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16 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coffman v. Keene Corp.green2 sentences2026In the wake of its determination that the experts’ opinions should be barred, the Appellate Division held that “[d]efendant should have been granted summary judgment due to the lack of proof of causation.” 7 Plaintiff argues that the Appellate Division should have applied a proximate cause standard to her failure to warn claim based on the heeding presumption, citing Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 594 (1993), and other cases, and that the appellate court should have concluded there was prima facie evidence of proximate cause for the warning claim because 2.2 percent of Ozurdex units in 2018Plaintiff has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that Mr. Baker would have followed an adequate warning instruction if it had been provided. [(emphasis added); see id. at 8-9.] In products liability litigation, "[w]hen the alleged defect is the failure to provide warnings, a plaintiff is required to 12 A-4407-15T1 prove that the absence of a warning was a proximate cause of his harm." Coffman, 133 N.J. at 594 . | 3 | 3 |
Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.green2 sentences2020The "plaintiff must plead specific facts alleging 'deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects,' or 'manipulation of the post-market regulatory process.'" Ibid. (first quoting Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 189 N.J. 615, 626 (2007); then quoting McDarby, 2 N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4 states: "If the warning or instruction given in connection with a . . . device . . . has been approved . . . by the [FDA] under the [FDCA ,] a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate." A-0680-18T4 20 401 N.J. Super. at 63 ). 2018N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4 provides that [i]f the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or device or food or food additive has been approved or *525 prescribed by the federal Food and Drug Administration under [federal laws], a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate. [ (emphasis added).] The Legislature, by attaching a presumption of adequacy to FDA-approved warnings, "recognized the preeminent role of federal regulation of drugs and medical devices." Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson , 211 N.J. 362 , 387, 48 A.3d 1041 (2012) ; accord Rowe , 189 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratoriesgreen2 sentences1986Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. 1983All of them recognize liability of the manufacturer or distributor of a product for failure to provide a warning only if the warning would have enabled the user of the product to make it reasonably safe in ordinary use or otherwise to protect himself, Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc.green2 sentences2026Ibid. 2017Significantly, the PLA also provides that: 68 A-4760-14T1 If the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or device or food or food additive has been approved or prescribed by the federal Food and Drug Administration under the "Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," . . . a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate. . . . [N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4.] In Perez, supra, 161 N.J. at 25 , the Court held that "[f]or all practical purposes, absent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA stan | 1 | 3 |
Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.green1 sentence2017Significantly, the PLA also provides that: 68 A-4760-14T1 If the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or device or food or food additive has been approved or prescribed by the federal Food and Drug Administration under the "Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," . . . a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate. . . . [N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4.] In Perez, supra, 161 N.J. at 25 , the Court held that "[f]or all practical purposes, absent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA stan | 1 | 1 |
Wyeth v. Levinegreen1 sentence2016See ibid. | 1 | 1 |
Zammit v. Shire US, Inc.green2 sentences2007Compare Zammit v. Shire US, Inc., 415 F.Supp.2d 760, 764-65 (E.D.Mich.2006) (holding that defendant drug manufacturer was not liable to plaintiff for failure to warn under section 600.2946(5) because drug was approved by the FDA), with Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 156-57 , 592 A.2d 1176 (1991) (recognizing that fee presumption is only rebut-table, and not conclusive). 2007Compare Zammit v. Shire US, Inc., 415 F.Supp. 2d 760, 764-65 (E.D.Mich.2006) (holding that defendant drug manufacturer was not liable to plaintiff for failure to warn under section 600.2946(5) because drug was approved by the FDA), with Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 156-57 , 592 A. 2d 1176 (1991) (recognizing that the presumption is only rebuttable, and not conclusive). | 1 | 1 |
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratoriesgreen2 sentences2007Compare Zammit v. Shire US, Inc., 415 F.Supp.2d 760, 764-65 (E.D.Mich.2006) (holding that defendant drug manufacturer was not liable to plaintiff for failure to warn under section 600.2946(5) because drug was approved by the FDA), with Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 156-57 , 592 A.2d 1176 (1991) (recognizing that fee presumption is only rebut-table, and not conclusive). 2007Compare Zammit v. Shire US, Inc., 415 F.Supp.2d 760, 764-65 (E.D.Mich.2006) (holding that defendant drug manufacturer was not liable to plaintiff for failure to warn under section 600.2946(5) because drug was approved by the FDA), with Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 125 N.J. 117, 156-57 , 592 A.2d 1176 (1991) (recognizing that fee presumption is only rebut-table, and not conclusive). | 1 | 1 |
Worm v. American Cyanamid Co.green1 sentence1996The manufacturer in that case cannot comply with both. [Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1307 (4th Cir.1992).] As another Federal Court observed: [a] jury verdict or Court decision ruling that compliance with the labeling requirements of the FHSA does not provide sufficient warning under state law would frustrate the congressional purpose of providing nationally uniform requirements. [Lee, supra, 792 F.Supp. at 1008 .] In Cipollone, supra, the United States Supreme Court considered the preemption of state law tort actions under a provision of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adv | 1 | 1 |
Shackil v. Lederle Laboratoriesgreen2 sentences1991N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 (section 8, not codified, provides for immediate effect); see Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 214 , 561 A. 2d 511 (1989) (O'Hern, J., dissenting). 1991N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 (section 8, not codified, provides for immediate effect); see Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 214 , 561 A. 2d 511 (1989) (O'Hern, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co.
green
2 sentences1986Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. 1983All of them recognize liability of the manufacturer or distributor of a product for failure to provide a warning only if the warning would have enabled the user of the product to make it reasonably safe in ordinary use or otherwise to protect himself, Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. | 2 | 1983–1986 |
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.
green
2 sentences1986Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. 1983All of them recognize liability of the manufacturer or distributor of a product for failure to provide a warning only if the warning would have enabled the user of the product to make it reasonably safe in ordinary use or otherwise to protect himself, Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. | 2 | 1983–1986 |
Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. 1983All of them recognize liability of the manufacturer or distributor of a product for failure to provide a warning only if the warning would have enabled the user of the product to make it reasonably safe in ordinary use or otherwise to protect himself, Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. | 2 | 1983–1986 |
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Corp.
green
2 sentences1986Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. 1983All of them recognize liability of the manufacturer or distributor of a product for failure to provide a warning only if the warning would have enabled the user of the product to make it reasonably safe in ordinary use or otherwise to protect himself, Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem Corp., 91 N.J. 386 (1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229 (1981); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P. 2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); see also Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. | 2 | 1983–1986 |
Brown v. United States Stove Co.
green
1 sentence2022Ibid. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2020The heightened pleading requirement "serves to permit a determination whether a failure to warn claim is preempted by the MDA or is a permissible parallel state claim." Ibid. 2020The "plaintiff must plead specific facts alleging 'deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects,' or 'manipulation of the post-market regulatory process.'" Ibid. (first quoting Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 189 N.J. 615, 626 (2007); then quoting McDarby, 2 N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4 states: "If the warning or instruction given in connection with a . . . device . . . has been approved . . . by the [FDA] under the [FDCA ,] a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate." A-0680-18T4 20 401 N.J. Super. at 63 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson
red
2 sentences2018N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4 provides that [i]f the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or device or food or food additive has been approved or *525 prescribed by the federal Food and Drug Administration under [federal laws], a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate. [ (emphasis added).] The Legislature, by attaching a presumption of adequacy to FDA-approved warnings, "recognized the preeminent role of federal regulation of drugs and medical devices." Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson , 211 N.J. 362 , 387, 48 A.3d 1041 (2012) ; accord Rowe , 189 N.J. 2018N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4 provides that [i]f the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or device or food or food additive has been approved or *525 prescribed by the federal Food and Drug Administration under [federal laws], a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate. [ (emphasis added).] The Legislature, by attaching a presumption of adequacy to FDA-approved warnings, "recognized the preeminent role of federal regulation of drugs and medical devices." Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson , 211 N.J. 362 , 387, 48 A.3d 1041 (2012) ; accord Rowe , 189 N.J. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Boes v. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE, INC.
neutral
1 sentence2008Banner v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 383 N.J.Super. 364, 378 , 891 A. 2d 1229 (App.Div.2006), certif. denied, 190 N.J. 393 , 921 A. 2d 447 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
BANNER EX REL. BANNER v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Banner v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 383 N.J.Super. 364, 378 , 891 A. 2d 1229 (App.Div.2006), certif. denied, 190 N.J. 393 , 921 A. 2d 447 (2007). 2008Banner v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 383 N.J.Super. 364, 378 , 891 A. 2d 1229 (App.Div.2006), certif. denied, 190 N.J. 393 , 921 A. 2d 447 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Batson v. Lederle Laboratories
green
1 sentence1997Additionally, there is a rebuttable presumption that the warning or instruction is adequate if the warning or instruction was "given in connection with a drug or device... has been approved or prescribed by the federal Food and Drug Administration under the `Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.'..." Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Products, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996The manufacturer in that case cannot comply with both. [Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1307 (4th Cir.1992).] As another Federal Court observed: [a] jury verdict or Court decision ruling that compliance with the labeling requirements of the FHSA does not provide sufficient warning under state law would frustrate the congressional purpose of providing nationally uniform requirements. [Lee, supra, 792 F.Supp. at 1008 .] In Cipollone, supra, the United States Supreme Court considered the preemption of state law tort actions under a provision of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adv | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Melvin Moss v. Parks Corporation, (Two Cases)
green
2 sentences1996In considering the extent of FHSA preemption in Moss, supra, 985 F. 2d at 736 , the Fourth Circuit noted a previous decision where it had stated that: [if] federal law mandates a specific label and pennits nothing additional or different, it can hardly be urged that a state tort duty based on a warning requirement that is more elaborate and different does not conflict. 1996In considering the extent of FHSA preemption in Moss, supra, 985 F. 2d at 736 , the Fourth Circuit noted a previous decision where it had stated that: [if] federal law mandates a specific label and pennits nothing additional or different, it can hardly be urged that a state tort duty based on a warning requirement that is more elaborate and different does not conflict. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
green
1 sentence1991Section four of the Products Liability Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4, creates a rebuttable presumption that a warning or instruction is adequate "if the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug * * * has been approved or prescribed by the federal Food and Drug Administration." The section also defines adequate warning as follows: An adequate product warning or instruction is one that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have provided with respect to the danger and that communicates adequate information on the dangers and safe use of the product, * * * i | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories
green
1 sentence1983Super. 311 (App.Div. 1979), certif. den. 81 N.J. 50 (1979). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.