variance claim in Texas

2015When reviewing a variance claim, the “‘sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

2015When reviewing a variance claim, the “‘sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

2011See also In the Interest of T.J.S., 71 S.W.3d 452, 458-59 (Tex.App.--Waco 2002, pet. denied).

2011See also In the Interest of T.J.S., 71 S.W.3d 452, 458-59 (Tex.App.--Waco 2002, pet. denied).

2008The variance requirement is therefore applied flexibly in order to serve its purpose of giving the governmental unit an opportunity to “grant different forms of relief or make policy decisions which might abate the alleged taking.” Id., quoting Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 503.

2008The variance requirement is therefore applied flexibly in order to serve its purpose of giving the governmental unit an opportunity to “grant different forms of relief or make policy decisions which might abate the alleged taking.” Id., quoting Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 503.

2015When reviewing a variance claim, the “‘sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

2015When reviewing a variance claim, the “‘sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

2015See, e.g., Hammack v. State, No. 06-14- 00175-CR, — S.W.3d —, 2015 WL 1869497, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 24, 2015, no pet.); Moore, 11 S.W.3d at 499-500 .

2015See, e.g., Hammack v. State, No. 06-14- 00175-CR, — S.W.3d —, 2015 WL 1869497 , at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 24, 2015, no pet.); Moore, 11 S.W.3d at 499–500.

2015See, e.g., Traylor v. State, 561 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978).

2015See, e.g., Traylor v. State, 561 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim.

2000The inquiry under the doctrine of variance is whether a "variance was such as to mislead the defendant to his prejudice." Id.

1998The inquiry under the doctrine of variance is whether a “variance was such as to mislead the defendant to his prejudice.” Id.

2009The variance requirement is therefore applied flexibly in order to serve its purpose of giving the governmental unit an opportunity to "grant different forms of relief or make policy decisions which might abate the alleged taking." Id.

2009The variance requirement is therefore applied flexibly in order to serve its purpose of giving the governmental unit an opportunity to “grant different forms of relief or make policy decisions which might abate the alleged taking.” Id.

2018Although we noted that, under existing law, the variance between the indictment and the proof was fatal, we "call[ed] on the Court of Criminal Appeals to overturn the outdated exception to the variance rule as it applies to indictments." Id. at 85 .

2015Blind, unthinking adherence to an outdated vestige from the past, which has no redeeming qualities other than its pedigree, serves neither justice nor reason and renders the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant essentially irrelevant." Spencer v. State. 867 S.W.2d 81,85 (Tex.App--Texarkana 1993).

2021In re P.A.C., 498 S.W.3d 210, 217 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). 6 Because Appellant did not request that the trial court enter findings of fact regarding the trial court’s specific reasons for the variance from the standard possession order, the trial court was not required to enter any such findings.

2017CODE ANN. § 153.258 (“Without regard to Rules 296 through 299, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, in all cases in which possession of a child by a parent is contested and the possession of the child varies from the standard possession order, on written request made or filed with the court not later than 10 days after the date of the hearing or on oral request made in open court during the hearing, the court shall state in the order the specific reasons for the variance from the standard order.”); Voros v. Turnage, 849 S.W.2d 353, 354-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, Order) (abating for tri

2014See Fuller, 73 S.W.3d at 253–54 (“There is no 3 As mentioned, Appellant did assert that the $52.30 on the gift card was not “money” as a ground for directed verdict.

2011See generally Dix & Dawson, supra, note 18, § 31.162 for a discussion of the traditional materiality law concerning variances. 36 .See, e.g., Pye v. State, 71 Tex.Crim. 94 , 154 S.W. 222 (1913) (affirming forgery conviction in which the name of the complainant was "Rene Perry,” but the name signed to the alleged forged note in the indictment was "Reen Perrey”).

2011See generally Dix & Dawson, supra, note 18, § 31.162 for a discussion of the traditional materiality law concerning variances. 36 .See, e.g., Pye v. State, 71 Tex.Crim. 94 , 154 S.W. 222 (1913) (affirming forgery conviction in which the name of the complainant was "Rene Perry,” but the name signed to the alleged forged note in the indictment was "Reen Perrey”).

2008Stevens v. State , 891 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. Crim.

2001Finally, in Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Crim.App.1998), cited by Judge Keasler, our discussion of the defendant's variance claim incorporated notions of both legal insufficiency and notice.

2001Finally, in Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), cited by Judge Keasler, our discussion of the defendant's variance claim incorporated notions of both legal insufficiency and notice.

1998Executive 100, Inc., 922 F.2d at 1540 (aggrieved landowner must “have sought variances or pursued alternative, less ambitious development plans”); Landmark Land Co., 874 F.2d at 721 (claim not ripe until initial permit application denied and some effort made to “compromise” with the city to allow some level of development).

1993Blevins v. State, 672 S.W.2d 828, 832-39 (Tex.App—Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.) (Nye, C.J., concurring).

1993See e.g., Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 836-37 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Thompson v. State, 563 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978).

1981See Jablon v. Town Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Newton, 157 Conn. 434 , 254 A.2d 914, 916 (1969); Glidden v. Town of Nottingham, 109 N.H. 134 , 244 A.2d 430, 431 (1968); Fitzgerald v. Board of Review of the City of Newport, 99 R.I. 221 , 206 A.2d 635 (1965).

1981See Jablon v. Town Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Newton, 157 Conn. 434 , 254 A.2d 914, 916 (1969); Glidden v. Town of Nottingham, 109 N.H. 134 , 244 A.2d 430, 431 (1968); Fitzgerald v. Board of Review of the City of Newport, 99 R.I. 221 , 206 A.2d 635 (1965).