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16 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Caputo v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2016Id. [¶ 21] For example, we cited Caputo v. Nelson, 455 F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir.2006), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that a police officer had not engaged in the functional equivalent of interrogation by using the defendant’s phone in his presence “to relay information about what the officers found at [the defendant’s residence” to other officers. 2012See, e.g., Caputo v. Nelson, 455 F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir.2006) (recognizing that other courts have determined that not all declaratory statements by police regarding the evidence and charges qualify as interrogation); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir.1992) (“[T]he Innis definition of interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those charges.”); Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Payne with approval and | 2 | 2 |
State v. Webstergreen2 sentences2018Probable Cause to A k Defendant to Take an Intoxilyzer Test This court looks to the case of State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115 ~7, 754 A.2d 976 as authority on the issue of probable cause in cases of OUI in Maine. 2018Probable Cause to A k Defendant to Take an Intoxilyzer Test This court looks to the case of State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115 ~7, 754 A.2d 976 as authority on the issue of probable cause in cases of OUI in Maine. | 1 | 3 |
Rhode Island v. Innisgreen2 sentences2020Interrogation [¶26] “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted). “[B]rief, neutral questions that are not part of an effort to elicit a confession or admission do not constitute interrogation.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 8 , 991 A.2d 806 . [¶27] In State v. Dominique, 2008 ME 2020Interrogation [¶26] “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted). “[B]rief, neutral questions that are not part of an effort to elicit a confession or admission do not constitute interrogation.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 8 , 991 A.2d 806 . [¶27] In State v. Dominique, 2008 ME | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. Secretary of Stategreen1 sentence2018See Powell v. Secretary ofState, 614 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Me. 1992.) •In Belhumeur, the defendant had been alone in his vehicle for a period of at least two hours during which the vehicle was parked on a side street with the engines running and tine headlights on . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cusackgreen1 sentence2016CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Stop In order to justify a brief investigatory stop, "a police officer must have an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct or a civil violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur, and the officer's suspicion must be ' objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances."' State v. Brown, 1997 ME 90 , CJ[ 5, 694 A.2d 453 (quoting 4 State v. Cusack, 649 A.2d 16, 18 (Me. 1994)). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. State of Mainegreen1 sentence2016See Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1295 . | 1 | 1 |
Payson v. Secretary of Stategreen1 sentence2016Where the Superior Court acts as an intermediate 2 The intoxilyzer test was conducted by a certified operator, whose certification number was noted on the test; therefore the test result was admitted without testimony from that certified operator. 2 appellate court, ''we review the hearing examiner's decision directly for abuse of discretion, error of law, or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record." Payson v. Secretary of State, 634 A.2d 1278, 1279 (Me. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Candagegreen2 sentences2015“Probable cause to arrest exists whenever facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police and of which' there was reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a prudent and cautious person to believe that the arrestee had committed the crime.” State v. Candage, 549 A.2d 355, 360 (Me.1988); see also State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115, ¶ 7 , 754 A.2d 976 (“For there to be probable cause to arrest someone for operating under the influence ... an officer must have probable cause to believe that the person’s senses' are affected to the slightest degree, or to any extent, by the alcohol th 2015“Probable cause to arrest exists whenever facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police and of which' there was reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a prudent and cautious person to believe that the arrestee had committed the crime.” State v. Candage, 549 A.2d 355, 360 (Me.1988); see also State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115, ¶ 7 , 754 A.2d 976 (“For there to be probable cause to arrest someone for operating under the influence ... an officer must have probable cause to believe that the person’s senses' are affected to the slightest degree, or to any extent, by the alcohol th | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ifillgreen1 sentence2014Those decisions, however, are inapposite because they relate to the admissibility of breath tests administered by the State and (1) offered by the State to attempt to prove an element of the crime of operating under the influence, see, e.g., Ifill, 560 A.2d at 1077 (stating that the results of a state-administered portable ALERT test are inadmissible), or (2) offered by a defendant attempting to rebut the State’s evidence, see State v. McConvey, 459 A.2d 562, 569 (Me.1983) (“Blood-alcohol test results may be admissible as rebuttal evidence provided the results are reliable.”). [¶ 10] We agree | 1 | 1 |
State v. McConveygreen1 sentence2014Those decisions, however, are inapposite because they relate to the admissibility of breath tests administered by the State and (1) offered by the State to attempt to prove an element of the crime of operating under the influence, see, e.g., Ifill, 560 A.2d at 1077 (stating that the results of a state-administered portable ALERT test are inadmissible), or (2) offered by a defendant attempting to rebut the State’s evidence, see State v. McConvey, 459 A.2d 562, 569 (Me.1983) (“Blood-alcohol test results may be admissible as rebuttal evidence provided the results are reliable.”). [¶ 10] We agree | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lloyd C. Paynegreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Caputo v. Nelson, 455 F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir.2006) (recognizing that other courts have determined that not all declaratory statements by police regarding the evidence and charges qualify as interrogation); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir.1992) (“[T]he Innis definition of interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those charges.”); Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Payne with approval and | 1 | 1 |
Ike Easley, Jr. v. Sheldon Freygreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Caputo v. Nelson, 455 F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir.2006) (recognizing that other courts have determined that not all declaratory statements by police regarding the evidence and charges qualify as interrogation); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir.1992) (“[T]he Innis definition of interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those charges.”); Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Payne with approval and | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kelleygreen1 sentence1999See State v. Royal, 590 A.2d 523, 525 (Me.1990) (citing State v. Kelley, 357 A.2d 890, 898-99 (Me.1976)). 2 The trial court begins its analysis *1242 by determining the nature, extent, timing and source of the information received by the jurors. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Royalgreen1 sentence1999See State v. Royal, 590 A.2d 523, 525 (Me.1990) (citing State v. Kelley, 357 A.2d 890, 898-99 (Me.1976)). 2 The trial court begins its analysis *1242 by determining the nature, extent, timing and source of the information received by the jurors. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Robert James Poolegreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Caputo v. Nelson, 455 F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir.2006) (recognizing that other courts have determined that not all declaratory statements by police regarding the evidence and charges qualify as interrogation); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir.1992) (“[T]he Innis definition of interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those charges.”); Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Payne with approval and | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Reese
green
2 sentences2020Interrogation [¶26] “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted). “[B]rief, neutral questions that are not part of an effort to elicit a confession or admission do not constitute interrogation.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 8 , 991 A.2d 806 . [¶27] In State v. Dominique, 2008 ME 2020Interrogation [¶26] “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted). “[B]rief, neutral questions that are not part of an effort to elicit a confession or admission do not constitute interrogation.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 8 , 991 A.2d 806 . [¶27] In State v. Dominique, 2008 ME | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Dominique
green
2 sentences2020Interrogation [¶26] “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted). “[B]rief, neutral questions that are not part of an effort to elicit a confession or admission do not constitute interrogation.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 8 , 991 A.2d 806 . [¶27] In State v. Dominique, 2008 ME 2020Interrogation [¶26] “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted). “[B]rief, neutral questions that are not part of an effort to elicit a confession or admission do not constitute interrogation.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 8 , 991 A.2d 806 . [¶27] In State v. Dominique, 2008 ME | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Dunlap
green
1 sentence2016Arndt further argues that our holding in State v. Dunlap, 395 A.2d 821 (Me.1978), bars the consideration of any delay caused by law enforcement as exigent circumstances. [¶ 6] The State argues that destruction of evidence has been-recognized as exigent circumstances, and that the metabolization of alcohol by the body is such an exigency. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Imagineering, Inc. v. Superintendent of Insurance
green
1 sentence2016The agency's factual determinations must be sustained unless shown to be clearly erroneous." lmagineering Inc. v. Superintendent ofIns. 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991) The party seeking to vacate the agency decision bears the burden of persuasion on appeal. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Stade
green
1 sentence2016In Stade, the defendant actually took the breathalyzer test, based off of the police officer's incorrect notion that he could get a work permit to drive, so as not to lose his ability to drive to work. 683 A.2d at 165 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2016CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Stop In order to justify a brief investigatory stop, "a police officer must have an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct or a civil violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur, and the officer's suspicion must be ' objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances."' State v. Brown, 1997 ME 90 , CJ[ 5, 694 A.2d 453 (quoting 4 State v. Cusack, 649 A.2d 16, 18 (Me. 1994)). 2016CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Stop In order to justify a brief investigatory stop, "a police officer must have an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct or a civil violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur, and the officer's suspicion must be ' objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances."' State v. Brown, 1997 ME 90 , CJ[ 5, 694 A.2d 453 (quoting 4 State v. Cusack, 649 A.2d 16, 18 (Me. 1994)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Cote
green
2 sentences2016Cote, 1999 ME 123 , ~ 16, 736 A.2d 262 . (-= The courts in Maine have long held that Due Process rights can be violated when police give inaccurate information regarding the consequences of taking or refusing an intoxilyzer test. 2016Cote, 1999 ME 123 , ~ 16, 736 A.2d 262 . (-= The courts in Maine have long held that Due Process rights can be violated when police give inaccurate information regarding the consequences of taking or refusing an intoxilyzer test. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Pineo
green
1 sentence2015With respect to the admissibility of the defendant's intoxilyzer test, the Court determines that the requisite foundational showing of reliability was made by the State, and thus the accuracy and reliability of the test result are questions for the factfinder, State v. Pineo, 2002 ME 93 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State of Maine v. Clarence Cote
green
2 sentences2015When a defendant in a criminal matter challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence on appeal, “we review the factual findings underlying the trial court’s ruling for clear error and the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Cote, 2015 ME 78, ¶ 9 , 118 A.3d 805 . 2015When a defendant in a criminal matter challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence on appeal, “we review the factual findings underlying the trial court’s ruling for clear error and the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Cote, 2015 ME 78, ¶ 9 , 118 A.3d 805 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Brann
green
2 sentences2012Because . the parties agree that Bragg was in custody at the time she took the intoxilyzer test and made her incriminating statement, “[t]he State .... bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a Miranda warning was not required.” State v. Brann, 1999 ME 113, ¶ 12 , 736 A.2d 251 . [¶ 16] Although we have not yet addressed this exact issue, other courts have recognized that simply presenting a defendant with evidence against her does not necessarily constitute an interrogation for Miranda purposes. 2012Because . the parties agree that Bragg was in custody at the time she took the intoxilyzer test and made her incriminating statement, “[t]he State .... bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a Miranda warning was not required.” State v. Brann, 1999 ME 113, ¶ 12 , 736 A.2d 251 . [¶ 16] Although we have not yet addressed this exact issue, other courts have recognized that simply presenting a defendant with evidence against her does not necessarily constitute an interrogation for Miranda purposes. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Rangeley Crossroads Coalition v. Land Use Regulation Commission
green
2 sentences2009Under Rule 80C and 5 M.R.S. § 11007(C), an agency's decision will be reviewed for abuse of discretion, error of law, or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ~ Rangeley Crossroads Coalition v. Land Use Regulation Commission, 2008 ME 115 <JI 10, 955 A.2d 223, 227 . 2009Under Rule 80C and 5 M.R.S. § 11007(C), an agency's decision will be reviewed for abuse of discretion, error of law, or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ~ Rangeley Crossroads Coalition v. Land Use Regulation Commission, 2008 ME 115 <JI 10, 955 A.2d 223, 227 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Mancini v. Secretary of State
green
2 sentences2001In Mancini v. Secretary of State, 540 A.2d 117 (Me. 1988), the Law Court found substantial evidence to support a hearing examiner’s decision upholding suspension even though a chemist testified that it was equally likely that a driver's BAC was 09% or .11% when the test results indicated a BAC of .10%. 2001In Mancini v. Secretary of State, 540 A.2d 117 (Me. 1988), the Law Court found substantial evidence to support a hearing examiner’s decision upholding suspension even though a chemist testified that it was equally likely that a driver's BAC was 09% or .11% when the test results indicated a BAC of .10%. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Collin
green
2 sentences1983In State v. Collin, 441 A.2d 693 (Me.1982), the trial judge had excluded very similar opinion testimony by the same Patrick Demers that was offered by the defense to cast doubt on the validity of an intoxilyzer test result presented by the State; this court found no reversible error in the exclusion of the similar evidence. 1983In Collin , the evidence failed to link up the proffered Demers opinion about an “average person” to that particular defendant, thus “greatly diminish[ing] the probative value of the evidence sought by defense counsel.” Id. at 695 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.