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16 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Amoco Production Co. v. Alexandergreen2 sentences2008Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 569 (Tex.1981) (“The reasonably prudent operator standard is not to be reduced to the [plaintiff lessors] because [their lessee] has other lessors in the same field. [The lessee's] status as a common lessee does not affect its liability to the [plaintiff lessors].”). 2008Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 569 (Tex. 1981) ("The reasonably prudent operator standard is not to be reduced to the [plaintiff lessors] because [their lessee] has other lessors in the same field. [The lessee's] status as a common lessee does not affect its liability to the [plaintiff lessors]."). | 5 | 6 |
Clifton v. Koontzgreen2 sentences2026Blackstone answered and counterclaimed, and Zarvona filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking declarations that “(a) the retained acreage clause is a snapshot provision and does not provide for rolling lease terminations during the secondary term on a unit-by-unit basis, and (b) Section 11.0(b) does not apply on a unit-by-unit basis and does not define the measuring period for assessing production in paying quantities when production has not ceased[.]” Based on an affidavit and 5 various exhibits including production records from wells in the Clarke, Delta, Simmons, and Woods units, 2026Whether Section 11.0(b) of the Lease is triggered after production in paying quantities ceases under the paying-quantities test established in Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959) or whether Section 11.0(b) replaces Clifton and defines a 90-day measuring period for a paying-quantities analysis without regard to the reasonably prudent operator standard. 2. | 2 | 2 |
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Pagegreen2 sentences2018See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Page, 141 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. Civ. 2018See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Page , 141 S.W.2d 691 , 693 (Tex. Civ. | 2 | 2 |
Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barkergreen2 sentences2019See Menking, 621 S.W.2d at 448-49 . - 13 - Chesapeake next relies on Bryan v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 1 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1927, no writ), and Tex. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928). 2019See Menking, 621 S.W.2d at 448-49 . - 13 - Chesapeake next relies on Bryan v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 1 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1927, no writ), and Tex. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928). | 1 | 2 |
Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyotegreen2 sentences1997See Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d at 284 ; see generally Walter Cardwell, Do Producers Owe Royalty on Take-or-Pay Settlements, 9th Ann. 1992Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1979), writ refd n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.1980), to support its claim of a higher good faith standard than that imposed by the reasonably prudent operator standard. | 1 | 2 |
Tanglewood Homes Association, Inc. v. Stewart A. Feldman, Marla B. Feldman, and Miichael T. Kelly, Trusteegreen1 sentence2024See id. 5 Appellants challenge the trial court’s grant of leave to Ivory and Grandfield to amend their answers after the scheduling-order deadline but more than seven days before trial.4 Appellants assert that allowing the amendment was an abuse of discretion because the reasonably- prudent-operator defense is inapplicable to Appellants’ claims and legally futile. | 1 | 1 |
Boyles v. Kerrgreen1 sentence2024Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 614 (Tex. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Springer Ranch, Ltd. v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2019See Springer Ranch, 421 S.W.3d at 280 (“[P]arties make their own contracts, and it is not within the province - 17 - of this court to vary their terms in order to protect them from the consequences of their own oversights and failures.”) The express terms of Paragraph 18 evidence the parties’ intent that the reasonably prudent operator standard does not apply to Chesapeake’s obligation to drill an offset well, pay Compensatory Royalty, or release acreage. | 1 | 1 |
HECI Exploration Co. v. Neelgreen1 sentence2019See HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 889 ; Amoco, 622 S.W.2d at 568 . | 1 | 1 |
Menking v. Tar Heel Energy Corp.green1 sentence2019See Menking, 621 S.W.2d at 448-49 . - 13 - Chesapeake next relies on Bryan v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 1 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1927, no writ), and Tex. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928). | 1 | 1 |
Bryan v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co.green1 sentence2019See Menking, 621 S.W.2d at 448-49 . - 13 - Chesapeake next relies on Bryan v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 1 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1927, no writ), and Tex. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928). | 1 | 1 |
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2019See Anadarko, 94 S.W.3d at 554 (presume parties intend each lease clause to have effect). | 1 | 1 |
Uri, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty.green1 sentence2019Chesapeake asserts that the MDL court erred by considering this extrinsic evidence and that this court should refuse to consider it. - 18 - “The parol evidence rule does not . . . prohibit courts from considering extrinsic evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding the contract’s execution as an aid in the construction of the contract’s language, but the evidence may only give the words of a contract a meaning consistent with that to which they are reasonably susceptible . . . .” URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 765 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Bachler v. Rosenthalgreen1 sentence2017See Bachler v. Rosenthal, 798 S.W.2d 646, 648-50 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied); see also Cannon v. Sun-Key Oil Co., Inc., 117 S.W.3d 416, 421 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet. denied) (“A ‘total cessation of production’ occurs when a well that has been producing gas ceases to produce any quantity of gas. | 1 | 1 |
Cannon v. Sun-Key Oil Co., Inc.green1 sentence2017See Bachler v. Rosenthal, 798 S.W.2d 646, 648-50 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied); see also Cannon v. Sun-Key Oil Co., Inc., 117 S.W.3d 416, 421 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet. denied) (“A ‘total cessation of production’ occurs when a well that has been producing gas ceases to produce any quantity of gas. | 1 | 1 |
Corzelius v. Harrellgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 568 ; Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82 , 325 S.W.2d 684, 690 (1959); Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509 , 186 S.W.2d 961, 967-68 (Tex.1945). 2005See, e.g., Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 568 ; Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82 , 325 S.W.2d 684, 690 (1959); Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509 , 186 S.W.2d 961, 967-68 (Tex.1945). | 1 | 1 |
Southeastern Pipe Line Co., Inc. v. Tichacekgreen1 sentence2000See Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d at 170 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024This case resembles Cruz, in which the party complaining of the omission of a jury question submitted a proposed charge four days before trial 17 that included the omitted charge. 364 S.W.3d at 830 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Thota v. Young
green
1 sentence2024Omission of the reasonably prudent operator instruction was reversible error We will not reverse a judgment for charge error unless it “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or “probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case [on appeal].” Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 687 ; Tex. R. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Murphy Exploration & Prod. Company-usa, Corp. v. Shirley Adams, Charlene Burgess, Willie Mae Herbst Jasik, William Albert Herbst, Helen Herbst, & R. May Oil & Gas Co.
green
2 sentences2019Id. 2019The first element requires proof of substantial drainage; the second requires proof that “a reasonably prudent operator would have acted to prevent that drainage.” Murphy, 560 S.W.3d at 109 n.3; see Amoco, 622 S.W.2d at 568 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Good v. TXO Production Corp.
green
2 sentences2019Proof of substantial drainage was required in Good because “the parties expressly adopted the reasonably prudent operator standard.” Id. 2019We note that Chesapeake also relies on Good for the proposition that lease language triggering an offset obligation when a neighboring well is “draining” the leased premises does not excuse the requirement that the lessor prove “substantial drainage.” See Good, 763 S.W.2d at 61 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bruni
green
1 sentence2005Hurd Enters. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101 , 109 n. 10 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1992, writ denied). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote
green
1 sentence1992Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1979), writ refd n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.1980), to support its claim of a higher good faith standard than that imposed by the reasonably prudent operator standard. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.