hostile work environment claim in Ohio

2024To prevail on a hostile-work-environment claim based on racial harassment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she was subject to unwelcome harassment, (2) the harassment was based on race, (3) the harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment” and (4) either (a) the harassment was committed by a supervisor or (b) the employer, through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corr

2012Id. at 175-176 . {¶15} Because Brandner has alleged a hostile-work-environment claim, she must show the following: (1) that the harassment was unwelcome, (2) that the harassment was based on sex, (3) that the harassing 7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment,” and (4) that either (a) the harassment was committed by a supervisor, or (b) the employer, through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known of the hara

2026Id., citing Woods v. Cantrall, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2022); Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264-265 (3d Cir. 2017); and Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (a reasonable jury could find that a supervisor’s two uses of a racial epithet, whether viewed as a single incident or as a pair of discrete instances, were severe enough to engender a hostile work environment).

2025See, e.g., Woods v. Cantrall, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that a supervisor directly calling the plaintiff a “[l]azy [m]onkey ass [n-word]” amounts to an actionable claim of hostile work environment); Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264-265 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs’ allegation that their supervisor called them the n-word could be sufficient to create a hostile work environment cause of action); Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (writing that “a reasonable jury could find that [the supervisor]’s two uses of the ‘

2026Id., citing Woods v. Cantrall, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2022); Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264-265 (3d Cir. 2017); and Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (a reasonable jury could find that a supervisor’s two uses of a racial epithet, whether viewed as a single incident or as a pair of discrete instances, were severe enough to engender a hostile work environment).

2025See, e.g., Woods v. Cantrall, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that a supervisor directly calling the plaintiff a “[l]azy [m]onkey ass [n-word]” amounts to an actionable claim of hostile work environment); Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264-265 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs’ allegation that their supervisor called them the n-word could be sufficient to create a hostile work environment cause of action); Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (writing that “a reasonable jury could find that [the supervisor]’s two uses of the ‘

2026Id., citing Woods v. Cantrall, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2022); Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264-265 (3d Cir. 2017); and Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (a reasonable jury could find that a supervisor’s two uses of a racial epithet, whether viewed as a single incident or as a pair of discrete instances, were severe enough to engender a hostile work environment).

2025See, e.g., Woods v. Cantrall, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that a supervisor directly calling the plaintiff a “[l]azy [m]onkey ass [n-word]” amounts to an actionable claim of hostile work environment); Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264-265 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs’ allegation that their supervisor called them the n-word could be sufficient to create a hostile work environment cause of action); Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (writing that “a reasonable jury could find that [the supervisor]’s two uses of the ‘

2022Chapa at ¶ 55 , citing Harris at 21-22 (the standard for a hostile work environment claim requires the conduct to be both objectively hostile or abusive and subjectively perceived by the plaintiff to interfere with the conditions of their employment).

2022Chapa at ¶ 55 , citing Harris at 21-22 (the standard for a hostile work environment claim requires the conduct to be both objectively hostile or abusive and subjectively perceived by the plaintiff to interfere with the conditions of their employment).

2022Chapa at ¶ 68 (summary judgment in favor of employer was appropriate where appellant failed to meet the fourth element of a hostile work environment claim because he did not demonstrate the alleged conduct created an objectively hostile work environment).

2016Franklin No. 12AP- 466, 2014-Ohio-897, ¶99 , citing Dendinger v. Ohio, 207 Fed.Appx. 521, 526 (6th Cir.2006), citing Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 266-67 (6th Cir.2003). {¶14} The United States Supreme Court has further emphasized that the doctrine does not apply to “discrete acts of discrimination, even those that are related to one another, unless it involves a hostile work environment claim” nor does it apply to “discrete acts of which the plaintiff was aware at the time that they occurred and when the plaintiff has failed to present evidence of a long-standing policy of discrimination.”

2018Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742 , 754 [ 118 S.Ct. 2257 , 141 L.Ed.2d 633 ] (1998) ("Because Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work environment claim which requires a showing of severe or pervasive conduct.").

2018Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742 , 754 [ 118 S.Ct. 2257 , 141 L.Ed.2d 633 ] (1998) ("Because Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work environment claim which requires a showing of severe or pervasive conduct.").

1999As provided by R.C. 4112.02 (A), "[I]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice * * * [f]or any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age or ancestry of a person, * * * to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment." As we stated in Delaney v. Skyline Lodge, Inc. (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 264 , 270 , 642 N.E.2d 395 , 400 , to prevail on a hostile-work-environment claim, an employee must allege and prove the following: (1) the

1999As provided by R.C. 4112.02 (A), "[I]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice * * * [f]or any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age or ancestry of a person, * * * to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment." As we stated in Delaney v. Skyline Lodge, Inc. (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 264 , 270 , 642 N.E.2d 395 , 400 , to prevail on a hostile-work-environment claim, an employee must allege and prove the following: (1) the

2026See Croley, 2025-Ohio-4762 , at ¶ 28 (10th Dist.) (collecting cases holding that a supervisor’s use of a racial slur, even on one or two occasions, may be severe enough to support a hostile work environment claim); see also Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632-633 (2d Cir. 1997).

2026See Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 112 F.4th 74, 85-87 (2d Cir. 2024).

2026See Croley, 2025-Ohio-4762 , at ¶ 28 (10th Dist.) (collecting cases holding that a supervisor’s use of a racial slur, even on one or two occasions, may be severe enough to support a hostile work environment claim); see also Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632-633 (2d Cir. 1997).

2025See Banks at 265 (“A reasonable jury could find that even a single placement of this object [a noose] -- imbued as it is with historical gravity as a symbol and tool of actual violence -- directly at the workstation of a Black employee could amount to severe conduct sufficient to support an inference that the workplace is hostile to Black employees.”); Burns v. Winroc Corp., 565 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1064 (D.C.Minn. 2008) (“Moreover, the noose was discovered after an evening when the truck assigned to [the employee] was the only one parked in the warehouse, suggesting that [the employee] was intende

2025See, e.g., Brown v. Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 594 F.Supp.2d 382 , 392- 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding the display of two nooses that were targeted at the plaintiff amounted to severe or pervasive enough conduct to defeat summary judgment of a hostile work environment claim); see also Williams, 154 F.Supp.2d 820 .

2025See, e.g., Woods v. Cantrall, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that a supervisor directly calling the plaintiff a “[l]azy [m]onkey ass [n-word]” amounts to an actionable claim of hostile work environment); Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264-265 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs’ allegation that their supervisor called them the n-word could be sufficient to create a hostile work environment cause of action); Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (writing that “a reasonable jury could find that [the supervisor]’s two uses of the ‘

2025Williams, 154 F.Supp.2d 820 at 826 . {¶ 44} As to the final prong, Croley must demonstrate that there is a specific basis for attributing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer.

2025See, e.g., Brown v. Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 594 F.Supp.2d 382 , 392- 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding the display of two nooses that were targeted at the plaintiff amounted to severe or pervasive enough conduct to defeat summary judgment of a hostile work environment claim); see also Williams, 154 F.Supp.2d 820 .

2025See Banks at 265 (“A reasonable jury could find that even a single placement of this object [a noose] -- imbued as it is with historical gravity as a symbol and tool of actual violence -- directly at the workstation of a Black employee could amount to severe conduct sufficient to support an inference that the workplace is hostile to Black employees.”); Burns v. Winroc Corp., 565 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1064 (D.C.Minn. 2008) (“Moreover, the noose was discovered after an evening when the truck assigned to [the employee] was the only one parked in the warehouse, suggesting that [the employee] was intende

2025“Conduct that is not explicitly race-based may be illegally race-based and properly considered in a hostile-work-environment analysis when it can be shown that but for the employee’s race, []he would not have been the object of harassment.” Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 706 (6th Cir. 2007).

2025Id. {¶ 121} The Sixth Circuit has addressed this issue with almost uniform results, and “has established a relatively high bar for what amounts to actionable discriminatory conduct under a hostile work environment theory,” and the display of a noose under the circumstances of this case does not clear that bar.

2025See also Hargrett v. RMI Titanium Co., 2010-Ohio-406 , ¶ 43 (11th Dist.) (finding summary judgment appropriate regarding the hostile work environment claim when the noose was not specifically directed at the appellants). {¶ 35} Before our examination of the above line of cases, we note the dissent cites Morrisette v. DFS Servs., L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-4336 (10th Dist.) for the proposition that it is consistent with Brown.

2025In Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 644 Fed.Appx. 787, 788 (9th Cir. 2016), the plaintiff alleged a hostile work environment claim based on the display of a noose hung in the inventory warehouse.

2024Further, a hostile work environment constructive discharge claim requires proof of more than the severe or pervasive conduct required for a hostile work environment claim. “‘While a hostile-work-environment claim requires a plaintiff to prove “severe or pervasive” harassment, . . . [a] plaintiff who advances such a compound claim must show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.’” Godsey-Marshall v. Phillipsburg, 2010-Ohio-2266 , ¶ 23 (2d Dist.) (describing such a “compound claim” as “‘an aggravated case of, sexual harassment or hostile w