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17 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cornerstone Christian Schools v. University Interscholastic Leaguegreen2 sentences2022Soccer Ass’n, 693 S.W.2d 513, 514, 518 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ); see also Cornerstone Christian Schs., 563 F.3d at 135-40 (addressing constitutional challenges to UIL rule when UIL was party); Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622-23 (Tex. 2011) (noting distinction between governmental entity and officials as parties in sovereign-immunity context). 2010See Cornerstone Christian Schs. v. UIL, 563 F.3d 127, 135-36 (5th Cir.2009) (reviewing UIL rule to determine whether it violated constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, due process, and equal protection); Saenz, 487 F.2d at 1027 (holding that UIL is governmental entity immune from antitrust liability); Blue v. UIL, 503 F.Supp. 1030, 1034 (N.D.Tex.1980) (concluding that UIL rules “constitute state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983”); see also Sullivan v. UIL, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex.1981) (“All public schools are eligible for membership in the [UI | 4 | 4 |
Sullivan v. University Interscholastic Leaguegreen2 sentences2010See Cornerstone Christian Schs. v. UIL, 563 F.3d 127, 135-36 (5th Cir.2009) (reviewing UIL rule to determine whether it violated constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, due process, and equal protection); Saenz, 487 F.2d at 1027 (holding that UIL is governmental entity immune from antitrust liability); Blue v. UIL, 503 F.Supp. 1030, 1034 (N.D.Tex.1980) (concluding that UIL rules “constitute state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983”); see also Sullivan v. UIL, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex.1981) (“All public schools are eligible for membership in the [UI 1997Laws 2207 , 2348. 36 Brief at 4. 37 Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos , 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.), appeal dism'd , 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 38 Niles v. University Interscholastic League , 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 465 U.S. 1028 (1984) (rule requiring high school student to reside in district for at least one year prior to participating in interscholastic events did not violate equal protection clause); Blue v. University Interscholastic League , 503 F. Supp. 1030 , 1035 (N.D.Tex. 1980); Stamos , 695 S.W.2d at 561 -62 . 39 Sullivan , 616 S.W.2d at 172 (Tex. 1981) (finding unconstituti | 4 | 4 |
Blue v. University Interscholastic Leaguegreen2 sentences2010See Cornerstone Christian Schs. v. UIL, 563 F.3d 127, 135-36 (5th Cir. 2009) (reviewing UIL rule 12 to determine whether it violated constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, due process, and equal protection); Saenz, 487 F.2d at 1027 (holding that UIL is governmental entity immune from antitrust liability); Blue v. UIL, 503 F. Supp. 1030, 1034 (N.D. 2010See Cornerstone Christian Schs. v. UIL, 563 F.3d 127, 135-36 (5th Cir.2009) (reviewing UIL rule to determine whether it violated constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, due process, and equal protection); Saenz, 487 F.2d at 1027 (holding that UIL is governmental entity immune from antitrust liability); Blue v. UIL, 503 F.Supp. 1030, 1034 (N.D.Tex.1980) (concluding that UIL rules “constitute state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983”); see also Sullivan v. UIL, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex.1981) (“All public schools are eligible for membership in the [UI | 3 | 4 |
E. G. Saenz v. University Interscholastic Leaguegreen2 sentences2010See Cornerstone Christian Schs. v. UIL, 563 F.3d 127, 135-36 (5th Cir. 2009) (reviewing UIL rule 12 to determine whether it violated constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, due process, and equal protection); Saenz, 487 F.2d at 1027 (holding that UIL is governmental entity immune from antitrust liability); Blue v. UIL, 503 F. Supp. 1030, 1034 (N.D. 2010See Cornerstone Christian Schs. v. UIL, 563 F.3d 127, 135-36 (5th Cir.2009) (reviewing UIL rule to determine whether it violated constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, due process, and equal protection); Saenz, 487 F.2d at 1027 (holding that UIL is governmental entity immune from antitrust liability); Blue v. UIL, 503 F.Supp. 1030, 1034 (N.D.Tex.1980) (concluding that UIL rules “constitute state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983”); see also Sullivan v. UIL, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex.1981) (“All public schools are eligible for membership in the [UI | 3 | 3 |
Tooke v. City of Mexiagreen2 sentences2010See Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex. 2006) (holding that immunity is not waived absent clear legislative intent to do so). 2010See Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex.2006) (holding that immunity is not waived absent clear legislative intent to do so). | 3 | 3 |
The City of El Paso v. Lilli M. Heinrichgreen2 sentences2010See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n.6 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 2010We express no opinion on the merits of TASO's ultra vires claims, including whether, in the event that TASO brought these claims against a government officer acting in an official capacity, it could "allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex.2009). | 3 | 3 |
University Interscholastic League v. Buchanangreen2 sentences2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (1993) 81 Ed. Law Rep. 1145 , 1 A.D.D. 742, 3 NDLR P 263 its first point of error, the UIL alleges that the rule does not Although the UIL provides a waiver procedure for some discriminate solely on the basis of the Students' handicaps; eligibility rules, e.g., the four-year eligibility rule, it fails the UIL maintains that the Students are ineligible due to their to furnish such a process for the over–19 rule. 2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (1993) 81 Ed. Law Rep. 1145 , 1 A.D.D. 742, 3 NDLR P 263 its first point of error, the UIL alleges that the rule does not Although the UIL provides a waiver procedure for some discriminate solely on the basis of the Students' handicaps; eligibility rules, e.g., the four-year eligibility rule, it fails the UIL maintains that the Students are ineligible due to their to furnish such a process for the over–19 rule. | 2 | 7 |
University Interscholastic League v. North Dallas Chamber of Commerce Soccer Ass'ngreen2 sentences2022Soccer Ass’n, 693 S.W.2d 513, 514, 518 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ); see also Cornerstone Christian Schs., 563 F.3d at 135-40 (addressing constitutional challenges to UIL rule when UIL was party); Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622-23 (Tex. 2011) (noting distinction between governmental entity and officials as parties in sovereign-immunity context). 1997Laws 2207 , 2348. 36 Brief at 4. 37 Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos , 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.), appeal dism'd , 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 38 Niles v. University Interscholastic League , 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 465 U.S. 1028 (1984) (rule requiring high school student to reside in district for at least one year prior to participating in interscholastic events did not violate equal protection clause); Blue v. University Interscholastic League , 503 F. Supp. 1030 , 1035 (N.D.Tex. 1980); Stamos , 695 S.W.2d at 561 -62 . 39 Sullivan , 616 S.W.2d at 172 (Tex. 1981) (finding unconstituti | 2 | 2 |
Brennan v. Stewartgreen2 sentences1993Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals in Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1262 (5th Cir.1988), concluded that “our precedent requires that the ‘reasonable accommodation’ question be decided as an issue of fact....” Although the UIL provides a waiver procedure for some eligibility rules, e.g., the four-year eligibility rule, it fails to furnish such a process for the over-19 rule. 1993Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals in Brennan v. Stewart , 834 F.2d 1248, 1262 (5th Cir. 1988), concluded that "our precedent requires that the 'reasonable accommodation' question be decided as an issue of fact . . . ." Although the UIL provides a waiver procedure for some eligibility rules, e.g., the four-year eligibility rule, it fails to furnish such a process for the over-19 rule. | 2 | 2 |
In Re University Interscholastic Leaguegreen1 sentence2023Interscholastic League, 20 S.W.3d 690, 692 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (“[T]he right to participate in extracurricular activities is not a fundamental right . . . [and] judicial intervention in [UIL] matters such as these often does more harm than good.”). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Sefzikgreen1 sentence2022Soccer Ass’n, 693 S.W.2d 513, 514, 518 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ); see also Cornerstone Christian Schs., 563 F.3d at 135-40 (addressing constitutional challenges to UIL rule when UIL was party); Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622-23 (Tex. 2011) (noting distinction between governmental entity and officials as parties in sovereign-immunity context). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Boardgreen1 sentence2010See Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). 11 In its response to the UIL’s plea to the jurisdiction, TASO describes its suit as “seeking a declaration that the UIL is without any vested authority to take over the profession of sports officiating, and that no body has delegated to it the authority to tax or regulate sports officials.” 19 challenges. | 1 | 1 |
City of Dallas v. Heardgreen2 sentences2009Code Ann . ' 51.014(8) (Vernon 2008); City of Dallas v. Heard , 252 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2008, pet. denied). [3] Although Jaco did not state in his pleadings that he believed, in good faith, that a UIL rule is a law or was adopted under a statute or ordinance, the District did not specially except to the pleading, which we construe liberally. 2009Code Ann . ' 51.014(8) (Vernon 2008); City of Dallas v. Heard , 252 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2008, pet. denied). [3] Although Jaco did not state in his pleadings that he believed, in good faith, that a UIL rule is a law or was adopted under a statute or ordinance, the District did not specially except to the pleading, which we construe liberally. | 1 | 1 |
UNIVERSITY OF TX SW. MED. CTR. v. Gentilellogreen2 sentences2009Code Ann . ' 51.014(8) (Vernon 2008); City of Dallas v. Heard , 252 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2008, pet. denied). [3] Although Jaco did not state in his pleadings that he believed, in good faith, that a UIL rule is a law or was adopted under a statute or ordinance, the District did not specially except to the pleading, which we construe liberally. 2009Code Ann . ' 51.014(8) (Vernon 2008); City of Dallas v. Heard , 252 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2008, pet. denied). [3] Although Jaco did not state in his pleadings that he believed, in good faith, that a UIL rule is a law or was adopted under a statute or ordinance, the District did not specially except to the pleading, which we construe liberally. | 1 | 1 |
Republican Party of Texas v. Dietzgreen1 sentence2000See Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 924 S.W.2d 932, 932-33 (Tex.1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
University Interscholastic League v. Paynegreen1 sentence2010But see Payne, 635 S.W.2d at 757 n. 5 (citing Blue and noting that state action is “a different *961 and far broader concept than the jurisdictional question before this court,” in reference to question of whether UIL was state agency exempt from appeal-bond requirement). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Marshall
green
2 sentences2015There is no evidence other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, before the Court to suggest that the [UIL] bases its decision to bar the 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 Plaintiff from playing high school invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the football on any particular harm that various parties in its determination of whether to grant a might result if he is allowed to preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. 2015There is no evidence other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, before the Court to suggest that the [UIL] bases its decision to bar the 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 Plaintiff from playing high school invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the football on any particular harm that various parties in its determination of whether to grant a might result if he is allowed to preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. | 7 | 1993–2015 |
Beachem v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2015There is no evidence other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, before the Court to suggest that the [UIL] bases its decision to bar the 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 Plaintiff from playing high school invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the football on any particular harm that various parties in its determination of whether to grant a might result if he is allowed to preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. 2015There is no evidence other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, before the Court to suggest that the [UIL] bases its decision to bar the 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 Plaintiff from playing high school invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the football on any particular harm that various parties in its determination of whether to grant a might result if he is allowed to preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. | 4 | 1993–2015 |
Marshall v. Doe
green
2 sentences2015There is no evidence other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, before the Court to suggest that the [UIL] bases its decision to bar the 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 Plaintiff from playing high school invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the football on any particular harm that various parties in its determination of whether to grant a might result if he is allowed to preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. 2015There is no evidence other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, before the Court to suggest that the [UIL] bases its decision to bar the 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 Plaintiff from playing high school invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the football on any particular harm that various parties in its determination of whether to grant a might result if he is allowed to preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. | 4 | 1993–2015 |
Hollywood Marine, Inc., Et Al. v. United States
green
2 sentences2015There is no evidence other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, before the Court to suggest that the [UIL] bases its decision to bar the 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 Plaintiff from playing high school invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the football on any particular harm that various parties in its determination of whether to grant a might result if he is allowed to preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. 2015There is no evidence other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, before the Court to suggest that the [UIL] bases its decision to bar the 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 Plaintiff from playing high school invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the football on any particular harm that various parties in its determination of whether to grant a might result if he is allowed to preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. | 3 | 2015–2015 |
University Interscholastic League v. Midwestern University
green
2 sentences1997In University Interscholastic League v. Midwestern University , 255 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. 1953), the Texas Supreme Court addressed similar questions about a UIL rule. 1997In University Interscholastic League v. Midwestern University , 255 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. 1953), the Texas Supreme Court addressed similar questions about a UIL rule. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos
green
2 sentences1997Laws 2207 , 2348. 36 Brief at 4. 37 Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos , 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.), appeal dism'd , 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 38 Niles v. University Interscholastic League , 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 465 U.S. 1028 (1984) (rule requiring high school student to reside in district for at least one year prior to participating in interscholastic events did not violate equal protection clause); Blue v. University Interscholastic League , 503 F. Supp. 1030 , 1035 (N.D.Tex. 1980); Stamos , 695 S.W.2d at 561 -62 . 39 Sullivan , 616 S.W.2d at 172 (Tex. 1981) (finding unconstituti 1997Laws 2207 , 2348. 36 Brief at 4. 37 Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos , 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.), appeal dism'd , 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 38 Niles v. University Interscholastic League , 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 465 U.S. 1028 (1984) (rule requiring high school student to reside in district for at least one year prior to participating in interscholastic events did not violate equal protection clause); Blue v. University Interscholastic League , 503 F. Supp. 1030 , 1035 (N.D.Tex. 1980); Stamos , 695 S.W.2d at 561 -62 . 39 Sullivan , 616 S.W.2d at 172 (Tex. 1981) (finding unconstituti | 2 | 1997–1997 |
K.D.F. v. Rex
green
2 sentences2010The ultra vires nature of TASO’s claims will be addressed more fully in our discussion of whether sovereign immunity was waived. 14 UIL’s mandatory venue provision in a list of statutes that “minimiz[e] the litigation costs that taxpayers must bear by providing state agencies with a convenient venue in which to litigate.” K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589 , 595 & n.5 (Tex. 1994). 2010The ultra vires nature of TASO’s claims will be addressed more fully in our discussion of whether sovereign immunity was waived. 14 UIL’s mandatory venue provision in a list of statutes that “minimiz[e] the litigation costs that taxpayers must bear by providing state agencies with a convenient venue in which to litigate.” K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589 , 595 & n.5 (Tex. 1994). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District
green
2 sentences2007The instant cause is akin to Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District , 797 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ), which involved the application of the "no-pass, no-play" law. 2007The instant cause is akin to Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District , 797 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ), which involved the application of the "no-pass, no-play" law. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Mark David Niles v. The University Interscholastic League and the District Iii-17aaaaa Executive Committee
green
1 sentence1997Laws 2207 , 2348. 36 Brief at 4. 37 Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos , 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.), appeal dism'd , 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 38 Niles v. University Interscholastic League , 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 465 U.S. 1028 (1984) (rule requiring high school student to reside in district for at least one year prior to participating in interscholastic events did not violate equal protection clause); Blue v. University Interscholastic League , 503 F. Supp. 1030 , 1035 (N.D.Tex. 1980); Stamos , 695 S.W.2d at 561 -62 . 39 Sullivan , 616 S.W.2d at 172 (Tex. 1981) (finding unconstituti | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Stamos v. Spring Branch Independent School District
green
1 sentence1997Laws 2207 , 2348. 36 Brief at 4. 37 Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos , 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.), appeal dism'd , 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 38 Niles v. University Interscholastic League , 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 465 U.S. 1028 (1984) (rule requiring high school student to reside in district for at least one year prior to participating in interscholastic events did not violate equal protection clause); Blue v. University Interscholastic League , 503 F. Supp. 1030 , 1035 (N.D.Tex. 1980); Stamos , 695 S.W.2d at 561 -62 . 39 Sullivan , 616 S.W.2d at 172 (Tex. 1981) (finding unconstituti | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Niles v. University Interscholastic League
green
1 sentence1997Laws 2207 , 2348. 36 Brief at 4. 37 Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos , 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.), appeal dism'd , 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 38 Niles v. University Interscholastic League , 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 465 U.S. 1028 (1984) (rule requiring high school student to reside in district for at least one year prior to participating in interscholastic events did not violate equal protection clause); Blue v. University Interscholastic League , 503 F. Supp. 1030 , 1035 (N.D.Tex. 1980); Stamos , 695 S.W.2d at 561 -62 . 39 Sullivan , 616 S.W.2d at 172 (Tex. 1981) (finding unconstituti | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Doe v. Marshall
green
2 sentences1993The United States District Court, in Doe v. Marshall, 459 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D.Tex.1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the various parties in its determination of whether to grant a preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. 1993The United States District Court, in Doe v. Marshall, 459 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D.Tex.1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 , 101 S.Ct. 2336 , 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), 5 invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the various parties in its determination of whether to grant a preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.