Gollihar standard in Texas

2006However, the rule of idem sonans, that a misspelling is not fatal if it sounds like the correct name and thus sufficiently identifies the victim so that the defendant is not misled to his prejudice, see Dingler v. State , 705 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Crim.

2006However, the rule of idem sonans, that a misspelling is not fatal if it sounds like the correct name and thus sufficiently identifies the victim so that the defendant is not misled to his prejudice, see Dingler v. State, 705 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), harmonizes with the holding of Gollihar that a variance is not fatal unless if it is material and prejudices the defendant’s substantial rights. 5 .

2006See Arellano v. State , 54 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex. App.--Waco 2001, pet. ref'd) (citing Gollihar for proposition that variance between victim's name in indictment and proof at trial may be fatal, and stating that misspelling is not fatal if within idem sonans); see also Sanchez v. State , No. 07-02-0287-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4440 , at *5 (Tex. App.--Amarillo May 17, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (discussing idem sonans and stating that consideration of sufficiency of evidence must involve Gollihar inquiry into materiality of name variance).

2006See Arellano v. State, 54 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, *921 pet. ref'd) (citing Gollihar for proposition that variance between victim’s name in indictment and proof at trial may be fatal, and stating that misspelling is not fatal if within idem sonans); see also Sanchez v. State, No. 07-02-0287-CR, 2004 WL 1093719 , at 1, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4440 , at *5 (Tex.App.-Amarillo May 17, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (discussing idem sonans and stating that consideration of sufficiency of evidence must involve Gollihar inquiry into materiality of name variance).

2015See id. (holding that variance in model number of go-cart alleged in indictment and model number actually proved was not material in theft prosecution).

2015See id. (holding that variance in model number of go-cart alleged in indictment and model number actually proved was not material in theft prosecution).

2015And quite correctly, this Court, citing that footnote, recognized Due Process demands sufficiency of the evidence be assessed in view of the trial court's charge to the jury (which of course must track the indictment): Gollihar's' standard of measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the "elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case" clearly is not the same as the Jackson v. Virginia standard of measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the "substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Compare Jackson, 99 S.Ct. at 2792 fn.

2002Gollihar’s standard of measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the “elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case” clearly is not the same as the Jackson v. Virginia standard of measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the “substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Compare Jackson, 99 S.Ct. at 2792 fn. 16, with, Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 255 .

2015And quite correctly, this Court, citing that footnote, recognized Due Process demands sufficiency of the evidence be assessed in view of the trial court's charge to the jury (which of course must track the indictment): Gollihar's' standard of measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the "elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case" clearly is not the same as the Jackson v. Virginia standard of measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the "substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Compare Jackson, 99 S.Ct. at 2792 fn.

2005In Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that the Gollihar standard was clearly not the same as the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) standard of measuring evidence sufficiency against the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. 10 .

2010Id. at 853-854; Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Russeau, 171 S.W.3d at 883 .

2005In Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that the Gollihar standard was clearly not the same as the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) standard of measuring evidence sufficiency against the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. 10 .

2005In Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that the Gollihar standard was clearly not the same as the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) standard of measuring evidence sufficiency against the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. 10 .

2004App. 1975) (physical pain when briefcase grabbed, arm twisted back leaving small bruise); Salley v. State, 25 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (police officer found appellant crying and in pain, her hair was “messed up in back,” and she said defendant hit her in the head with his fist; sufficient evidence to show bodily injury); cf. In re M.C.L., 110 S.W.3d 591, 600 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (evidence insufficient to show bodily injury from juvenile kicking officer when only evidence of injury to officer was cuts from glass shards from juvenile breaking win

2004App. 1975) (physical pain when briefcase grabbed, arm twisted back leaving small bruise); Salley v. State, 25 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (police officer found appellant crying and in pain, her hair was “messed up in back,” and she said defendant hit her in the head with his fist; sufficient evidence to show bodily injury); cf. In re M.C.L., 110 S.W.3d 591, 600 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (evidence insufficient to show bodily injury from juvenile kicking officer when only evidence of injury to officer was cuts from glass shards from juvenile breaking win

2004App. 1975) (physical pain when briefcase grabbed, arm twisted back leaving small bruise); Salley v. State, 25 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (police officer found appellant crying and in pain, her hair was “messed up in back,” and she said defendant hit her in the head with his fist; sufficient evidence to show bodily injury); cf. In re M.C.L., 110 S.W.3d 591, 600 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (evidence insufficient to show bodily injury from juvenile kicking officer when only evidence of injury to officer was cuts from glass shards from juvenile breaking win

2004App. 1975) (physical pain when briefcase grabbed, arm twisted back leaving small bruise); Salley v. State, 25 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (police officer found appellant crying and in pain, her hair was “messed up in back,” and she said defendant hit her in the head with his fist; sufficient evidence to show bodily injury); cf. In re M.C.L., 110 S.W.3d 591, 600 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (evidence insufficient to show bodily injury from juvenile kicking officer when only evidence of injury to officer was cuts from glass shards from juvenile breaking win