purview rule in Texas

2007Such a comment would violate the Fifth Amendment, which generally prohibits a prosecutor from making adverse comments about a defendant’s decision not to testify at trial.2 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611-12 (1965); Wead, 129 S.W.3d at 128 n.2.

2007Such a comment would violate the Fifth Amendment, which generally prohibits a prosecutor from making adverse comments about a defendant's decision not to testify at trial. (2) Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609, 611-12 (1965); Wead , 129 S.W.3d at 128 n.2.

1938As has been often stated: “The right to maintain a suit in a county other than that in which the statute fixes the venue must depend upon the existence of the fact or facts which constitute an exception to the statute, and not upon the mere averment of such fact or facts.” Hilliard Bros. v. Wilson, 76 Tex. 180 , 13 S. W. 25, 26 ; Compton v. Elliott, supra. Appellee’s averments were that the individual appellants, A. H.

1938As has been often stated: “The right to maintain a suit in a county other than that in which the statute fixes the venue must depend upon the existence of the fact or facts which constitute an exception to the statute, and not upon the mere averment of such fact or facts.” Hilliard Bros. v. Wilson, 76 Tex. 180 , 13 S. W. 25, 26 ; Compton v. Elliott, supra. Appellee’s averments were that the individual appellants, A. H.

2023Id.

2015It has instructed that in determining whether a transaction Sanders v. Blockbuster, Inc., 127 S.W.3d at 386 . is within the purview of the rule, weight should be given to “such considerations as whether the facts are related [8] With regard to the Burris Tracks, both parties asserted in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form claims involving them in the Fort Worth case.

1990See Texas American Bank/ Levelland, supra; and Jensen v. Bryson, supra. However, “equitable title” within the purview of that rule is a present right to the legal title which is available in a statutory action of trespass to try title and must be distinguished from a mere equitable right in which a plaintiff, to show title, must first set aside or reform a deed not absolutely void.

1988In holding that the admission was timely filed within the purview of the rule, we observed “[t]he mere test of jurors as to their qualification we do not think a commencement of the trial within the meaning of the rule,” and held that “ ‘Trial', within the meaning of the rule and statute governing practice or procedure in civil cases, relates to trials on the merits upon a plea in bar and does not extend to a trial on a plea in abatement or on hearing of demurrers or dilatory matters.” Id. at 753-54 .

1987In arguing that a motion for judgment on the verdict is not one of the motions within the purview of rule 329b, Callejo *128 relies on First Freeport National Bank v. Brazoswood National Bank, 712 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).

1981Levy v. Lamar Savings Leasing Corp., 584 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1979, no writ); Tyson v. Seaport Grain, Inc., 388 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1965, writ dism’d).

1978These stop and frisk operations are lesser intrusions into a person's sphere of privacy than a formal arrest but are nevertheless subject to the Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and "It is clear that protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Sec. 9.

1978These stop and frisk operations are lesser intrusions into a person's sphere of privacy than a formal arrest but are nevertheless subject to the Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and "It is clear that protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Sec. 9.

1978In Ex parte Murchison, 560 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, enhanced by two prior felony convictions.

1978In Ex parte Murchison, 560 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, enhanced by two prior felony convictions.

1974Ray, Texas Evidence sec. 1254 at 116 (2d ed. 1956) it is said, “Random jottings and voluntary, isolated memoranda are clearly outside the purview of this clause.” In Perez v. San Antonio Transit Company, 342 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1961, writ ref’d) it was held that a memorandum made under closely similar circumstances was erroneously admitted into evidence over the objection that it was hearsay.

1966Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, supra; Medical & Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229 S.W.2d 932 , writ ref., n. r. e.; Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S.W.2d 567 , writ ref., n. r. e. We have carefully examined the pleadings, depositions and affidavits in this case in an effort to determine whether there is *649 any evidence raising a genuine issue of a material fact within the purview of the rule of law enunciated in the next preceding paragraph which would make the rendition of the summary judgment in question improper.

1966“The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of any material fact is upon the movant, and ‘All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact must be resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment.’ ” Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412 , 252 S.W.2d 929 .

1966“The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of any material fact is upon the movant, and ‘All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact must be resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment.’ ” Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412 , 252 S.W.2d 929 .

1966Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, supra; Medical & Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229 S.W.2d 932 , writ ref., n. r. e.; Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S.W.2d 567 , writ ref., n. r. e. We have carefully examined the pleadings, depositions and affidavits in this case in an effort to determine whether there is *649 any evidence raising a genuine issue of a material fact within the purview of the rule of law enunciated in the next preceding paragraph which would make the rendition of the summary judgment in question improper.

1963We have gone further and reviewed the entire record within the purview of the rule laid down by our Supreme Court in re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660 , and find that we cannot say that the testimony revealed by the entire record is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong.

1963We have gone further and reviewed the entire record within the purview of the rule laid down by our Supreme Court in re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660 , and find that we cannot say that the testimony revealed by the entire record is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong.

1957Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 134 Texas 332, 350 , 114 S.W. 2d 226 , 136 S.W. 2d 207 .” Our case does not come within the purview of the exception.

1957Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 134 Texas 332, 350 , 114 S.W. 2d 226 , 136 S.W. 2d 207 .” Our case does not come within the purview of the exception.

1957Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 134 Texas 332, 350 , 114 S.W. 2d 226 , 136 S.W. 2d 207 .” Our case does not come within the purview of the exception.

1956Said exception No. 14, because of its mandatory and exclusive wording, controls the venue of this case.” Texan Development Co. v. Hodges, Tex.Civ.App., 237 S.W.2d 436 ; Lott v. Fields, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 878 ; Jones v. Ford, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 333 .

1956This Court in Galindo v. Garcia, 222 S.W.2d 477, 480 , stated that “a suit by a grantor in a de.ed or those, holding under him, seeking to set aside and cancel a deed, is properly regarded as a suit to remove an incumbrance or cloud upon the title to land and is within the purview of exception No, 14 of Article 1995.

1956Said exception No. 14, because of its mandatory and exclusive wording, controls the venue of this case.” Texan Development Co. v. Hodges, Tex.Civ.App., 237 S.W.2d 436 ; Lott v. Fields, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 878 ; Jones v. Ford, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 333 .

1956Said exception No. 14, because of its mandatory and exclusive wording, controls the venue of this case.” Texan Development Co. v. Hodges, Tex.Civ.App., 237 S.W.2d 436 ; Lott v. Fields, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 878 ; Jones v. Ford, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 333 .

1951Appellant contends that since Houghland had not been in its employ for approximately a year prior to the trial he was not an adverse witness within the purview of this rule, citing and relying on Dollahite-Levy Co. v. Phillips, Tex.Civ.App., 99 S.W.2d 688 , (wr. dis.).

1949Mitchell v. Porter Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W. 981 , par. 1; Weeks v. De Young, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W. 852, 854 ; Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co. v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ.App., 4 S.W.2d 995 , par. 3.” Upon the basis of the above cited authorities we hold that a suit by a grantor in a deed or those holding under him, seeking to set aside and cancel a deed, is properly regarded as a suit to remove an incumbrance or cloud upon the title' to land and is within the purview of exception No. 14 of Article 1995.