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16 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 2001–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.green2 sentences2018City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Schlittler v. State, 488 S.W.3d 306, 316 (Tex. Crim. 2010City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 ; Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Kiss v. State, 316 S.W.3d 665, 668-69 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. ref'd). | 3 | 4 |
Troxel v. Granvillegreen2 sentences2020Id. at 80 . 2006Id. at 80 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 . | 1 | 3 |
Reed v. Town of Gilbertgreen2 sentences2020In applying the strict-scrutiny standard to former subsection (b)(1)—and holding that it did not survive strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First Amendment— the Thompson court nevertheless provided some limiting guideposts.4 As an that interest.”); see also Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (citing Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 , and discussing Court’s application of strict scrutiny to content-based laws seeking to regulate speech in various professional fields). 4 See Murray v. State, 261 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. App. 2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th | 1 | 2 |
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Uniongreen1 sentence2024See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) (“The breadth of this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA.”). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 2144green2 sentences2021But the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine allows a court to declare a law unconstitutional on its face “even if it may have some legitimate application and even if the parties before the court were not engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 864–65 (first citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 , 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010); and then Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 , 609–10, 124 S. Ct. 1941 , 1948–49 (2004)). 7 that Section 36.063 is a content-based restriction on speech, is subject to a strict- scrutiny analysis, forbids protected speech, and fails 2021But the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine allows a court to declare a law unconstitutional on its face “even if it may have some legitimate application and even if the parties before the court were not engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 864–65 (first citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 , 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010); and then Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 , 609–10, 124 S. Ct. 1941 , 1948–49 (2004)). 7 that Section 36.063 is a content-based restriction on speech, is subject to a strict- scrutiny analysis, forbids protected speech, and fails | 1 | 1 |
Murray, Raymond Desmondgreen1 sentence2020In applying the strict-scrutiny standard to former subsection (b)(1)—and holding that it did not survive strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First Amendment— the Thompson court nevertheless provided some limiting guideposts.4 As an that interest.”); see also Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (citing Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 , and discussing Court’s application of strict scrutiny to content-based laws seeking to regulate speech in various professional fields). 4 See Murray v. State, 261 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. App. | 1 | 1 |
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerragreen1 sentence2020In applying the strict-scrutiny standard to former subsection (b)(1)—and holding that it did not survive strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First Amendment— the Thompson court nevertheless provided some limiting guideposts.4 As an that interest.”); see also Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (citing Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 , and discussing Court’s application of strict scrutiny to content-based laws seeking to regulate speech in various professional fields). 4 See Murray v. State, 261 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. App. | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. Stategreen1 sentence2020In applying the strict-scrutiny standard to former subsection (b)(1)—and holding that it did not survive strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First Amendment— the Thompson court nevertheless provided some limiting guideposts.4 As an that interest.”); see also Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (citing Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 , and discussing Court’s application of strict scrutiny to content-based laws seeking to regulate speech in various professional fields). 4 See Murray v. State, 261 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. App. | 1 | 1 |
Rangra v. Browngreen1 sentence2018Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A speech regulation is content-based if it defines the regulated speech by reference to its content”; agreeing that the criminal provisions of TOMA are “content-based regulations that require the state to satisfy the strict-scrutiny test in order to uphold them.”). | 1 | 1 |
Schlittler v. Stategreen1 sentence2018City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Schlittler v. State, 488 S.W.3d 306, 316 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Barstow v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th 2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th | 1 | 1 |
Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th | 1 | 1 |
Bernal v. Faintergreen1 sentence2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th | 1 | 1 |
Armando Salgado v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Salgado, 492 S.W.3d at 396 . 2016See Salgado, 492 S.W.3d at 397 (concluding the online- solicitation statute is a conduct-based statute, that it does not criminalize protected speech, and that the statute, given the speech at issue, was not subject to a strict- scrutiny analysis). | 1 | 1 |
Kunz v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2015Other Factors Suggest that a Police-Imposed Restriction, Even if Content-Neutral, Is Subject to Strict Scrutiny One reason the Madsen court declined to impose the strict-scrutiny standard in the injunction 31 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 32 Id. at 294-95 . 33 Id. at 296 (Justice Jackson dissenting). 34 Id. 35 Id. at 294-95 (Court’s op.). 36 Id. 2015Other Factors Suggest that a Police-Imposed Restriction, Even if Content-Neutral, Is Subject to Strict Scrutiny One reason the Madsen court declined to impose the strict-scrutiny standard in the injunction 31 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 32 Id. at 294-95 . 33 Id. at 296 (Justice Jackson dissenting). 34 Id. 35 Id. at 294-95 (Court’s op.). 36 Id. | 1 | 1 |
Kiss v. Stategreen1 sentence2010City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 ; Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Kiss v. State, 316 S.W.3d 665, 668-69 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
Cannady v. Stategreen1 sentence2010City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 ; Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Kiss v. State, 316 S.W.3d 665, 668-69 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett
green
2 sentences2007“Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses ‘distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement,’ a State’s decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 , 121 S.Ct. 955, 963 , 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 , 105 S.Ct. at 3255 ). “ ‘Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental 2007“Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses ‘distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement,’ a State’s decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 , 121 S.Ct. 955, 963 , 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 , 105 S.Ct. at 3255 ). “ ‘Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Sabri v. United States
green
2 sentences2021But the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine allows a court to declare a law unconstitutional on its face “even if it may have some legitimate application and even if the parties before the court were not engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 864–65 (first citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 , 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010); and then Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 , 609–10, 124 S. Ct. 1941 , 1948–49 (2004)). 7 that Section 36.063 is a content-based restriction on speech, is subject to a strict- scrutiny analysis, forbids protected speech, and fails 2021But the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine allows a court to declare a law unconstitutional on its face “even if it may have some legitimate application and even if the parties before the court were not engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 864–65 (first citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 , 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010); and then Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 , 609–10, 124 S. Ct. 1941 , 1948–49 (2004)). 7 that Section 36.063 is a content-based restriction on speech, is subject to a strict- scrutiny analysis, forbids protected speech, and fails | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Broadrick v. Oklahoma
green
1 sentence2021But the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine allows a court to declare a law unconstitutional on its face “even if it may have some legitimate application and even if the parties before the court were not engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 864–65 (first citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 , 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010); and then Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 , 609–10, 124 S. Ct. 1941 , 1948–49 (2004)). 7 that Section 36.063 is a content-based restriction on speech, is subject to a strict- scrutiny analysis, forbids protected speech, and fails | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Thompson, Ex Parte Ronald
green
2 sentences2020App. 2009). 8 example, the Thompson court indicated that then-in-effect section 21.15(b)(2) would indeed meet the strict-scrutiny standard: One need only look at the next subsection of the statute— § 21.15(b)(2)—to see an example of a provision that is in fact narrowly drawn to protect substantial privacy interests—the provision that makes it a crime to “photograph or . . . record[ ] . . . a visual image of another at a location that is a bathroom or private dressing room.” 442 S.W.3d at 348–49 (alterations in original) (quoting 2007 Tex. Penal Code § 21.15(b)(2)); see Act of May 18, 2007, 80t 2020App. 2009). 8 example, the Thompson court indicated that then-in-effect section 21.15(b)(2) would indeed meet the strict-scrutiny standard: One need only look at the next subsection of the statute— § 21.15(b)(2)—to see an example of a provision that is in fact narrowly drawn to protect substantial privacy interests—the provision that makes it a crime to “photograph or . . . record[ ] . . . a visual image of another at a location that is a bathroom or private dressing room.” 442 S.W.3d at 348–49 (alterations in original) (quoting 2007 Tex. Penal Code § 21.15(b)(2)); see Act of May 18, 2007, 80t | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Lo, Ex Parte John Christopher
green
1 sentence2018Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 15 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Estes v. State
green
1 sentence2018The court of criminal appeals reversed our Estes I judgment and remanded Estes’s appeal to us to consider Estes’s remaining constitutional issues: (1) whether a strict-scrutiny analysis applies to Estes’s equal-protection claim and (2) whether section 22.011(f) violated Estes’s substantive due-process rights.5 Id. at 706 & n.114. 4 Estes did not raise a facial challenge to section 22.011(f), only an as-applied challenge. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doe
green
2 sentences2007“Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses ‘distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement,’ a State’s decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 , 121 S.Ct. 955, 963 , 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 , 105 S.Ct. at 3255 ). “ ‘Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental 2007“Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses ‘distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement,’ a State’s decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 , 121 S.Ct. 955, 963 , 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 , 105 S.Ct. at 3255 ). “ ‘Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith
red
1 sentence2002Id. at 885 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Turner v. Safley
green
2 sentences2001Declining to engage in a strict-scrutiny analysis, the Court stated that a regulation is valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 . 2001Declining to engage in a strict-scrutiny analysis, the Court stated that a regulation is valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.