Castillo motion in Texas

2008See Palac-ios, 46 S.W.3d at 880 .

2008See Palacios , 46 S.W.3d at 880 .

2008See id.

2008See id.

2001Assuming without deciding that Castillo's objection that the admission of Dollie's jury charge was "prejudicial" sufficed to preserve this issue for our review, we nevertheless conclude for the reasons stated in connection with our Rule 605 analysis that the admission of the charge from Dollie's trial did not "indicate[] the judge's opinion concerning a matter to be determined by the jury." Knoll, 966 S.W.2d at 640 (emphasis added); accord Dahl, 590 S.W.2d at 196 ; see also H.E.

2001Assuming without deciding that Castillo’s objection that the admission of Dollie’s jury charge was “prejudicial” sufficed to preserve this issue for our review, we nevertheless conclude for the reasons stated in connection with our Rule 605 analysis that the admission of the charge from Dollie’s trial did not “indicate! ] the judge’s opinion concerning a matter to be determined by the jury.” Knoll, 966 S.W.2d at 640 (emphasis added); accord Dahl, 590 S.W.2d at 196 ; see also H.E.

2001Assuming without deciding that Castillo's objection that the admission of Dollie's jury charge was "prejudicial" sufficed to preserve this issue for our review, we nevertheless conclude for the reasons stated in connection with our Rule 605 analysis that the admission of the charge from Dollie's trial did not "indicate[] the judge's opinion concerning a matter to be determined by the jury." Knoll, 966 S.W.2d at 640 (emphasis added); accord Dahl, 590 S.W.2d at 196 ; see also H.E.

2001Assuming without deciding that Castillo’s objection that the admission of Dollie’s jury charge was “prejudicial” sufficed to preserve this issue for our review, we nevertheless conclude for the reasons stated in connection with our Rule 605 analysis that the admission of the charge from Dollie’s trial did not “indicate! ] the judge’s opinion concerning a matter to be determined by the jury.” Knoll, 966 S.W.2d at 640 (emphasis added); accord Dahl, 590 S.W.2d at 196 ; see also H.E.

2024See Demps v. State, 278 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d).

2022See id.; 4 Campbell v. Clark, 471 S.W.3d 615, 625 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.) (“A statement must assert an objectively verifiable fact, rather than an opinion, to be actionable.”).

2021Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim.

2021See id.

2014Negligence has long been defined as doing something that a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances would not have done, or, conversely, failing to do something that a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances would have done. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 398 (Tex. 2008).

2014See Kourosh Hemyari v. Stephens, 355 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). 8 In its May 7 order, the trial court granted Castillo’s motion to compel and ordered relators to provide “full and complete responses and answers” to Request 81.

2013No. 09-12-00385-CV, 2013 WL 3270613, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 27, 2013, no pet. h.).

2012See Kelly, 163 S.W.3d at 726 . 4 III.

2009Preservation of Error The court of appeals held that Ford failed to preserve error regarding the discovery requests it made in both its (1) motion to delay the settlement, and (2) response to Castillo’s motion for summary judgment. 200 S.W.3d at 227, 230 .

2009Preservation of Error The court of appeals held that Ford failed to preserve error regarding the discovery requests it made in both its (1) motion to delay the settlement, and (2) response to Castillo's motion for summary judgment. 200 S.W.3d at 227, 230 .

2006Castillo Did Not Raise This Argument Below as Part of Her Official-Immunity Summary-Judgment Ground First, because “[s]ummary judgment is a harsh remedy,” an appellate court “will strictly construe summary judgment in procedural and substantive matters against the movant.” Tanksley v. CitiCapital Commercial Corp. , 145 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (citations omitted).

2001Butt Grocery Co., 985 S.W.2d at 24 ; Whiteside, 12 S.W.3d at 624.

1979Certainly, one can inform generally of applicable punishment without reading the precise allegations for enhancement, and thereby avoid what some have regarded as jeopardizing the presumption of innocence. 10 Thus harmonizing the Bevill conclusion and the Castillo rule, we adhere to both and hold that the admonition of Article 36.01, § 1, supra — that unless otherwise excepted allegations of prior convictions for purpose of enhancement under Section 12.-42(a), (b) or (c), supra, shall not be read to the jury until hearing on punishment is held — is not offended by either the State or the accus

1979Certainly, one can inform generally of applicable punishment without reading the precise allegations for enhancement, and thereby avoid what some have regarded as jeopardizing the presumption of innocence. 10 Thus harmonizing the Bevill conclusion and the Castillo rule, we adhere to both and hold that the admonition of Article 36.01, § 1, supra — that unless otherwise excepted allegations of prior convictions for purpose of enhancement under Section 12.-42(a), (b) or (c), supra, shall not be read to the jury until hearing on punishment is held — is not offended by either the State or the accus