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40 California opinions name it 2 courts 1893–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Grable v. Grablegreen2 sentences2014(Pyle v. Moles, supra, F060873; see Grable v. Grable (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 353, 359-360 [“[A] decision of an appellate court … falls within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata and is conclusive of the issues and matters determined by the appellate court.”]; accord Overstreet v. County of Butte (1962) 57 Cal.2d 504, 507 ; Dept. of Water & Power v. Inyo Chem. 1991But the first judgment ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.' " (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1985) Judgment, § 253, pp. 691-692.) Thus, in Grable v. Grable (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 353, 359-360 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 353 ], the court said: “It is also settled that the decision of an appellate court . . . falls within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata and is conclusive of the issues and matters determined by the appellate court.” (See, also, Ryerson v. Riverside Cement Co. (1968) 266 | 2 | 2 |
Overstreet v. County of Buttegreen2 sentences2014(Pyle v. Moles, supra, F060873; see Grable v. Grable (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 353, 359-360 [“[A] decision of an appellate court … falls within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata and is conclusive of the issues and matters determined by the appellate court.”]; accord Overstreet v. County of Butte (1962) 57 Cal.2d 504, 507 ; Dept. of Water & Power v. Inyo Chem. 1991But the first judgment ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.' " (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1985) Judgment, § 253, pp. 691-692.) Thus, in Grable v. Grable (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 353, 359-360 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 353 ], the court said: “It is also settled that the decision of an appellate court . . . falls within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata and is conclusive of the issues and matters determined by the appellate court.” (See, also, Ryerson v. Riverside Cement Co. (1968) 266 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Robargegreen2 sentences1959(People v. Trujillo (1948), 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [ 194 P.2d 681 ], cert. den. [ 335 U.S. 887 , 69 S.Ct. 236 , 93 L.Ed. 426 ] ; People v. Robarge (1953), 41 Cal.2d 628, 632-633 [ 262 P.2d 14 ] ; People v. Chapman (1957), 151 Cal.App. 2d 59, 63 [ 311 P.2d 190 ]. 1959(People v. Trujillo (1948), 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [ 194 P.2d 681 ], cert. den. [ 335 U.S. 887 , 69 S.Ct. 236 , 93 L.Ed. 426 ] ; People v. Robarge (1953), 41 Cal.2d 628, 632-633 [ 262 P.2d 14 ] ; People v. Chapman (1957), 151 Cal.App. 2d 59, 63 [ 311 P.2d 190 ]. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Trujillogreen2 sentences1959(People v. Trujillo (1948), 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [ 194 P.2d 681 ], cert. den. [ 335 U.S. 887 , 69 S.Ct. 236 , 93 L.Ed. 426 ] ; People v. Robarge (1953), 41 Cal.2d 628, 632-633 [ 262 P.2d 14 ] ; People v. Chapman (1957), 151 Cal.App. 2d 59, 63 [ 311 P.2d 190 ]. 1959(People v. Trujillo (1948), 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [ 194 P.2d 681 ], cert. den. [ 335 U.S. 887 , 69 S.Ct. 236 , 93 L.Ed. 426 ] ; People v. Robarge (1953), 41 Cal.2d 628, 632-633 [ 262 P.2d 14 ] ; People v. Chapman (1957), 151 Cal.App. 2d 59, 63 [ 311 P.2d 190 ]. | 1 | 2 |
Bono v. Davidgreen2 sentences2014First, recognizing there is some range in the breadth of arbitration clauses, a court should classify the particular clause as either broad or narrow. [Citations.] Next, if reviewing a narrow clause, the court must determine whether the dispute is over an issue that ‘is on its face within the purview of the clause,’ or over a collateral issue that is somehow connected to the main agreement that contains the arbitration clause. [Citations.] Where the arbitration clause is narrow, a collateral matter will generally be ruled beyond its purview. [Citation.] Where the arbitration clause is broad, ‘ 2014(See Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A., supra, 252 F.3d at p. 226 [“ ‘[s]pecific words or phrases alone may not be determinative although words of limitation would indicate a narrower clause’ ”]; Bono, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067 [mandatory arbitration clause “covers only, a controversy involving ‘the construction and application of any provision of this Agreement;’ ” “[t]his is substantially narrower than . . . the clauses . . . which used terminology such as ‘any controversy arising out of or relating to’ and the like”]; Medical Staff of Doctors Medical Center in Modesto v. Kamil (2005) 132 Ca | 1 | 1 |
Medical Staff of Doctors Medical Center v. Kamilgreen1 sentence2014(See Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A., supra, 252 F.3d at p. 226 [“ ‘[s]pecific words or phrases alone may not be determinative although words of limitation would indicate a narrower clause’ ”]; Bono, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067 [mandatory arbitration clause “covers only, a controversy involving ‘the construction and application of any provision of this Agreement;’ ” “[t]his is substantially narrower than . . . the clauses . . . which used terminology such as ‘any controversy arising out of or relating to’ and the like”]; Medical Staff of Doctors Medical Center in Modesto v. Kamil (2005) 132 Ca | 1 | 1 |
Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc.green2 sentences2014First, recognizing there is some range in the breadth of arbitration clauses, a court should classify the particular clause as either broad or narrow. [Citations.] Next, if reviewing a narrow clause, the court must determine whether the dispute is over an issue that ‘is on its face within the purview of the clause,’ or over a collateral issue that is somehow connected to the main agreement that contains the arbitration clause. [Citations.] Where the arbitration clause is narrow, a collateral matter will generally be ruled beyond its purview. [Citation.] Where the arbitration clause is broad, ‘ 2014(See Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A., supra, 252 F.3d at p. 226 [“ ‘[s]pecific words or phrases alone may not be determinative although words of limitation would indicate a narrower clause’ ”]; Bono, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067 [mandatory arbitration clause “covers only, a controversy involving ‘the construction and application of any provision of this Agreement;’ ” “[t]his is substantially narrower than . . . the clauses . . . which used terminology such as ‘any controversy arising out of or relating to’ and the like”]; Medical Staff of Doctors Medical Center in Modesto v. Kamil (2005) 132 Ca | 1 | 1 |
Lane v. Wilkinsgreen2 sentences2001Moreover, we are convinced that the objectives of the Rules of Professional Conduct to protect the public and promote respect and confidence in the legal profession are furthered by including in the purview of rule 2-200 all agreements to divide fees, not just referrals. ( Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 639 , 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 31 .) Attorney fee agreements "are strictly construed against the attorney. ( Bennett v. Potter (1919) 180 Cal. 736, 740 [ 183 P. 156 ]; Lane v. Wilkins (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 315, 323 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 309 ].) In order to protect clients and to assure fee agree 2001Moreover, we are convinced that the objectives of the Rules of Professional Conduct to protect the public and promote respect and confidence in the legal profession are furthered by including in the purview of rule 2-200 all agreements to divide fees, not just referrals. ( Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 639 , 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 31 .) Attorney fee agreements "are strictly construed against the attorney. ( Bennett v. Potter (1919) 180 Cal. 736, 740 [ 183 P. 156 ]; Lane v. Wilkins (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 315, 323 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 309 ].) In order to protect clients and to assure fee agree | 1 | 1 |
Bennett v. Pottergreen2 sentences2001Moreover, we are convinced that the objectives of the Rules of Professional Conduct to protect the public and promote respect and confidence in the legal profession are furthered by including in the purview of rule 2-200 all agreements to divide fees, not just referrals. ( Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 639 , 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 31 .) Attorney fee agreements "are strictly construed against the attorney. ( Bennett v. Potter (1919) 180 Cal. 736, 740 [ 183 P. 156 ]; Lane v. Wilkins (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 315, 323 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 309 ].) In order to protect clients and to assure fee agree 2001Moreover, we are convinced that the objectives of the Rules of Professional Conduct to protect the public and promote respect and confidence in the legal profession are furthered by including in the purview of rule 2-200 all agreements to divide fees, not just referrals. ( Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 639 , 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 31 .) Attorney fee agreements "are strictly construed against the attorney. ( Bennett v. Potter (1919) 180 Cal. 736, 740 [ 183 P. 156 ]; Lane v. Wilkins (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 315, 323 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 309 ].) In order to protect clients and to assure fee agree | 1 | 1 |
| Glenn v. Gibsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kurata v. Los Angeles News Publishing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hayward v. Watsonville Register-Pajaronian and Sungreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sutphin v. Speikgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacKie v. MacKiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. Ski Run Apartments Associatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hood v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People Ex Rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Donovangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Regangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sherrillo v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lake v. Bonyngegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Steiner v. Rowleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Phillips v. Pattersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Social Welfare of State of California v. Stauffergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Chapmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of Bairdgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sischo v. City of Los Banosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Swarzwald v. Cooleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coulter v. Howardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Corvin v. Hyattgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Van Hoosear v. Railroad Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gomez
green
2 sentences2018As the Court of Appeal explained in Gomez, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 609 : “[W]hether a question about a suspect’s gang affiliation during a booking interview is encompassed by the booking question exception depends upon whether, under all the facts and circumstances, the question was designed to elicit an incriminating response.” (Id. at p. 627.) Under the factors suggested by Gomez for consideration in determining whether questions are legitimate booking questions or a pretext for eliciting incriminating information (id. at pp. 630-631), the challenged questions and answers here were admissible 2018As the Court of Appeal explained in Gomez, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 609 : “[W]hether a question about a suspect’s gang affiliation during a booking interview is encompassed by the booking question exception depends upon whether, under all the facts and circumstances, the question was designed to elicit an incriminating response.” (Id. at p. 627.) Under the factors suggested by Gomez for consideration in determining whether questions are legitimate booking questions or a pretext for eliciting incriminating information (id. at pp. 630-631), the challenged questions and answers here were admissible | 4 | 2016–2018 |
Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2016(Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, LTD. (9th Cir. 2008) 531 F.3d 767, 782-783 .) However, certain contracts may come within the purview of the rule. 2016(Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, LTD. (9th Cir. 2008) 531 F.3d 767, 782-783 .) However, certain contracts may come within the purview of the rule. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Diffenderfer v. Board of President of St. Louis Public Schools
green
2 sentences2012This principle is announced in Diffenderfer v. Board, etc. [(1894)] 120 Mo. 447 [ 25 S.W. 542 ], and Syms v. Mayor of New York [(1887)] 105 N.Y. 153 [6 N.Y. 2012This principle is announced in Diffenderfer v. Board, etc. [(1894)] 120 Mo. 447 [ 25 S.W. 542 ], and Syms v. Mayor of New York [(1887)] 105 N.Y. 153 [6 N.Y. | 2 | 1921–2012 |
Syms v. . Mayor, Etc., of N.Y.
green
2 sentences2012This principle is announced in Diffenderfer v. Board, etc. [(1894)] 120 Mo. 447 [ 25 S.W. 542 ], and Syms v. Mayor of New York [(1887)] 105 N.Y. 153 [6 N.Y. 1921This principle is announced in Diffenderfer v. Board, etc., 120 Mo. 447 [ 25 S. W. 542 ], and Syms v. Mayor of New York, 105 N. Y. 153 [ 11 N. E. 369 ], However, in each of these cases the language of the lease was sufficiently uncertain to permit of the application of the rule. [2] On the other hand, a clause providing for perpetual renewals at the option of the lessee is held to be enforceable when it appears that it was clearly the intention of the parties that the lessee should have that right. | 2 | 1921–2012 |
Grosslight v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2005(Evid.Code, § 1012.) The inclusion of such material within the purview of the privilege "encourages full disclosure of pertinent matters that otherwise might be withheld by [third persons] to the detriment of the patient." ( Grosslight, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 507 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 278 .) Therefore, we overrule the referee's order that this particular document be produced. 2005(Evid.Code, § 1012.) The inclusion of such material within the purview of the privilege "encourages full disclosure of pertinent matters that otherwise might be withheld by [third persons] to the detriment of the patient." ( Grosslight, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 507 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 278 .) Therefore, we overrule the referee's order that this particular document be produced. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
King v. Stephens-Adamson Manfg. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1968Co., 38 Wash. 160 [ 80 P. 303, 305 ] ; Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Ore. 1 [ 288 P. 192, 194-195 ] ; Sherwood v. Evening News Assn., 256 Mich. 318 [ 239 N.W. 305, 306-308 ].) In determining the scope of the term ‘ judicial proceeding’ within the purview of the rule, the courts of this state seem to take a comparatively broad view of the question. 1946Co., 38 Wash. 160 [ 80 P. 303, 305 ]; Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Ore. 1 [ 288 P. 192, 194-195 ]; Sherwood v. Evening News Assn., 256 Mich. 318 [ 239 N.W. 305, 306-308 ].) In determining the scope of the term “judicial proceeding” within the purview of the rule, the courts of this state seem to take a comparatively broad view of the question. | 2 | 1946–1968 |
Sherwood v. Evening News Assn.
green
2 sentences1968Co., 38 Wash. 160 [ 80 P. 303, 305 ] ; Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Ore. 1 [ 288 P. 192, 194-195 ] ; Sherwood v. Evening News Assn., 256 Mich. 318 [ 239 N.W. 305, 306-308 ].) In determining the scope of the term ‘ judicial proceeding’ within the purview of the rule, the courts of this state seem to take a comparatively broad view of the question. 1946Co., 38 Wash. 160 [ 80 P. 303, 305 ]; Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Ore. 1 [ 288 P. 192, 194-195 ]; Sherwood v. Evening News Assn., 256 Mich. 318 [ 239 N.W. 305, 306-308 ].) In determining the scope of the term “judicial proceeding” within the purview of the rule, the courts of this state seem to take a comparatively broad view of the question. | 2 | 1946–1968 |
McClure v. Review Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences1968Co., 38 Wash. 160 [ 80 P. 303, 305 ] ; Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Ore. 1 [ 288 P. 192, 194-195 ] ; Sherwood v. Evening News Assn., 256 Mich. 318 [ 239 N.W. 305, 306-308 ].) In determining the scope of the term ‘ judicial proceeding’ within the purview of the rule, the courts of this state seem to take a comparatively broad view of the question. 1968Co., 38 Wash. 160 [ 80 P. 303, 305 ] ; Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Ore. 1 [ 288 P. 192, 194-195 ] ; Sherwood v. Evening News Assn., 256 Mich. 318 [ 239 N.W. 305, 306-308 ].) In determining the scope of the term ‘ judicial proceeding’ within the purview of the rule, the courts of this state seem to take a comparatively broad view of the question. | 2 | 1946–1968 |
Kilgore v. Koen
green
2 sentences1968Co., 38 Wash. 160 [ 80 P. 303, 305 ] ; Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Ore. 1 [ 288 P. 192, 194-195 ] ; Sherwood v. Evening News Assn., 256 Mich. 318 [ 239 N.W. 305, 306-308 ].) In determining the scope of the term ‘ judicial proceeding’ within the purview of the rule, the courts of this state seem to take a comparatively broad view of the question. 1968Co., 38 Wash. 160 [ 80 P. 303, 305 ] ; Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Ore. 1 [ 288 P. 192, 194-195 ] ; Sherwood v. Evening News Assn., 256 Mich. 318 [ 239 N.W. 305, 306-308 ].) In determining the scope of the term ‘ judicial proceeding’ within the purview of the rule, the courts of this state seem to take a comparatively broad view of the question. | 2 | 1946–1968 |
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1959(People v. Trujillo (1948), 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [ 194 P.2d 681 ], cert. den. [ 335 U.S. 887 , 69 S.Ct. 236 , 93 L.Ed. 426 ]; People v. Robarge (1953), 41 Cal.2d 628, 632-633 [ 262 P.2d 14 ]; People v. Chapman (1957), 151 Cal.App. [ 170 Cal.App.2d Supp. 826 ] 2d 59, 63 [ 311 P.2d 190 ]. 1959(People v. Trujillo (1948), 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [ 194 P.2d 681 ], cert. den. [ 335 U.S. 887 , 69 S.Ct. 236 , 93 L.Ed. 426 ] ; People v. Robarge (1953), 41 Cal.2d 628, 632-633 [ 262 P.2d 14 ] ; People v. Chapman (1957), 151 Cal.App. 2d 59, 63 [ 311 P.2d 190 ]. | 2 | 1957–1959 |
Woodmansee v. California
green
2 sentences1959(People v. Trujillo (1948), 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [ 194 P.2d 681 ], cert. den. [ 335 U.S. 887 , 69 S.Ct. 236 , 93 L.Ed. 426 ]; People v. Robarge (1953), 41 Cal.2d 628, 632-633 [ 262 P.2d 14 ]; People v. Chapman (1957), 151 Cal.App. [ 170 Cal.App.2d Supp. 826 ] 2d 59, 63 [ 311 P.2d 190 ]. 1959(People v. Trujillo (1948), 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [ 194 P.2d 681 ], cert. den. [ 335 U.S. 887 , 69 S.Ct. 236 , 93 L.Ed. 426 ] ; People v. Robarge (1953), 41 Cal.2d 628, 632-633 [ 262 P.2d 14 ] ; People v. Chapman (1957), 151 Cal.App. 2d 59, 63 [ 311 P.2d 190 ]. | 2 | 1957–1959 |
Maede v. Oakland High School District
green
2 sentences1940Nor does it fall within the purview of the rule of such cases as Mondine v. Sarlin, 11 Cal.2d 593 [81 PaCal.2d 903], Maede v. Oakland High School Dist., 212 Cal. 419 [ 298 P. 987 ], Loeb v. Kimmerle, 215 Cal. 143 [9 PaCal.2d 199], and Bellman v. San Francisco H. 1940Nor does it fall within the purview of the rule of such cases as Mondine v. Sarlin, 11 Cal.2d 593 [81 PaCal.2d 903], Maede v. Oakland High School Dist., 212 Cal. 419 [ 298 P. 987 ], Loeb v. Kimmerle, 215 Cal. 143 [9 PaCal.2d 199], and Bellman v. San Francisco H. | 2 | 1940–1944 |
Weeks v. Crow
green
1 sentence2014First, recognizing there is some range in the breadth of arbitration clauses, a court should classify the particular clause as either broad or narrow. [Citations.] Next, if reviewing a narrow clause, the court must determine whether the dispute is over an issue that ‘is on its face within the purview of the clause,’ or over a collateral issue that is somehow connected to the main agreement that contains the arbitration clause. [Citations.] Where the arbitration clause is narrow, a collateral matter will generally be ruled beyond its purview. [Citation.] Where the arbitration clause is broad, ‘ | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Victoria v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2014First, recognizing there is some range in the breadth of arbitration clauses, a court should classify the particular clause as either broad or narrow. [Citations.] Next, if reviewing a narrow clause, the court must determine whether the dispute is over an issue that ‘is on its face within the purview of the clause,’ or over a collateral issue that is somehow connected to the main agreement that contains the arbitration clause. [Citations.] Where the arbitration clause is narrow, a collateral matter will generally be ruled beyond its purview. [Citation.] Where the arbitration clause is broad, ‘ | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Department of Water & Power v. Inyo Chemical Co.
green
1 sentence2014Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 744, 750 .) Since the issue was previously raised, litigated, and resolved, Pyle was collaterally estopped from pursuing the present action.6 DISPOSITION The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Becker v. Submarine Oil Co.
green
2 sentences2012In Becker v. Submarine Oil Co. (1921) 55 Cal.App. 698 [ 204 P. 245 ] (Becker), the Court of Appeal stated the general rule: “It is true that while not within the purview of the rule against perpetuities, leases which may have been intended to be renewable in perpetuity, if at all uncertain in that regard, will be construed as importing but one renewal. 2012In Becker v. Submarine Oil Co. (1921) 55 Cal.App. 698 [ 204 P. 245 ] (Becker), the Court of Appeal stated the general rule: “It is true that while not within the purview of the rule against perpetuities, leases which may have been intended to be renewable in perpetuity, if at all uncertain in that regard, will be construed as importing but one renewal. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
1 sentence2010These are the modem practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.’ (Id. at p. 68.)” (Geier, at p. 598.) The Crawford court clarified that “ ‘not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns,’ (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51 ) and . . . acknowledged that certain exceptions to the rule against hearsay in existence *291 at the time the confrontation clause was originally adopted fell outside the purview of the clause because ‘there is scant evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Geier
green
1 sentence2010Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial—for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.’ (Id. at p. 56, italics & fn. omitted.)” (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 597 .) The high court acknowledged, however, that dying declarations, even those testimonial in nature, were recognized at common law, but left unanswered the question whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for such declarations. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Public Utility District No. 1 Of Grays Harbor County Washington v. Idacorp Inc.
green
1 sentence2007Based on those factors, the court of appeals stated that “while market-based rates may not have historically been the type of rate envisioned by the filed rate doctrine, we conclude that they do not fall outside of the purview of the doctrine.” (Grays Harbor, supra, 379 F.3d 641, 651 .) Although this analysis of the evolution of this regulatory method is very general in nature, it is nevertheless persuasive and we have been given no reason to depart from it here. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Alderman v. Hamilton
green
2 sentences2001(Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6146-6148.)" ( Alderman v. Hamilton (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1037 , 252 Cal. Rptr. 845 .) The consumer protection rationale of rule 2-200 is particularly vital where, as here, a contingent fee is split by agreement of attorneys, with the outside attorney paid a percentage of the fee, rather than compensation based upon an hourly rate or other set salary. [5] Disclosure to the client of the allocation of fees and the outside attorney's interest in the case is imperative to facilitate informed consent. 2001(Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6146-6148.)" ( Alderman v. Hamilton (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1037 , 252 Cal. Rptr. 845 .) The consumer protection rationale of rule 2-200 is particularly vital where, as here, a contingent fee is split by agreement of attorneys, with the outside attorney paid a percentage of the fee, rather than compensation based upon an hourly rate or other set salary. [5] Disclosure to the client of the allocation of fees and the outside attorney's interest in the case is imperative to facilitate informed consent. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Scolinos v. Kolts
green
2 sentences2001Moreover, we are convinced that the objectives of the Rules of Professional Conduct to protect the public and promote respect and confidence in the legal profession are furthered by including in the purview of rule 2-200 all agreements to divide fees, not just referrals. ( Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 639 , 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 31 .) Attorney fee agreements "are strictly construed against the attorney. ( Bennett v. Potter (1919) 180 Cal. 736, 740 [ 183 P. 156 ]; Lane v. Wilkins (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 315, 323 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 309 ].) In order to protect clients and to assure fee agree 2001Moreover, we are convinced that the objectives of the Rules of Professional Conduct to protect the public and promote respect and confidence in the legal profession are furthered by including in the purview of rule 2-200 all agreements to divide fees, not just referrals. ( Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 639 , 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 31 .) Attorney fee agreements "are strictly construed against the attorney. ( Bennett v. Potter (1919) 180 Cal. 736, 740 [ 183 P. 156 ]; Lane v. Wilkins (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 315, 323 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 309 ].) In order to protect clients and to assure fee agree | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Beckstead v. International Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Ryerson v. Riverside Cement Co. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Ortiz green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Agricultural Labor Relations Board v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Mickelson green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Burns v. Grable green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Reed v. Cranor green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Williams v. Illinois green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| People v. Haeussler green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| People v. Goldenson green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| People v. Ferns green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| North Confidence Min. Etc. Co. v. Fitch green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Pozzobon v. O'DONNELL green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Hodges v. Gonzales neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| The Miller Co., Inc. v. Superior Court neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Davis v. Renton neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Herr v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.