Thomas plea in Michigan

2017In addition, even without an objection, the trial court properly instructed the jury on Thomas’s presumption of innocence and the prosecutor’s burden to “prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that “[t]he defendant is not required to prove his innocence or to do anything.” The court also instructed the jury that “[i]f a lawyer says something different about the law, follow what I say.” These instructions were sufficient to protect Thomas’s substantial rights, People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 35 ; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), lv gtd 499 Mich 934 (2016), and the jury is pres

2017In addition, even without an objection, the trial court properly instructed the jury on Thomas’s presumption of innocence and the prosecutor’s burden to “prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that “[t]he defendant is not required to prove his innocence or to do anything.” The court also instructed the jury that “[i]f a lawyer says something different about the law, follow what I say.” These instructions were sufficient to protect Thomas’s substantial rights, People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 35 ; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), lv gtd 499 Mich 934 (2016), and the jury is pres

2017People v Henry, 315 Mich App 130, 150 ; 889 NW2d 1 (2016).

2017People v Henry, 315 Mich App 130, 150 ; 889 NW2d 1 (2016).

2017In addition, even without an objection, the trial court properly instructed the jury on Thomas’s presumption of innocence and the prosecutor’s burden to “prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that “[t]he defendant is not required to prove his innocence or to do anything.” The court also instructed the jury that “[i]f a lawyer says something different about the law, follow what I say.” These instructions were sufficient to protect Thomas’s substantial rights, People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 35 ; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), lv gtd 499 Mich 934 (2016), and the jury is pres

2017In addition, even without an objection, the trial court properly instructed the jury on Thomas’s presumption of innocence and the prosecutor’s burden to “prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that “[t]he defendant is not required to prove his innocence or to do anything.” The court also instructed the jury that “[i]f a lawyer says something different about the law, follow what I say.” These instructions were sufficient to protect Thomas’s substantial rights, People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 35 ; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), lv gtd 499 Mich 934 (2016), and the jury is pres

2023A. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL This Court reviews a trial court’s decisions to grant or deny a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion, Guerrero v Smith, 280 Mich App 647, 666 ; 761 NW2d 723 (2008), and this Court similarly reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, Mueller v Brannigan Bros Restaurants and Taverns LLC, 323 Mich App 566, 571 ; 918 NW2d 545 (2018).

2023A. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL This Court reviews a trial court’s decisions to grant or deny a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion, Guerrero v Smith, 280 Mich App 647, 666 ; 761 NW2d 723 (2008), and this Court similarly reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, Mueller v Brannigan Bros Restaurants and Taverns LLC, 323 Mich App 566, 571 ; 918 NW2d 545 (2018).

2023A. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL This Court reviews a trial court’s decisions to grant or deny a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion, Guerrero v Smith, 280 Mich App 647, 666 ; 761 NW2d 723 (2008), and this Court similarly reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, Mueller v Brannigan Bros Restaurants and Taverns LLC, 323 Mich App 566, 571 ; 918 NW2d 545 (2018).

2023A. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL This Court reviews a trial court’s decisions to grant or deny a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion, Guerrero v Smith, 280 Mich App 647, 666 ; 761 NW2d 723 (2008), and this Court similarly reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, Mueller v Brannigan Bros Restaurants and Taverns LLC, 323 Mich App 566, 571 ; 918 NW2d 545 (2018).

2023During opening statements, the prosecutor described Thomas’s plea bargain, emphasizing that “while Thomas was getting ‘something out of it [i.e. testifying against Kincade],’ he was also a person who ‘did something wrong’ but was going ‘to face up to it.’ ” Kincade, 412 N.W.2d at 253 .

2023The prosecutor questioned Thomas extensively about the plea at the beginning of Thomas’s direct testimony, to which Kincade’s attorney did not object; instead, the attorney inquired about the reduced charge and “suggested that Thomas’ guilty plea was ‘no big deal’ because he had violated his parole and likely would have gone to prison anyway.” Ibid.

2021Dawoud v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 317 Mich App 517, 524 ; 895 NW2d 188 (2016). -7- Affirmed.

2020Seldon, 297 Mich App at 437 .

2019Id. at 68 .

2016MCR 2.603(A)(1).” 4 MCR 2.603(D)(1) provides that “[a] motion to set aside a default or a default judgment, except when grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, shall be granted only if good cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed.” To determine whether a meritorious defense has been presented, a trial court should consider whether: “(1) the plaintiff cannot prove or defendant can disprove an element of the claim or a statutory requirement; (2) a ground for summary disposition exists . . . or (3) the plaintiff’s claim rests on evidence that i

2016MCR 2.603(A)(1).” 4 MCR 2.603(D)(1) provides that “[a] motion to set aside a default or a default judgment, except when grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, shall be granted only if good cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed.” To determine whether a meritorious defense has been presented, a trial court should consider whether: “(1) the plaintiff cannot prove or defendant can disprove an element of the claim or a statutory requirement; (2) a ground for summary disposition exists . . . or (3) the plaintiff’s claim rests on evidence that i

2015Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331 , 338 n 9; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). -4-

2015Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331 , 338 n 9; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). -4-

1996Instead, it narrowly focused on language in People v. Sturgis, 427 Mich. 392, 401 , 397 N.W.2d 783 (1986), that, under the state constitutional analysis, part of Michigan's broader "same transaction" test includes whether all the charges "demonstrate `a single intent and goal.'" [28] The Court of Appeals said that there was "no indication in the record that the `single intent and goal' of the conspirators in Florida was to conspire to possess with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine in Michigan." [29] This analysis ignores the holding in Brown that a prosecution for a lesser inclu

1996Instead, it narrowly focused on language in People v. Sturgis, 427 Mich. 392, 401 , 397 N.W.2d 783 (1986), that, under the state constitutional analysis, part of Michigan's broader "same transaction" test includes whether all the charges "demonstrate `a single intent and goal.'" [28] The Court of Appeals said that there was "no indication in the record that the `single intent and goal' of the conspirators in Florida was to conspire to possess with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine in Michigan." [29] This analysis ignores the holding in Brown that a prosecution for a lesser inclu

1986Thomas then changed his position and opposed setting aside the divorce. [3] See Gunn v Gunn, 205 Mich 198, 200 ; 171 NW 371 (1919).

1986Thomas then changed his position and opposed setting aside the divorce. [3] See Gunn v Gunn, 205 Mich 198, 200 ; 171 NW 371 (1919).