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14 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1998–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dorris v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5); Dorris, supra, 291 Ga. App. at 718-719 (affirming the defendant’s DUI per se conviction based upon evidence as to the irregular manner in which defendant’s truck was parked in the parking lot, defendant’s presence in the driver’s seat, the signs of intoxication, and the intoxilyzer test results showing a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.198 grams); O’Connell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 (1) (a) ( 648 SE2d 147 ) (2007) (ruling that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting the defendant’s DUI per se conviction given the defendant’s degree of int 2013See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5); Dorris, supra, 291 Ga. App. at 718-719 (affirming the defendant’s DUI-per se conviction based upon evidence as to the irregular manner in which defendant’s truck was parked in the parking lot, defendant’s presence in the driver’s seat, the signs of intoxication, and the intoxilyzer test results showing a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.198 grams). (b) The evidence presented was insufficient to convict Green for impeding the flow of traffic, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-184 (a) (1). | 3 | 4 |
Barber v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Barber v. State, 236 Ga. App. 294, 297 (2), n. 1 ( 512 SE2d 48 ) (1999) (although defendant’s written motion to suppress “could be read to encompass both the pre-trial and in-court identifications [,]” the fact that defense counsel during the hearing on the motion limited the relief sought to only pre-trial identification waived any objection to subsequent in-court identifications); Roberson v. State, 228 Ga. App. 416, 420 (3) ( 491 SE2d 864 ) (1997) (although defendant’s written motion in limine asserted several grounds for the exclusion of an Intoxilyzer breath test, defendant waived his 2014See Barber v. State, 236 Ga. App. 294, 297 (2), n. 1 ( 512 SE2d 48 ) (1999) (although defendant’s written motion to suppress “could be read to encompass both the pre-trial and in-court identifications [,]” the fact that defense counsel during the hearing on the motion limited the relief sought to only pre-trial identification waived any objection to subsequent in-court identifications); Roberson v. State, 228 Ga. App. 416, 420 (3) ( 491 SE2d 864 ) (1997) (although defendant’s written motion in limine asserted several grounds for the exclusion of an Intoxilyzer breath test, defendant waived his | 2 | 2 |
Roberson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Barber v. State, 236 Ga. App. 294, 297 (2), n. 1 ( 512 SE2d 48 ) (1999) (although defendant’s written motion to suppress “could be read to encompass both the pre-trial and in-court identifications [,]” the fact that defense counsel during the hearing on the motion limited the relief sought to only pre-trial identification waived any objection to subsequent in-court identifications); Roberson v. State, 228 Ga. App. 416, 420 (3) ( 491 SE2d 864 ) (1997) (although defendant’s written motion in limine asserted several grounds for the exclusion of an Intoxilyzer breath test, defendant waived his 2014See Barber v. State, 236 Ga. App. 294, 297 (2), n. 1 ( 512 SE2d 48 ) (1999) (although defendant’s written motion to suppress “could be read to encompass both the pre-trial and in-court identifications [,]” the fact that defense counsel during the hearing on the motion limited the relief sought to only pre-trial identification waived any objection to subsequent in-court identifications); Roberson v. State, 228 Ga. App. 416, 420 (3) ( 491 SE2d 864 ) (1997) (although defendant’s written motion in limine asserted several grounds for the exclusion of an Intoxilyzer breath test, defendant waived his | 2 | 2 |
O'CONNELL v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5); Dorris, supra, 291 Ga. App. at 718-719 (affirming the defendant’s DUI per se conviction based upon evidence as to the irregular manner in which defendant’s truck was parked in the parking lot, defendant’s presence in the driver’s seat, the signs of intoxication, and the intoxilyzer test results showing a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.198 grams); O’Connell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 (1) (a) ( 648 SE2d 147 ) (2007) (ruling that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting the defendant’s DUI per se conviction given the defendant’s degree of int 2013See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5); Dorris, supra, 291 Ga. App. at 718-719 (affirming the defendant’s DUI per se conviction based upon evidence as to the irregular manner in which defendant’s truck was parked in the parking lot, defendant’s presence in the driver’s seat, the signs of intoxication, and the intoxilyzer test results showing a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.198 grams); O’Connell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 (1) (a) ( 648 SE2d 147 ) (2007) (ruling that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting the defendant’s DUI per se conviction given the defendant’s degree of int | 2 | 2 |
State v. Barnardgreen2 sentences2016Rather, the Department is only authorized to revoke or suspend the nonresident’s privilege of driving in Georgia pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-51 (a). 4 See State v. Barnard, 321 Ga. App. 20, 23-24 (1) ( 740 SE2d 837 ) (2013) (The Department “has no authority to suspend or revoke the driver’s license of a nonresident motorist.”) (Footnote omitted.). 2016Rather, the Department is only authorized to revoke or suspend the nonresident’s privilege of driving in Georgia pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-51 (a). 4 See State v. Barnard, 321 Ga. App. 20, 23-24 (1) ( 740 SE2d 837 ) (2013) (The Department “has no authority to suspend or revoke the driver’s license of a nonresident motorist.”) (Footnote omitted.). | 1 | 1 |
Norton v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Further, there was evidence that paramedic first responders were still treating Smith while the initial responding officer was on the scene, and that the initial officer smelled alcohol on Smith at that time , so this supports a finding that the accident scene was still “fresh” at the time Teague was dispatched, which preceded the Intoxilyzer test by only one hour.13 Finally, there was no evidence that Smith consumed alcohol after driving, so Smith’s test result, 0.126, following these events suggests that his blood alcohol concentration 12 Cf. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1) ( 722 2013Further, there was evidence that paramedic first responders were still treating Smith while the initial responding officer was on the scene, and that the initial officer smelled alcohol on Smith at that time , so this supports a finding that the accident scene was still “fresh” at the time Teague was dispatched, which preceded the Intoxilyzer test by only one hour.13 Finally, there was no evidence that Smith consumed alcohol after driving, so Smith’s test result, 0.126, following these events suggests that his blood alcohol concentration 12 Cf. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1) ( 722 | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Further, there was evidence that paramedic first responders were still treating Smith while the initial responding officer was on the scene, and that the initial officer smelled alcohol on Smith at that time , so this supports a finding that the accident scene was still “fresh” at the time Teague was dispatched, which preceded the Intoxilyzer test by only one hour.13 Finally, there was no evidence that Smith consumed alcohol after driving, so Smith’s test result, 0.126, following these events suggests that his blood alcohol concentration 12 Cf. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1) ( 722 2013Further, there was evidence that paramedic first responders were still treating Smith while the initial responding officer was on the scene, and that the initial officer smelled alcohol on Smith at that time , so this supports a finding that the accident scene was still “fresh” at the time Teague was dispatched, which preceded the Intoxilyzer test by only one hour.13 Finally, there was no evidence that Smith consumed alcohol after driving, so Smith’s test result, 0.126, following these events suggests that his blood alcohol concentration 12 Cf. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1) ( 722 | 1 | 1 |
Frye v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Further, there was evidence that paramedic first responders were still treating Smith while the initial responding officer was on the scene, and that the initial officer smelled alcohol on Smith at that time , so this supports a finding that the accident scene was still “fresh” at the time Teague was dispatched, which preceded the Intoxilyzer test by only one hour.13 Finally, there was no evidence that Smith consumed alcohol after driving, so Smith’s test result, 0.126, following these events suggests that his blood alcohol concentration 12 Cf. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1) ( 722 2013Further, there was evidence that paramedic first responders were still treating Smith while the initial responding officer was on the scene, and that the initial officer smelled alcohol on Smith at that time , so this supports a finding that the accident scene was still “fresh” at the time Teague was dispatched, which preceded the Intoxilyzer test by only one hour.13 Finally, there was no evidence that Smith consumed alcohol after driving, so Smith’s test result, 0.126, following these events suggests that his blood alcohol concentration 12 Cf. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1) ( 722 | 1 | 1 |
Lawson v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Further, there was evidence that paramedic first responders were still treating Smith while the initial responding officer was on the scene, and that the initial officer smelled alcohol on Smith at that time , so this supports a finding that the accident scene was still “fresh” at the time Teague was dispatched, which preceded the Intoxilyzer test by only one hour.13 Finally, there was no evidence that Smith consumed alcohol after driving, so Smith’s test result, 0.126, following these events suggests that his blood alcohol concentration 12 Cf. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1) ( 722 2013Further, there was evidence that paramedic first responders were still treating Smith while the initial responding officer was on the scene, and that the initial officer smelled alcohol on Smith at that time , so this supports a finding that the accident scene was still “fresh” at the time Teague was dispatched, which preceded the Intoxilyzer test by only one hour.13 Finally, there was no evidence that Smith consumed alcohol after driving, so Smith’s test result, 0.126, following these events suggests that his blood alcohol concentration 12 Cf. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1) ( 722 | 1 | 1 |
Chesser v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Holowiak contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a subpoena to secure an out-of-state witness who could provide the Intoxilyzer 5000 source code, under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, OCGA § 24-10-90 et seq. “[F]or a witness from another state to be summoned to testify in this state he must be a necessary and material witness.” Chesser v. State, 168 Ga. App. 195, 196 ( 308 SE2d 589 ) (1983); OCGA § 24-10-92 (b). 2011Holowiak contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a subpoena to secure an out-of-state witness who could provide the Intoxilyzer 5000 source code, under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, OCGA § 24-10-90 et seq. “[F]or a witness from another state to be summoned to testify in this state he must be a necessary and material witness.” Chesser v. State, 168 Ga. App. 195, 196 ( 308 SE2d 589 ) (1983); OCGA § 24-10-92 (b). | 1 | 1 |
Diaz v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431 ) (2002). 2 See generally Park v. State, 220 Ga. App., 215, 218 (4) ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996). 3 (Footnotes omitted.) Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 5 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 6 Id. 7 (Emphasis omitted.) 8 Id. 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 728-729. 10 See Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 381 (1) ( 537 SE2d 784 ) (2000). 2003Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431 ) (2002). 2 See generally Park v. State, 220 Ga. App., 215, 218 (4) ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996). 3 (Footnotes omitted.) Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 5 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 6 Id. 7 (Emphasis omitted.) 8 Id. 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 728-729. 10 See Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 381 (1) ( 537 SE2d 784 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Ladow v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431 ) (2002). 2 See generally Park v. State, 220 Ga. App., 215, 218 (4) ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996). 3 (Footnotes omitted.) Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 5 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 6 Id. 7 (Emphasis omitted.) 8 Id. 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 728-729. 10 See Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 381 (1) ( 537 SE2d 784 ) (2000). 2003Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431 ) (2002). 2 See generally Park v. State, 220 Ga. App., 215, 218 (4) ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996). 3 (Footnotes omitted.) Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 5 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 6 Id. 7 (Emphasis omitted.) 8 Id. 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 728-729. 10 See Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 381 (1) ( 537 SE2d 784 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Park v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431 ) (2002). 2 See generally Park v. State, 220 Ga. App., 215, 218 (4) ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996). 3 (Footnotes omitted.) Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 5 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 6 Id. 7 (Emphasis omitted.) 8 Id. 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 728-729. 10 See Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 381 (1) ( 537 SE2d 784 ) (2000). 2003Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431 ) (2002). 2 See generally Park v. State, 220 Ga. App., 215, 218 (4) ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996). 3 (Footnotes omitted.) Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 5 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 6 Id. 7 (Emphasis omitted.) 8 Id. 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 728-729. 10 See Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 381 (1) ( 537 SE2d 784 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania v. Munizgreen2 sentences1999See id. at 600-601 . 1999See id. at 600-601 . | 1 | 1 |
Hunter v. Stategreen2 sentences1998In this case, as in Hunter v. State, 191 Ga.App. 219, 220 , 381 S.E.2d 525 (1989), "the State is at least entitled to an inference" that the officer acted within his territorial jurisdiction, Troup County. 1998In this case, as in Hunter v. State, 191 Ga.App. 219, 220 , 381 S.E.2d 525 (1989), "the State is at least entitled to an inference" that the officer acted within his territorial jurisdiction, Troup County. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stetz v. State
green
1 sentence2010Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with this Court’s recent holding that “the only discoverable information from an intoxilyzer test under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (4) is the computer printout of the test result.” (Footnote omitted.) Stetz, 301 Ga. App. at 461 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Associates
green
2 sentences2003Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431 ) (2002). 2 See generally Park v. State, 220 Ga. App., 215, 218 (4) ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996). 3 (Footnotes omitted.) Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 5 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 6 Id. 7 (Emphasis omitted.) 8 Id. 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 728-729. 10 See Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 381 (1) ( 537 SE2d 784 ) (2000). 2003Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431 ) (2002). 2 See generally Park v. State, 220 Ga. App., 215, 218 (4) ( 469 SE2d 353 ) (1996). 3 (Footnotes omitted.) Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 4 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 5 (Footnote omitted.) Id. 6 Id. 7 (Emphasis omitted.) 8 Id. 9 (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 728-729. 10 See Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 381 (1) ( 537 SE2d 784 ) (2000). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Department of Education v. Kitchens
green
2 sentences2000Citing to Dept. of Ed. v. Kitchens, 193 Ga. App. 229 ( 387 SE2d 579 ) (1989), the trial court determined that it must construe the exemption in OCGA § 35-3-155 narrowly. 2000Citing to Dept. of Ed. v. Kitchens, 193 Ga. App. 229 ( 387 SE2d 579 ) (1989), the trial court determined that it must construe the exemption in OCGA § 35-3-155 narrowly. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Helmeci v. State
green
2 sentences2000This Code section provides: Unless otherwise provided by law, technical, scientific, and similar processes, procedures, guidelines, standards, and methods for the collection, preservation, or testing of evidence adopted by the division shall not be subject to the provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.” The trial court determined that this Code section exempted DFS from the publication requirements of the APA with regard to the method for administering the Intoxilyzer test (as previously determined in this Court by Helmeci, supra), but that the statute 2000This Code section provides: Unless otherwise provided by law, technical, scientific, and similar processes, procedures, guidelines, standards, and methods for the collection, preservation, or testing of evidence adopted by the division shall not be subject to the provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.” The trial court determined that this Code section exempted DFS from the publication requirements of the APA with regard to the method for administering the Intoxilyzer test (as previously determined in this Court by Helmeci, supra), but that the statute | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.