purview rule in Florida

1960Appellee states the question as: "Whether or not a judicial determination of immunity can be prejudicial to the person granted that immunity so that he can challenge that ruling on appeal, and, if so, was the substantive holding in this case that the receiving stolen property is a crime included under the Larceny Statutes and thus within the purview of the immunity statute, correct?" The answer to the first part of said question has been answered by our Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel., Benemovsky v. Sullivan, Fla. 1948, 37 So.2d 907 , wherein Justice Terrell stated that the state ma

1958Bene-movsky v. Sullivan, supra [Fla., 37 So.2d 907 ], the county solicitor was conducting an investigation into criminal Communism.

1984We believe this case is controlled by the decision of Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153 (Fla.1956).

1984We believe this case is controlled by the decision of Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1956).

1958In affirming the conviction, we noted that the proceeding at which defendant was required to testify was ‘not the violation of any of the statutes of this State against bribery, burglary, larceny, gaming or gambling or any of the statutes against the illegal sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors’ ( 157 Fla. 721 , 27 So.2d 76 ) and therefore the testimony so given ‘did not bring the accused within the purview of the immunity afforded by the statute, supra.’ “In the case of State ex rel.

1954In affirming the conviction, we noted that the proceeding at which defendant was required to testify was "not the violation of any of the statutes of this State against bribery, burglary, larceny, gaming or gambling or any of the statutes against the illegal sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors" [ 157 Fla. 721 , 27 So.2d 76 ] and therefore the testimony so given "did not bring the accused within the purview of the immunity afforded by the statute, supra." In the case of State ex rel.

1958In affirming the conviction, we noted that the proceeding at which defendant was required to testify was ‘not the violation of any of the statutes of this State against bribery, burglary, larceny, gaming or gambling or any of the statutes against the illegal sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors’ ( 157 Fla. 721 , 27 So.2d 76 ) and therefore the testimony so given ‘did not bring the accused within the purview of the immunity afforded by the statute, supra.’ “In the case of State ex rel.

1954In affirming the conviction, we noted that the proceeding at which defendant was required to testify was "not the violation of any of the statutes of this State against bribery, burglary, larceny, gaming or gambling or any of the statutes against the illegal sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors" [ 157 Fla. 721 , 27 So.2d 76 ] and therefore the testimony so given "did not bring the accused within the purview of the immunity afforded by the statute, supra." In the case of State ex rel.

2010Servs. v. English, 534 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that credibility is a matter that falls solely within the purview of the hearing officer’s discretion as the fact finder); Cont’l Baking Co. v. Vilchez, 219 So.2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (holding that where there is competent substantial evidence to support the findings of the appeals referee, the referee’s order must be upheld).

2010Servs. v. English, 534 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that credibility is a matter that falls solely within the purview of the hearing officer’s discretion as the fact finder); Cont’l Baking Co. v. Vilchez, 219 So.2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (holding that where there is competent substantial evidence to support the findings of the appeals referee, the referee’s order must be upheld).

2009The court specifically held that Huckaby’s case did not fall within the purview of this rule because the indictment “[did] not allege the critical element of the crime of incest — requisite consanguinity between the defendant and his victims.” Id. at 32 .

2006We note that in HMG Property Investors, Inc. v. Parque Industrial Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d 908 , 916 n. 12 (1st Cir.1988), the court found when dealing with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the corollary to rule 1.420(b) under Florida rules, a cross-complainant was considered a plaintiff within the purview of the section and stated that "[i]n any event, labels are relatively unimportant.

1991Pursuant to the exception, "where property and contract rights have been acquired under and in accordance with a previous statutory construction of the supreme court, such rights should not be destroyed by giving retrospective operation to a subsequent overruling decision." Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc., 517 So.2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801 , 109 S.Ct. 30 , 102 L.Ed.2d 9 (1988); Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472 , 18 So.2d 251, 253 (1944); Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 389 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), review denied, 399 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 19

1991Pursuant to the exception, "where property and contract rights have been acquired under and in accordance with a previous statutory construction of the supreme court, such rights should not be destroyed by giving retrospective operation to a subsequent overruling decision." Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc., 517 So.2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801 , 109 S.Ct. 30 , 102 L.Ed.2d 9 (1988); Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472 , 18 So.2d 251, 253 (1944); Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 389 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), review denied, 399 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 19

1991Pursuant to the exception, "where property and contract rights have been acquired under and in accordance with a previous statutory construction of the supreme court, such rights should not be destroyed by giving retrospective operation to a subsequent overruling decision." Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc., 517 So.2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801 , 109 S.Ct. 30 , 102 L.Ed.2d 9 (1988); Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472 , 18 So.2d 251, 253 (1944); Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 389 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), review denied, 399 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 19

1991Pursuant to the exception, "where property and contract rights have been acquired under and in accordance with a previous statutory construction of the supreme court, such rights should not be destroyed by giving retrospective operation to a subsequent overruling decision." Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc., 517 So.2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801 , 109 S.Ct. 30 , 102 L.Ed.2d 9 (1988); Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472 , 18 So.2d 251, 253 (1944); Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 389 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), review denied, 399 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 19

1990Warren v. Southeastern Leisure Systems, Inc., 522 So.2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

1990We find the fact scenario of this case brings it within the purview of the principle of law enunciated in Tri-State Systems, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 500 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), and cases cited therein.

1990That is, “[ajlthough DOT may revoke a permit for the reasons stated in the statute, it may not do so because DOT’s interpretation of that statute has subsequently changed.” 500 So.2d at 183 .

1989Included within the definition of express assumption of risk are express contracts not to sue for injury or loss which may thereafter be occasioned by the covenantee's negligence as well as situations in which actual consent exists such as where one voluntarily participates in a contact sport." 526 So.2d at 1007 (quoting Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1977) (citation omitted)) (emphasis omitted).

1985The trial court held the waiver did apply and we must agree because another panel of this court in the last month ruled in North Broward Hospital District v. Eldred, 466 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 1985), that such hospitals are in fact primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the state and consequently Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980) does apply.