16 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1929–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Guttman v. Covert Town Bd.green1 sentence2023When this matter was previously before us, we concluded that, "although the Town Board held a public hearing and a meeting to discuss respondents' application and engaged in a lengthy discussion regarding that application, the Town Board failed to articulate its reasons for granting the variance and failed to set forth any findings of fact to support its determination" ( Matter of Guttman v Covert Town Bd. , 197 AD3d 1009, 1010 [4th Dept 2021]). | 1 | 1 |
Fike v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Webstergreen1 sentence2021We are unable on the record before us to review the propriety of Supreme Court's conclusions regarding the Town Board's determination ( see Matter of Fike v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Webster , 2 AD3d 1343, 1343 [4th Dept 2003]). | 1 | 1 |
Manupella v. Troy City Zoning Board of Appealsgreen1 sentence2018As relevant here, "[t]he owner of real property subject to a variance challenge generally is a necessary party because the owner will be inequitably and adversely impacted if the zoning board decision were annulled" ( Matter of Manupella v Troy City Zoning Bd. of Appeals , 272 AD2d 761, 763 [2000]). | 1 | 1 |
Conversions for Real Estate, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Inc.green1 sentence2007Here, the petitioners’ contention that the ZBA granted other area variances from the off-street parking requirement is insufficient to establish that its conduct in denying the petitioners a variance from that requirement was arbitrary or capricious, since the petitioners failed to establish that the ZBA “reach[ed] a different result on essentially the same facts” (id. at 547, citing Matter of Charles A. Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516 [1985]; see Matter of Conversions for Real Estate, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Roslyn, 31 AD3d 635, 636 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
Llana v. Town of Pittstowngreen1 sentence2000The owner of real property subject to a variance challenge generally is a necessary party because the owner will be inequitably and adversely impacted if the zoning board decision were annulled (see, Matter of O’Connell v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 267 AD2d 742, 743 , lv denied 94 NY2d 938 ; Matter of Sopchak v Guernsey, 176 AD2d 403, 404 , supra; see also, Matter of Llana v Town of Pittstown, 234 AD2d 881 ). | 1 | 1 |
Galusha v. . Galushagreen1 sentence1929Other cases may be cited, not so similar in their facts, and yet pointing in the same direction (Ring v. Ring, supra; De Hierapolis v. Reilly, 44 App. Div. 22; 168 N. Y. 585 ; Dunbar v. Dunbar, [1909] 2 Ch. 639; cf. Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 644, 645 , where there was divorce, not annulment). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber
green
2 sentences1973The Board of Appeals unanimously granted a variance to re-establish the nonconforming use and Special Term annulled that determination, holding that the appellant had not proved the unnecessary hardship required for a variance under the rule of Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber ( 282 N. Y. 71 ) and also that if there was any hardship to appellant, it was self-imposed. 1959I do not think that the proof before the Zoning Board of Appeals was adequate to warrant a variance under the rule laid down in Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber ( 282 N. Y. 71 ) as reiterated in Matter of Crossroads Recreation v. Broz (4 N Y 2d 39). | 3 | 1943–1973 |
Cornell University v. Bagnardi
green
2 sentences2024NYU further contends that the ZR amendment adopted, which was modified to maintain the variance requirement, violates New York law as set forth in Cornell Univ. v Bagnardi ( 68 NY2d 583 [1986]) and its progeny. 2024NYU further contends that the ZR amendment adopted, which was modified to maintain the variance requirement, violates New York law as set forth in Cornell Univ. v Bagnardi ( 68 NY2d 583 [1986]) and its progeny. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re Charles A. Field Delivery Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007Here, the petitioners’ contention that the ZBA granted other area variances from the off-street parking requirement is insufficient to establish that its conduct in denying the petitioners a variance from that requirement was arbitrary or capricious, since the petitioners failed to establish that the ZBA “reach[ed] a different result on essentially the same facts” (id. at 547, citing Matter of Charles A. Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516 [1985]; see Matter of Conversions for Real Estate, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Roslyn, 31 AD3d 635, 636 [2006]). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Patel v. Patel
green
1 sentence2000The owner of real property subject to a variance challenge generally is a necessary party because the owner will be inequitably and adversely impacted if the zoning board decision were annulled (see, Matter of O’Connell v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 267 AD2d 742, 743 , lv denied 94 NY2d 938 ; Matter of Sopchak v Guernsey, 176 AD2d 403, 404 , supra; see also, Matter of Llana v Town of Pittstown, 234 AD2d 881 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Sopchak v. Guernsey
neutral
1 sentence2000The owner of real property subject to a variance challenge generally is a necessary party because the owner will be inequitably and adversely impacted if the zoning board decision were annulled (see, Matter of O’Connell v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 267 AD2d 742, 743 , lv denied 94 NY2d 938 ; Matter of Sopchak v Guernsey, 176 AD2d 403, 404 , supra; see also, Matter of Llana v Town of Pittstown, 234 AD2d 881 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Amodeo v. Town Board
green
1 sentence2000A party who proposes to purchase and develop real property also may be a necessary party for the same reasons (see, Matter of Amodeo v Town Bd., 249 AD2d 882 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
O'Connell v. Zoning Board of Appeals of New Scotland
green
1 sentence2000The owner of real property subject to a variance challenge generally is a necessary party because the owner will be inequitably and adversely impacted if the zoning board decision were annulled (see, Matter of O’Connell v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 267 AD2d 742, 743 , lv denied 94 NY2d 938 ; Matter of Sopchak v Guernsey, 176 AD2d 403, 404 , supra; see also, Matter of Llana v Town of Pittstown, 234 AD2d 881 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York
green
1 sentence1992Neither has Kalikow demonstrated that the landmark designation would deprive it of a reasonable return on the use of its property (see, French Investing Co. v City of New York, 39 NY2d 587, 596 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Historic Albany Foundation, Inc. v. Coyne
green
1 sentence1990In finding section 1-135 (b) (2) valid in Historic Albany Found. v Coyne (supra), we relied in part upon the fact that the challenged provision was also subject to being construed to afford an owner relief by way of a variance or waiver of the strict requirements of the ordinance regarding restoration or new construction after demolition. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.
green
1 sentence1990Among other reasons why this petition should have been dismissed is petitioner’s failure to seek and afford the Commission an opportunity to grant a waiver or variance so that any new development ordered and approved by the Commission would yield a fair return, thus obviating Supreme Court’s constitutional concerns (see, Hodel v Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Assn., 452 US 264, 297 ; Penn Cent. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
L & J Roost, Ltd. v. Department of Consumer Affairs
green
1 sentence1989With respect to petitioner’s contention of economic hardship that forms the first prong to the variance test, I note that its bare conclusory allegations of economic calamity is insufficient to annul the determination that was made here (see, L & J Roost v Department of Consumer Affairs, 128 AD2d 677 [2d Dept 1987]). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay
green
1 sentence1981Thus, in Williams v Town of Oyster Bay ( 32 NY2d 78, 81 , supra) the court expressly applied by analogy the variance rule to claims of alleged confiscation. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Calvar Corporation
neutral
1 sentence1959Neither does it appear on the face of the complaint that the ordinance or the Village Law authorizes a variance of the application of the general restrictions imposed, or the granting of a special exception, which would permit the use of appellant’s property for a purpose for which it is reasonably adapted, and that consequently the ordinance may not be declared unconstitutional, insofar as it affects appellant’s property until an application has been made for such a variance or exception and denied (cf. People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N. Y. 419, 421 ; Town of Cortlandt v. McNally, 282 App. Div. 1 | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Hammond v. Town of Caldwell
neutral
1 sentence1959When issue is joined and the facts are established, it may appear that adequate relief may be obtained under the provisions of the ordinance or the Village Law (cf. Hammond v. Town of Caldwell, 282 App. Div. 798 ). | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Town of Cortlandt v. McNally
neutral
1 sentence1959Neither does it appear on the face of the complaint that the ordinance or the Village Law authorizes a variance of the application of the general restrictions imposed, or the granting of a special exception, which would permit the use of appellant’s property for a purpose for which it is reasonably adapted, and that consequently the ordinance may not be declared unconstitutional, insofar as it affects appellant’s property until an application has been made for such a variance or exception and denied (cf. People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N. Y. 419, 421 ; Town of Cortlandt v. McNally, 282 App. Div. 1 | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Matter of Levy v. Bd. of Standards Appeals
green
1 sentence1943(Cf. Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber, supra; Matter of Levy v. Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 267 N. Y. 347, 354 .) Therefore, the defense that the action is premature, regardless of whether the defense be predicated on plaintiff’s failure to seek a change of the Zoning Resolution through the medium of a legislative amendment by the Board of Estimate or through the medium of an administrative variance by the Board of Standards and Appeals, is insufficient and must be struck out. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Claim of Aronstein v. Trojan Hat Co.
neutral
1 sentence1940(Matter of Aronstein v. Trojan Hat Co., Inc., 245 App. Div. 151 .) Moreover, as a foreman decedent’s average weekly earnings amounted to $32.68. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
De Hierapolis v. Reilly
green
1 sentence1929Other cases may be cited, not so similar in their facts, and yet pointing in the same direction (Ring v. Ring, supra; De Hierapolis v. Reilly, 44 App. Div. 22; 168 N. Y. 585 ; Dunbar v. Dunbar, [1909] 2 Ch. 639; cf. Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 644, 645 , where there was divorce, not annulment). | 1 | 1929–1929 |
De Hierapolis v. . Reilly
neutral
1 sentence1929Other cases may be cited, not so similar in their facts, and yet pointing in the same direction (Ring v. Ring, supra; De Hierapolis v. Reilly, 44 App. Div. 22; 168 N. Y. 585 ; Dunbar v. Dunbar, [1909] 2 Ch. 639; cf. Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 644, 645 , where there was divorce, not annulment). | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Ring v. Ring
neutral
1 sentence1929Other cases may be cited, not so similar in their facts, and yet pointing in the same direction (Ring v. Ring, supra; De Hierapolis v. Reilly, 44 App. Div. 22; 168 N. Y. 585 ; Dunbar v. Dunbar, [1909] 2 Ch. 639; cf. Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 644, 645 , where there was divorce, not annulment). | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.