purview rule in Missouri

2020"It is within the purview of the hearing officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case." Drury, 347 S.W.3d at 112 .

2020The Commission has some discretion when deciding "which approach best estimates the value of a particular property[,]" but its choice of a valuation approach must comply with the law that "real property in Missouri be taxed according to its true value in money." Snider, 156 S.W.3d at 348 .

1985In Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 336 Mo. 184 , 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934), the Court explained: One also has the right (and this applies to a newspaper which is properly in the business not only of giving the public news but also of making them think about its significance) to comment upon true facts, when they are matters of public concern, by stating his inferences and conclusions about them.

1985In Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 336 Mo. 184 , 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934), the Court explained: One also has the right (and this applies to a newspaper which is properly in the business not only of giving the public news but also of making them think about its significance) to comment upon true facts, when they are matters of public concern, by stating his inferences and conclusions about them.

1984Even when facially applicable, inconsistencies or contradictions in a witness’ trial testimony must be so polarized as to “rob the testimony of all probative force.” City of Kansas City v. Scanland, supra. Defendant seeks to pulverize sub-missibility of the state’s case under the rule of “destructive testimony” or “destructive contradictions” by applying it to certain testimony of the victim and that of her two schoolmates who made an in-court identification of defendant.

1979But, whether the declarations in this case are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule or outside the purview of that rule is a technical question we need not burden this opinion with answering. 10 *418 Defendant relies upon State v. Benson, 346 Mo. 497 , 142 S.W.2d 52 (1940).

1979But, whether the declarations in this case are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule or outside the purview of that rule is a technical question we need not burden this opinion with answering. 10 *418 Defendant relies upon State v. Benson, 346 Mo. 497 , 142 S.W.2d 52 (1940).

1976See: Wyckoff v. Davis, 297 S.W.2d 490 (Mo.1957).

1959Critcher v. Rudy Fick, Inc., Mo., 315 S.W.2d 421 ; Johnson v. Fotie, Mo., 308 S.W.2d 662 ; In re Petersen’s Estate, Mo., 295 S.W.2d 144 .

1959Critcher v. Rudy Fick, Inc., Mo., 315 S.W.2d 421 ; Johnson v. Fotie, Mo., 308 S.W.2d 662 ; In re Petersen's Estate, Mo., 295 S.W.2d 144 .

1959Critcher v. Rudy Fick, Inc., Mo., 315 S.W.2d 421 ; Johnson v. Fotie, Mo., 308 S.W.2d 662 ; In re Petersen’s Estate, Mo., 295 S.W.2d 144 .

1959Critcher v. Rudy Fick, Inc., Mo., 315 S.W.2d 421 ; Johnson v. Fotie, Mo., 308 S.W.2d 662 ; In re Petersen's Estate, Mo., 295 S.W.2d 144 .

1959Critcher v. Rudy Fick, Inc., Mo., 315 S.W.2d 421 ; Johnson v. Fotie, Mo., 308 S.W.2d 662 ; In re Petersen’s Estate, Mo., 295 S.W.2d 144 .

1959Critcher v. Rudy Fick, Inc., Mo., 315 S.W.2d 421 ; Johnson v. Fotie, Mo., 308 S.W.2d 662 ; In re Petersen's Estate, Mo., 295 S.W.2d 144 .

1936This court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause with directions to enter a judgment for the plaintiffs for only the installments falling due January and February 17, 1920, ruling, so far as pertinent here ( 309 Mo. 276 , 274 S.W. l.c. 703), that: "Plaintiffs in casting their petition in the form in which they did were endeavoring to state a case within the purview of the doctrine that the renunciation of a contract, covering the entire performance, before the time of performance is such a breach as gives an immediate right of action.

1917We take notice of a former appeal and of the record thereof (Keaton v. Jorndt, 259 Mo. 179 ); but we do not notice the facts and records in one action when called on to rule another and separate one. [Spurlock v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 67 ; Banks v. Burnam, 61 Mo. 76 ; 16 Cyc. 918.] So as this case as now presented comes to us as an entirely new case, we are not bound by the law thereof- as announced in the case of State ex rel. v. Geiger, supra, as “the law of the case,” within the purview of the rule urged on us, and so as to render that rule binding on us whether it be in our view rightly ruled o

1917We take notice of a former appeal and of the record thereof (Keaton v. Jorndt, 259 Mo. 179 ); but we do not notice the facts and records in one action when called on to rule another and separate one. [Spurlock v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 67 ; Banks v. Burnam, 61 Mo. 76 ; 16 Cyc. 918.] So as this case as now presented comes to us as an entirely new case, we are not bound by the law thereof- as announced in the case of State ex rel. v. Geiger, supra, as “the law of the case,” within the purview of the rule urged on us, and so as to render that rule binding on us whether it be in our view rightly ruled o

1917We take notice of a former appeal and of the record thereof (Keaton v. Jorndt, 259 Mo. 179 ); but we do not notice the facts and records in one action when called on to rule another and separate one. [Spurlock v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 67 ; Banks v. Burnam, 61 Mo. 76 ; 16 Cyc. 918.] So as this case as now presented comes to us as an entirely new case, we are not bound by the law thereof- as announced in the case of State ex rel. v. Geiger, supra, as “the law of the case,” within the purview of the rule urged on us, and so as to render that rule binding on us whether it be in our view rightly ruled o

1917We take notice of a former appeal and of the record thereof (Keaton v. Jorndt, 259 Mo. 179 ); but we do not notice the facts and records in one action when called on to rule another and separate one. [Spurlock v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 67 ; Banks v. Burnam, 61 Mo. 76 ; 16 Cyc. 918.] So as this case as now presented comes to us as an entirely new case, we are not bound by the law thereof- as announced in the case of State ex rel. v. Geiger, supra, as “the law of the case,” within the purview of the rule urged on us, and so as to render that rule binding on us whether it be in our view rightly ruled o

1916Manifestly the court excluded the paper itself on the theory that it was an ex parte and self-serving document which did not fall within the purview of the rule imparting the character of evidence to ex parte book accounts, etc., “made at the time or nearly so of doing the principal fact.” [Milling Co. v. Wash, 108 Mo. l. c. 285; Hay v. Fire Clay Co., 179 Mo. App. 567 .] The statement being prepared immediately before the interview and, therefore, long after most of the transactions referred to therein, was not contemporaneous, or nearly so, with the transactions and, therefore, was not a part

1915It is fairly clear by all of the books and cases, if language like that used by the detective Arthur had been used by the sheriff, or the jailer, or the prosecuting attorney, or by any other of those whom the books denominate “persons in authority,” the confession here would be utterly inadmissible, because not voluntary. [1 Greenleaf on Ev., sec. 222; 3 Ency. of Ev. 316.] The authorities practically all agree that a confession induced by a “person in authority” by the use of such words as “tell the truth and it will be better for you,” renders the confession inadmissible. [3 Ency. of Ev. 311;

1915It is fairly clear by all of the books and cases, if language like that used by the detective Arthur had been used by the sheriff, or the jailer, or the prosecuting attorney, or by any other of those whom the books denominate “persons in authority,” the confession here would be utterly inadmissible, because not voluntary. [1 Greenleaf on Ev., sec. 222; 3 Ency. of Ev. 316.] The authorities practically all agree that a confession induced by a “person in authority” by the use of such words as “tell the truth and it will be better for you,” renders the confession inadmissible. [3 Ency. of Ev. 311;

1912With respect to such matter false representations of the vendor will give the vendee a cause of action for the damages he sustains in instances wherein the following elements are combined: (1) That false representations of a material fact or facts were made by the vendor to the vendee with intent to deceive; (2) that the vendee believed the representations to be true and relied upon them and (3) that his reliance upon them was an act of ordinary prudence. [Phelps v. Jones, 141 Mo. App. 223 , and cases cited.] The vendor’s intent to deceive is an indispensable ingredient of the cause, but the e

1912Co. v. Yancey, 33 Ill.

1881A “ liability arising from the misconduct of the principal ” prior to the giving of the second bond, according to the express language of the statute under discussion, had been incurred, and the loss to the estate was directly attributable to the misconduct of Staehlin prior to the execution of the second bond — as but for such misconduct, no such loss could have occurred., These circumstances bring this case fully within the purview and principle of the rule as laid down in State v. Drury, supra. It is true, in that case the bond declared on was that of a curator, but the same provisions were