Thomas claim in Indiana

2010Id. at 850 .

2009Id.

1989When an unemployment compensation claimant appeals pro se the denial of unemployment compensation, the referee has a duty "to insure a complete presentation of [the claimant's] case at the review hearing." Flick v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1982), Ind. App., 443 N.E.2d 84, 86 . 640 IAC 1-11-3 (1988). [4] In his hearing before the referee, although Thomas quoted from the Act, [5] the referee failed either to request a citation for the quote or to obtain a copy of the quoted material from Thomas to place in the record; she failed to inquire and develop Thomas's po

1989When an unemployment compensation claimant appeals pro se the denial of unemployment compensation, the referee has a duty "to insure a complete presentation of [the claimant's] case at the review hearing." Flick v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1982), Ind.App., 443 N.E.2d 84, 86 . 640 IAC 1-11-3 (1988). 4 In his hearing before the referee, although Thomas quoted from the Act, 5 the referee failed either to request a citation for the quote or to obtain a copy of the quoted material from Thomas to place in the record; she failed to inquire and develop Thomas's positio

1982In a 2-1 decision (Buchanan, C.J., dissenting) the Second District found that the disqualifying statute, Ind. Code 22-4-15-1, as applied to Thomas's claim improperly burdened his right to the free exercise of his religion. [1] Our Supreme Court, however, accepted transfer and vacated the opinion in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, (1979) Ind., 391 N.E.2d 1127 .

1982J., dissenting) the Second District found that the disqualifying statute, Ind.Code 22-4-15-1, as applied to Thomas’s claim improperly burdened his right to the free exercise of his religion. 1 Our Supreme Court, however, accepted transfer and vacated the opinion in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, (1979) Ind., 391 N.E.2d 1127 .

2014Thomas’s claim that he was denied a fair trial, mirrors the issue raised by the defendant in Spearman v. State, 744 N.E.2d 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

2009Due Process In evaluating Thomas's challenge and the adequacy of the summons in this case, we bear in mind Thomas's constitutional due process protections. "'An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the cireumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'" Munster, 829 N.E.2d at 58 (quoting Mullane v. Cent.

2009Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)); see D.C., 887 N.E.2d at 957 . " '[Wlhen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.

2009Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)); see D.C., 887 N.E.2d at 957 . " '[Wlhen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.

2001Unlike the plaintiff in M.V. v. Charter Terre Haute Behavioral Health System, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind.Ct.

2001Unlike the plaintiff in M.V. v. Charter Terre Haute Behavioral Health System, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), whose false imprisonment claim against a psychiatric facility was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because he had failed to first take his claim to the Department of Insurance, Thomas' claims did not arise because of Deitsch's provision of medical services.

1997After reviewing the statutory schemes of IC 35-45-4-2 and IC 35-50-2-8, we find that they compliment each other and that the prostitution statute is not “a discreet, separate, and independent habitual offender statute.” Stanek v. State, 603 N.E.2d at 153-54 .

1997Unlike Freeman, Devore, and Stanek , because the Thomas defendant’s “convictions were not already enhanced by a specific habitual offender scheme, use of the general habitual offender statute does not result in double enhancement.” Thomas, 684 N.E.2d at 224 .

1994An award of appellate attorney fees may be had when “a claim or defense is ‘frivolous,’ i.e., that it is taken primarily for the purpose of harassment, the attorney is unable to make a good faith and rational argument on the merits of the action, or the attorney is unable to support the action taken by a good faith and rational argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Smoot v. Smoot (1992), Ind.App., 604 N.E.2d 618, 626 .

1992Haas. v. South Bend Community School Corp. (1972), 259 Ind. 515, 526 , 289 N.E.2d 495, 501 . 4 . - Appellees use this term to denote the practice of keeping student athletes out of varsity competition for a year in order to extend their eligibility.

1992Haas. v. South Bend Community School Corp. (1972), 259 Ind. 515, 526 , 289 N.E.2d 495, 501 . 4 . - Appellees use this term to denote the practice of keeping student athletes out of varsity competition for a year in order to extend their eligibility.

1991The Thomas rule was subsequently considered in State v. Harden (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 35 : This Court held in Thomas that reversible error occurred when the trial court allowed the jury to take into deliberations transcripts of prior inconsistent statements which had been used to impeach State's witnesses who had surprised the prosecution by giving exculpatory testimony.

1991The Thomas rule was subsequently considered in State v. Harden (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 35 : This Court held in Thomas that reversible error occurred when the trial court allowed the jury to take into deliberations transcripts of prior inconsistent statements which had been used to impeach State's witnesses who had surprised the prosecution by giving exculpatory testimony.

1987Id. at pp. 134-36." Ortiz v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 549 , 356 N.E.2d 1168 , 1197. 3 Applying the Thomas rule to this case, I.C. 34-1-21-6 required the judge, on the jury's request, to replay the properly admitted audio tape in open court.

1987Id. at pp. 134-36." Ortiz v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 549 , 356 N.E.2d 1168 , 1197. 3 Applying the Thomas rule to this case, I.C. 34-1-21-6 required the judge, on the jury's request, to replay the properly admitted audio tape in open court.

1984Wyler v. Lilly Varnish Co. (1969), 146 Ind.App. 91 , 252 N.E.2d 824 .

1984Wyler v. Lilly Varnish Co. (1969), 146 Ind.App. 91 , 252 N.E.2d 824 .

1978Indeed, the Board argues merely that there is a distinction and that Thomas' disqualification "was simply a determination that objective, religiously neutral standards were not met." We think it settled that *892 "[e]ven as to neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims, the Free Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government's valid aims." Gillette v. United States (1971) 401 U.S. 437 , 91 S.Ct. 828, 842 , 28 L.Ed.2d 168 .

1978Indeed, the Board argues merely that there is a distinction and that Thomas' disqualification "was simply a determination that objective, religiously neutral standards were not met." We think it settled that *892 "[e]ven as to neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims, the Free Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government's valid aims." Gillette v. United States (1971) 401 U.S. 437 , 91 S.Ct. 828, 842 , 28 L.Ed.2d 168 .