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6 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 1999–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Joseph
green
2 sentences2002Therefore, we conclude that information concerning the deal between LCNA and the confidential informant was properly discoverable. {¶ 15} Such a prosecutorial violation is reversible only when the record demonstrates that "(1) the prosecution's failure to disclose was a willful violation of the rule, (2) foreknowledge of the information would have benefited the accused in the preparation of his defense, and (3) the accused suffered some prejudicial effect." Id. citing State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 442 , 445 . {¶ 16} With respect to the first prong of the Parson test, we conclude that th 2002Therefore, we conclude that information concerning the deal between LCNA and the confidential informant was properly discoverable. {¶ 15} Such a prosecutorial violation is reversible only when the record demonstrates that "(1) the prosecution's failure to disclose was a willful violation of the rule, (2) foreknowledge of the information would have benefited the accused in the preparation of his defense, and (3) the accused suffered some prejudicial effect." Id. citing State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 442 , 445 . {¶ 16} With respect to the first prong of the Parson test, we conclude that th | 3 | 1999–2002 |
State v. Parson
green
2 sentences2002Therefore, we conclude that information concerning the deal between LCNA and the confidential informant was properly discoverable. {¶ 15} Such a prosecutorial violation is reversible only when the record demonstrates that "(1) the prosecution's failure to disclose was a willful violation of the rule, (2) foreknowledge of the information would have benefited the accused in the preparation of his defense, and (3) the accused suffered some prejudicial effect." Id. citing State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 442 , 445 . {¶ 16} With respect to the first prong of the Parson test, we conclude that th 2002Therefore, we conclude that information concerning the deal between LCNA and the confidential informant was properly discoverable. {¶ 15} Such a prosecutorial violation is reversible only when the record demonstrates that "(1) the prosecution's failure to disclose was a willful violation of the rule, (2) foreknowledge of the information would have benefited the accused in the preparation of his defense, and (3) the accused suffered some prejudicial effect." Id. citing State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 442 , 445 . {¶ 16} With respect to the first prong of the Parson test, we conclude that th | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2001State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13 , 15 . 2001State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13 , 15 , 470 N.E.2d 883 , 886 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Imbler v. Pachtman
green
1 sentence2021The trial court found this to be "couched as a clear threat," and discounted the argument of Ms. Long's counsel that these words were a threat to litigate: that argument could not wash, the trial court said, absent "evidence that this was her actual intent * * *," or "a good faith [legal] argument that there actually was somebody she could successfully sue." Id. at 11-12 (citing a prosecutorial immunity case, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), and also observing that "the trial judges have absolute immunity as well"). {¶ 15} "While it is evident that not all of Ms. Long's postings consti | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.