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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. McKeegreen2 sentences2025In Magana II we rejected Magana’s argument that we should apply a strict-scrutiny equal protection analysis based on McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pages 1208 to 1209, which held a strict-scrutiny standard applied to the determination whether the People “can demonstrate the constitutional justification for imposing on SVP’s a greater burden than is imposed on MDO’s and NGI’s in order to obtain release from commitment.” (See Magana II, at p. 323.) We observed that the McKee I court had cautioned, “‘[W]e strongly disagree with the concurring and dissenting opinion’s characterization of our view a 2022In essence, it changes the commitment from a two-year term, renewable only if the People prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual still meets the definition of an SVP, to an indefinite commitment from which the individual can be released if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer is an SVP.” (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1183-1184.) 16 court to determine, applying a strict-scrutiny equal protection analysis, whether the People “can demonstrate the constitutional justification for imposing on SVP’s a greater burden than is imposed on MDO’s and NG | 2 | 2 |
People v. Barrettgreen2 sentences2025In Magana II we rejected Magana’s argument that we should apply a strict-scrutiny equal protection analysis based on McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pages 1208 to 1209, which held a strict-scrutiny standard applied to the determination whether the People “can demonstrate the constitutional justification for imposing on SVP’s a greater burden than is imposed on MDO’s and NGI’s in order to obtain release from commitment.” (See Magana II, at p. 323.) We observed that the McKee I court had cautioned, “‘[W]e strongly disagree with the concurring and dissenting opinion’s characterization of our view a 2022In essence, it changes the commitment from a two-year term, renewable only if the People prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual still meets the definition of an SVP, to an indefinite commitment from which the individual can be released if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer is an SVP.” (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1183-1184.) 16 court to determine, applying a strict-scrutiny equal protection analysis, whether the People “can demonstrate the constitutional justification for imposing on SVP’s a greater burden than is imposed on MDO’s and NG | 2 | 2 |
People v. Maganagreen2 sentences2025(Magana II, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 324.) We explained, “[T]he rational basis analysis of Barrett is more applicable, even though made in the context of the section 6500 commitment statute, because it involves the analogous situation of the lack of a jury trial advisement and personal waiver under a civil commitment statute. 2025In Magana II we rejected Magana’s argument that we should apply a strict-scrutiny equal protection analysis based on McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pages 1208 to 1209, which held a strict-scrutiny standard applied to the determination whether the People “can demonstrate the constitutional justification for imposing on SVP’s a greater burden than is imposed on MDO’s and NGI’s in order to obtain release from commitment.” (See Magana II, at p. 323.) We observed that the McKee I court had cautioned, “‘[W]e strongly disagree with the concurring and dissenting opinion’s characterization of our view a | 1 | 1 |
In Re Moyered1 sentence2022In essence, it changes the commitment from a two-year term, renewable only if the People prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual still meets the definition of an SVP, to an indefinite commitment from which the individual can be released if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer is an SVP.” (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1183-1184.) 16 court to determine, applying a strict-scrutiny equal protection analysis, whether the People “can demonstrate the constitutional justification for imposing on SVP’s a greater burden than is imposed on MDO’s and NG | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Romer v. Evans
green
2 sentences2009Because Proposition 8 has only this limited effect on the fundamental rights of privacy and due process and the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the state Constitution as interpreted by the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th 757 , there is no need for us to consider whether a measure that actually deprives a minority group of the entire protection of a fundamental constitutional right or, even more sweepingly, leaves such a group vulnerable to public or private discrimination in all areas without legal recourse (cf. Romer v. Evans (1996) 517 U.S. 620 [ 134 2009Because Proposition 8 has only this limited effect on the fundamental rights of privacy and due process and the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the state Constitution as interpreted by the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th 757 , there is no need for us to consider whether a measure that actually deprives a minority group of the entire protection of a fundamental constitutional right or, even more sweepingly, leaves such a group vulnerable to public or private discrimination in all areas without legal recourse (cf. Romer v. Evans (1996) 517 U.S. 620 [ 134 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Marriage Cases
green
2 sentences2009Because Proposition 8 has only this limited effect on the fundamental rights of privacy and due process and the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the state Constitution as interpreted by the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th 757 , there is no need for us to consider whether a measure that actually deprives a minority group of the entire protection of a fundamental constitutional right or, even more sweepingly, leaves such a group vulnerable to public or private discrimination in all areas without legal recourse (cf. Romer v. Evans (1996) 517 U.S. 620 [ 134 2009Because Proposition 8 has only this limited effect on the fundamental rights of privacy and due process and the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the state Constitution as interpreted by the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th 757 , there is no need for us to consider whether a measure that actually deprives a minority group of the entire protection of a fundamental constitutional right or, even more sweepingly, leaves such a group vulnerable to public or private discrimination in all areas without legal recourse (cf. Romer v. Evans (1996) 517 U.S. 620 [ 134 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
District of Columbia v. Heller
green
1 sentence2008(Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. _ [ 128 S.Ct. at p. 2851 ] (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.); see also Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment (2007) 105 Mich. L.Rev. 683 [explaining the difficulties of applying strict scrutiny to gun control regulations and cataloguing the ways in which courts have and are likely to continue to scrutinize gun laws after adoption of an individual rights approach to the Second Amendment].) Further, as the dissent notes, it is “far from clear" that the firearm prohibitions approved in Heller itself (e.g., felon in possession of a firearm) would survive strict scrutiny | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In Re Bender
green
1 sentence1984Such a result is anomalous and clearly unsupported by current law.” {Id., at p. 390.) We agree with the court in In re Bender, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d 380 that section 2933, expressly conferring a privilege, not a right, upon prisoners sentenced to state prison and clearly intended by the Legislature to be amelioratory, does not effect a fundamental deprivation of liberty requiring a strict-scrutiny analysis. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.