California employment discriminatio

2021Co. (7th Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 526, 536-537 [to recover lost earnings on a hostile work environment claim, plaintiff “must prove that she was constructively discharged”], called into doubt on another ground by Cooke v. Stefani Management Services, Inc. (7th Cir. 2001) 250 F.3d 564, 568, fn. 3 ; Bundy v. Jackson (D.C.

2009Co. (7th Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 526, 528, 534-535 [summary judgment for defendant upheld where defendant rubbed and kissed plaintiff on one occasion and groped her on another].) A single harassing incident involving “physical violence or the threat thereof’ may qualify as being severe in the extreme.

2023The bullying Thomas alleges in her amended complaint is not in any way trivial—it simply is not yet sufficient to state a section 51.9 claim. 4 sniffed plaintiffs’ underwear, all without plaintiffs’ permission or knowledge.” (Ramirez, at pp. 1483, 1488.) Relying on Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035 (Hughes), the court explained that “To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must show that the harassing conduct was ‘ “severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employ

2021Severe or Pervasive Harassment “To prevail on a hostile work environment claim . . . , an employee must show that the harassing conduct was ‘severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex.’ [Citations.]” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1043 (Hughes); Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 283 .) “Taken into account must be the surrounding circumstances, such as the ‘ “ ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or h

2026(Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 627, quoting Roby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 706 .) And we readily agree FEHA’s “ ‘prohibition against sexual harassment includes protection from a broad range of conduct, ranging from expressly or impliedly conditioning employment 8 benefits on submission to or tolerance of unwelcome sexual advances, to the creation of a work environment that is hostile or abusive on the basis of sex.’ ” (Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1524 ; see also id. at p. 1527 [reversing summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim where the defendant showed

2026(Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 627, quoting Roby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 706 .) And we readily agree FEHA’s “ ‘prohibition against sexual harassment includes protection from a broad range of conduct, ranging from expressly or impliedly conditioning employment 8 benefits on submission to or tolerance of unwelcome sexual advances, to the creation of a work environment that is hostile or abusive on the basis of sex.’ ” (Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1524 ; see also id. at p. 1527 [reversing summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim where the defendant showed

2023One such clarification, codified in subdivision (b), stated that “[a] single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” ( § 12923, subd. (b).) The Legislature therefore explicitly rejected Brooks v. City of San Mateo (2000) 229 F.3d 917, 926 [holding that “If a single incident can ever suffice to support a hostile work environment claim, the incident must b

2014(Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., supra, 510 U.S. at p. 23 .) Polk is not asserting that Lowe’s is somehow liable under a different theory of liability.

2026LEXIS 11071, at *20, fn. 5 [“Frequent references and comparisons of [plaintiff] to Hitler would be extremely offensive and might well support a hostile work environment claim.”]; Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Penalver (Tex.Ct.App., Sep. 13, 2006, No. 04-05-00565- CV) 217 S.W.3d 44, 58 [quoting a prior opinion, that ‘[t]o compare a litigant to this cruel, inhuman savage madman [Hitler], . . . even though by the 4 slightest remark, is calculated to arouse the deepest prejudice on the part of the jury and should not be done by counsel”]; Severe Records, LLC v. Rich (M.D.Tenn., Aug. 26, 2009, No.

2026Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 675 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [“[A]s this court has often recognized, the judicial role in a democratic society is fundamentally to interpret laws, not to write them.”].) We thus refuse their invitation to impose a documentation requirement for a hostile work environment claim, and apply such a rule retroactively to Elizabeth in this case.

2026LEXIS 76657, at *11–12 [“Plaintiffs’ counsel’s comparison of the Defendant Rich to ‘Adolph Hitler’ (sic) . . . is patently offensive.”].) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the “that the proposed surname was vulgar, offensive, and a racial slur.” (Lee, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 .) Finally, case law supports denying a name change petition when the new name would be “inherently confusing.” (In re Ritchie (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1071, 1074 [affirming denial of petition to change name to III where “it is not unreasonable to conclude that the usage of n

2026LEXIS 76657, at *11–12 [“Plaintiffs’ counsel’s comparison of the Defendant Rich to ‘Adolph Hitler’ (sic) . . . is patently offensive.”].) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the “that the proposed surname was vulgar, offensive, and a racial slur.” (Lee, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 .) Finally, case law supports denying a name change petition when the new name would be “inherently confusing.” (In re Ritchie (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1071, 1074 [affirming denial of petition to change name to III where “it is not unreasonable to conclude that the usage of n

2026(See In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 754 [retroactive application of a law is unconstitutional if it deprives a person of a vested right without due process of law].) III.

2025(Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 628; accord, § 12923, subd. (c) [“existence of a hostile work environment depends on the totality of the circumstances”]; see Caldera, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 38 [the determination of whether harassment is severe or pervasive “ ‘is ordinarily one of fact’ ”].) Relevant factors include “ ‘ “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” ’ ” (Bailey, at p. 628.) “ ‘ “The required level of

2025(Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 628; accord, § 12923, subd. (c) [“existence of a hostile work environment depends on the totality of the circumstances”]; see Caldera, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 38 [the determination of whether harassment is severe or pervasive “ ‘is ordinarily one of fact’ ”].) Relevant factors include “ ‘ “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” ’ ” (Bailey, at p. 628.) “ ‘ “The required level of

2024(EEOC Compliance Manual, supra, at p. 15–37 & fn. 130, citing Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass (4th Cir. 2001) 242 F.3d 179, 185 (Spriggs); see also Woods v. Cantrell (5th Cir. 2022) 29 F.4th 284, 285 (Woods) [holding the district court erred in dismissing a hostile work environment claim based on “ ‘a single utterance’ ” of an unambiguous racial epithet by a supervisor]; Boyer-Liberto, supra, 786 F.3d at pp. 280–281 [vacating summary judgement on a hostile work environment claim and 5 In her briefing, Bailey cites section 12923 (added by Stats. 2018, ch. 955, § 1, eff.

2024(Paschall, at p. 815 [“There is, however, no spectrum when it comes to the use of a racial epithet in the workplace”]; see, e.g., Woods, supra, 29 F.4th at p. 285 [holding the district court erred in dismissing a hostile work environment claim based on “ ‘a single utterance’ ” of an unambiguous racial epithet by a supervisor].) “What matters is looking to the totality of the circumstances when determining whether the conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be 24 BAILEY v. SAN FRANCISCO DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. actionable.” (Paschall, at p. 815 [declin

2024(EEOC Compliance Manual, supra, at p. 15–37 & fn. 130, citing Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass (4th Cir. 2001) 242 F.3d 179, 185 (Spriggs); see also Woods v. Cantrell (5th Cir. 2022) 29 F.4th 284, 285 (Woods) [holding the district court erred in dismissing a hostile work environment claim based on “ ‘a single utterance’ ” of an unambiguous racial epithet by a supervisor]; Boyer-Liberto, supra, 786 F.3d at pp. 280–281 [vacating summary judgement on a hostile work environment claim and 5 In her briefing, Bailey cites section 12923 (added by Stats. 2018, ch. 955, § 1, eff.

2024It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.” (Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. at 21 p. 115.) 10 Accordingly, the high court has held in the statute of limitations context that “a hostile work environment claim . . . will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls within the [limitations] period.” (Id. at p. 122; see also Green v. Brennan (2016) 578 U.S. 547, 562 [limitations period for hostile-wor

2024“A cardinal rule of statutory construction holds that . . . ‘[w]here Congress borrows terms of art . . . , it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.’ ” (Molzof v. United States (1992) 502 U.S. 301, 307 ; see also Smith v. Spizzirri (2024) 601 U.S. 472, 477 [rejecting interpretation of 10 In Morgan, the court explained: “The following scenarios illustrate our point: (1) Acts on days 1–400 create a hostile work environment.

2021Co. (7th Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 526, 536-537 [to recover lost earnings on a hostile work environment claim, plaintiff “must prove that she was constructively discharged”], called into doubt on another ground by Cooke v. Stefani Management Services, Inc. (7th Cir. 2001) 250 F.3d 564, 568, fn. 3 ; Bundy v. Jackson (D.C.