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16 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
County of Walworth v. Rohnergreen2 sentences2020See generally Wis. Stat. § 356.65 (2) (describing how penalties escalate for successive OWI violations); see also Cty. of Walworth v. Rohner, 12 No. 2018AP1129.dk 108 Wis. 2d 713, 716 , 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982) ("Sec. 346.65(2) establishes an escalating penalty scheme for violation of the drunk driving statute."). 2020See generally Wis. Stat. § 356.65 (2) (describing how penalties escalate for successive OWI violations); see also Cty. of Walworth v. Rohner, 12 No. 2018AP1129.dk 108 Wis. 2d 713, 716 , 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982) ("Sec. 346.65(2) establishes an escalating penalty scheme for violation of the drunk driving statute."). | 2 | 2 |
State v. McAllistergreen2 sentences2020State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 538 , 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982) ("[W]e hold that the fact of a prior violation, civil or criminal, is not an element of the crime of [OWI] either in the ordinary sense of the meaning of the word element, i.e., the incidents of conduct giving rise to the prosecution, or in the constitutional sense."). ¶30 A defendant's prior convictions determine his status as a repeat offender, not his guilt. 2020State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 538 , 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982) ("[W]e hold that the fact of a prior violation, civil or criminal, is not an element of the crime of [OWI] either in the ordinary sense of the meaning of the word element, i.e., the incidents of conduct giving rise to the prosecution, or in the constitutional sense."). ¶30 A defendant's prior convictions determine his status as a repeat offender, not his guilt. | 2 | 2 |
County of Jefferson v. Renzgreen2 sentences2020She argued that the stop should have been completed before the officer developed probable cause for an OWI arrest. ¶10 During the suppression hearing, the State expressly conceded that the PBT was not supported by probable cause.4 The court determined that the 3 This statute has been interpreted to require “a quantum of proof greater than the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop ... but less than the level of proof required to establish probable cause for arrest.” City of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 316 , 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). 4 The State appeared to base th 2020She argued that the stop should have been completed before the officer developed probable cause for an OWI arrest. ¶10 During the suppression hearing, the State expressly conceded that the PBT was not supported by probable cause.4 The court determined that the 3 This statute has been interpreted to require “a quantum of proof greater than the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop ... but less than the level of proof required to establish probable cause for arrest.” City of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 316 , 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). 4 The State appeared to base th | 1 | 4 |
State v. Leflergreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Dumas v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 518, 519 , 280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979) (defendant was convicted of “possession of burglarious tools” based on his possession of a “tire iron and a crowbar”); see also State v. Lefler, 2013 WI App 22, ¶¶12-13 , 346 Wis. 2d 220 , 827 N.W.2d 650 (officer’s observation of “prying-type tools” in the defendant’s car during an OWI stop contributed to probable cause to search the trunk for other “burglarious tools”). 2024See, e.g., Dumas v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 518, 519 , 280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979) (defendant was convicted of “possession of burglarious tools” based on his possession of a “tire iron and a crowbar”); see also State v. Lefler, 2013 WI App 22, ¶¶12-13 , 346 Wis. 2d 220 , 827 N.W.2d 650 (officer’s observation of “prying-type tools” in the defendant’s car during an OWI stop contributed to probable cause to search the trunk for other “burglarious tools”). | 1 | 1 |
Dumas v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Dumas v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 518, 519 , 280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979) (defendant was convicted of “possession of burglarious tools” based on his possession of a “tire iron and a crowbar”); see also State v. Lefler, 2013 WI App 22, ¶¶12-13 , 346 Wis. 2d 220 , 827 N.W.2d 650 (officer’s observation of “prying-type tools” in the defendant’s car during an OWI stop contributed to probable cause to search the trunk for other “burglarious tools”). 2024See, e.g., Dumas v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 518, 519 , 280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979) (defendant was convicted of “possession of burglarious tools” based on his possession of a “tire iron and a crowbar”); see also State v. Lefler, 2013 WI App 22, ¶¶12-13 , 346 Wis. 2d 220 , 827 N.W.2d 650 (officer’s observation of “prying-type tools” in the defendant’s car during an OWI stop contributed to probable cause to search the trunk for other “burglarious tools”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kevin P. Kanegreen1 sentence2023See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980); see also, e.g., United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992) (Defendant “lacked a reasonable expectation of finality in his original illegal sentencing[.]”); United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1990) (“A defendant can acquire 22 No. 2021AP859-CR no legitimate expectation of finality in an illegal sentence[.]”); United States v. Kane, 876 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, a defendant can acquire no expectation of finality in an illegal sentence[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leonard Brady Jacksongreen1 sentence2023See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980); see also, e.g., United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992) (Defendant “lacked a reasonable expectation of finality in his original illegal sentencing[.]”); United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1990) (“A defendant can acquire 22 No. 2021AP859-CR no legitimate expectation of finality in an illegal sentence[.]”); United States v. Kane, 876 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, a defendant can acquire no expectation of finality in an illegal sentence[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Francis Rourkegreen1 sentence2023See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980); see also, e.g., United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992) (Defendant “lacked a reasonable expectation of finality in his original illegal sentencing[.]”); United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1990) (“A defendant can acquire 22 No. 2021AP859-CR no legitimate expectation of finality in an illegal sentence[.]”); United States v. Kane, 876 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, a defendant can acquire no expectation of finality in an illegal sentence[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Countygreen1 sentence2023Such interpretations are contrary to our standards for statutory interpretation.15 See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (“[S]tatutory language is interpreted … reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.”). ¶31 Moreover, our supreme court concluded in State v. Williams, 2014 WI 64 , 355 Wis. 2d 581 , 852 N.W.2d 467 , that the OWI graduated-penalty scheme, which advances the “purpose to punish repeat offenders,” requires circuit courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least the minimum term of confinement established by the legislature. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. DiFrancescogreen1 sentence2023See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980); see also, e.g., United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992) (Defendant “lacked a reasonable expectation of finality in his original illegal sentencing[.]”); United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1990) (“A defendant can acquire 22 No. 2021AP859-CR no legitimate expectation of finality in an illegal sentence[.]”); United States v. Kane, 876 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, a defendant can acquire no expectation of finality in an illegal sentence[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Patrick H. Daltongreen2 sentences2020See also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2537-38 (2019) (considering pre-blood draw factors in the exigency analysis); Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶45-48 (considering in the exigency analysis various law enforcement responsibilities officers prioritized over applying for a warrant in the two hours between the alcohol-related crash and the suspect’s refusal to submit to a blood draw at the hospital); Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶49 (suggesting that when an officer has probable cause of an OWI violation at the scene of a traffic stop and is transporting a suspect to the hospital for a blood dr 2020See also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2537-38 (2019) (considering pre-blood draw factors in the exigency analysis); Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶45-48 (considering in the exigency analysis various law enforcement responsibilities officers prioritized over applying for a warrant in the two hours between the alcohol-related crash and the suspect’s refusal to submit to a blood draw at the hospital); Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶49 (suggesting that when an officer has probable cause of an OWI violation at the scene of a traffic stop and is transporting a suspect to the hospital for a blood dr | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2020See also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2537-38 (2019) (considering pre-blood draw factors in the exigency analysis); Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶45-48 (considering in the exigency analysis various law enforcement responsibilities officers prioritized over applying for a warrant in the two hours between the alcohol-related crash and the suspect’s refusal to submit to a blood draw at the hospital); Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶49 (suggesting that when an officer has probable cause of an OWI violation at the scene of a traffic stop and is transporting a suspect to the hospital for a blood dr 2020See also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2537-38 (2019) (considering pre-blood draw factors in the exigency analysis); Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶45-48 (considering in the exigency analysis various law enforcement responsibilities officers prioritized over applying for a warrant in the two hours between the alcohol-related crash and the suspect’s refusal to submit to a blood draw at the hospital); Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶49 (suggesting that when an officer has probable cause of an OWI violation at the scene of a traffic stop and is transporting a suspect to the hospital for a blood dr | 1 | 1 |
State v. David W. Howesgreen2 sentences2020See also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2537-38 (2019) (considering pre-blood draw factors in the exigency analysis); Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶45-48 (considering in the exigency analysis various law enforcement responsibilities officers prioritized over applying for a warrant in the two hours between the alcohol-related crash and the suspect’s refusal to submit to a blood draw at the hospital); Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶49 (suggesting that when an officer has probable cause of an OWI violation at the scene of a traffic stop and is transporting a suspect to the hospital for a blood dr 2020See also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2537-38 (2019) (considering pre-blood draw factors in the exigency analysis); Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶¶45-48 (considering in the exigency analysis various law enforcement responsibilities officers prioritized over applying for a warrant in the two hours between the alcohol-related crash and the suspect’s refusal to submit to a blood draw at the hospital); Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶49 (suggesting that when an officer has probable cause of an OWI violation at the scene of a traffic stop and is transporting a suspect to the hospital for a blood dr | 1 | 1 |
Lorton v. Director of Revenuegreen1 sentence1999See Lorton v. Director of Revenue, 985 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. 1999). 19 Recently, the Illinois Appellate Court modified the circumstances in which requests for an attorney will constitute a refusal. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Kenosha v. Jensen
green
2 sentences2020So the municipal court simultaneously had subject matter jurisdiction over the OWI ordinance violation, but did not have competency to hear the case because our statutes require that it be pursued in circuit court. ¶74 The dissent's straw man indelibly colored its understanding and discussion of Booth, Rohner, and City of Kenosha v. Jensen, 184 Wis. 2d 91 , 516 N.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1994). 2020So the municipal court simultaneously had subject matter jurisdiction over the OWI ordinance violation, but did not have competency to hear the case because our statutes require that it be pursued in circuit court. ¶74 The dissent's straw man indelibly colored its understanding and discussion of Booth, Rohner, and City of Kenosha v. Jensen, 184 Wis. 2d 91 , 516 N.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1994). | 2 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Adam M. Blackman
green
2 sentences2025STAT. § 343.305(4).” State v. Blackman, 2017 WI 77 , ¶17 n.4, 377 Wis. 2d 339 , 898 N.W.2d 774 . 10 No. 2023AP169-CR under sub. (3)(a), the officer had placed the person under arrest for” an OWI violation “or had requested the person to take a test under sub. (3)(ar).” Sec. 343.305(9)(a)1. ¶24 A driver may request a refusal hearing on the revocation.8 WIS. 2025STAT. § 343.305(4).” State v. Blackman, 2017 WI 77 , ¶17 n.4, 377 Wis. 2d 339 , 898 N.W.2d 774 . 10 No. 2023AP169-CR under sub. (3)(a), the officer had placed the person under arrest for” an OWI violation “or had requested the person to take a test under sub. (3)(ar).” Sec. 343.305(9)(a)1. ¶24 A driver may request a refusal hearing on the revocation.8 WIS. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Teresa L. Clark
green
1 sentence2025Malloy presided at the March 2024 hearing and denied Flynn’s motion. 3 No. 2024AP2306-CR waiver of attorney form, and that “[h]ad the seriousness of [his] waiver of counsel been more fully explained to [him] …, [he] would have reconsidered whether it was wise to proceed pro se.” ¶6 The circuit court5 held a hearing on Flynn’s amended motion in September 2024 at which it questioned the viability of Flynn’s argument in light of our supreme court’s decision in Clark, in which the court held that where no transcript of a prior OWI plea colloquy is available, “the defendant must carry the burden to | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Waldner
green
2 sentences2023See Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 316-17 (the odor of intoxicants can be an indicator of intoxication); State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 58 , 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996) (although the odor of alcohol, by itself, may not establish reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed an OWI, it nevertheless serves as a significant “building block” for reasonable suspicion); State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶¶21-22 , 359 Wis. 2d 454 , 856 N.W.2d 834 (discussing glassy and bloodshot eyes as a physical indicator of intoxication); State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶35 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 (glassy and blood 2023See Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 316-17 (the odor of intoxicants can be an indicator of intoxication); State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 58 , 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996) (although the odor of alcohol, by itself, may not establish reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed an OWI, it nevertheless serves as a significant “building block” for reasonable suspicion); State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶¶21-22 , 359 Wis. 2d 454 , 856 N.W.2d 834 (discussing glassy and bloodshot eyes as a physical indicator of intoxication); State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶35 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 (glassy and blood | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Carter
green
1 sentence2023STAT. § 343.307(1)(d), namely, a “conviction[] under the law of another jurisdiction that prohibits a person from using a motor vehicle with an excess or specified range of alcohol concentration.” See Carter, 330 Wis. 2d 1, ¶30 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Clayton W. Williams
green
2 sentences2023Such interpretations are contrary to our standards for statutory interpretation.15 See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (“[S]tatutory language is interpreted … reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.”). ¶31 Moreover, our supreme court concluded in State v. Williams, 2014 WI 64 , 355 Wis. 2d 581 , 852 N.W.2d 467 , that the OWI graduated-penalty scheme, which advances the “purpose to punish repeat offenders,” requires circuit courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least the minimum term of confinement established by the legislature. 2023Such interpretations are contrary to our standards for statutory interpretation.15 See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (“[S]tatutory language is interpreted … reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.”). ¶31 Moreover, our supreme court concluded in State v. Williams, 2014 WI 64 , 355 Wis. 2d 581 , 852 N.W.2d 467 , that the OWI graduated-penalty scheme, which advances the “purpose to punish repeat offenders,” requires circuit courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least the minimum term of confinement established by the legislature. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Alvernest Floyd Kennedy
green
2 sentences2023See Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 316-17 (the odor of intoxicants can be an indicator of intoxication); State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 58 , 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996) (although the odor of alcohol, by itself, may not establish reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed an OWI, it nevertheless serves as a significant “building block” for reasonable suspicion); State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶¶21-22 , 359 Wis. 2d 454 , 856 N.W.2d 834 (discussing glassy and bloodshot eyes as a physical indicator of intoxication); State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶35 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 (glassy and blood 2023See Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 316-17 (the odor of intoxicants can be an indicator of intoxication); State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 58 , 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996) (although the odor of alcohol, by itself, may not establish reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed an OWI, it nevertheless serves as a significant “building block” for reasonable suspicion); State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶¶21-22 , 359 Wis. 2d 454 , 856 N.W.2d 834 (discussing glassy and bloodshot eyes as a physical indicator of intoxication); State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶35 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 (glassy and blood | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Michael R. Tullberg
green
2 sentences2023See Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 316-17 (the odor of intoxicants can be an indicator of intoxication); State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 58 , 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996) (although the odor of alcohol, by itself, may not establish reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed an OWI, it nevertheless serves as a significant “building block” for reasonable suspicion); State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶¶21-22 , 359 Wis. 2d 454 , 856 N.W.2d 834 (discussing glassy and bloodshot eyes as a physical indicator of intoxication); State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶35 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 (glassy and blood 2023See Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 316-17 (the odor of intoxicants can be an indicator of intoxication); State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 58 , 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996) (although the odor of alcohol, by itself, may not establish reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed an OWI, it nevertheless serves as a significant “building block” for reasonable suspicion); State v. Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, ¶¶21-22 , 359 Wis. 2d 454 , 856 N.W.2d 834 (discussing glassy and bloodshot eyes as a physical indicator of intoxication); State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶35 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 (glassy and blood | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Town of Menasha v. Bastian
green
2 sentences2021She asserted the circuit court “seem[ed] to have forgotten that it did not have jurisdiction over the refusal anymore.” Specifically, Fischer asserted that under Town of Menasha v. Bastian, 178 Wis. 2d 191 , 503 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1993), the court had no jurisdiction to address the dismissal of the refusal charge because the City had not 3 Although the municipal court revoked Fischer’s operating privilege for a period of seven months as a sanction for her OWI violation, it is undisputed that the court did not revoke her operating privilege under WIS. 2021She asserted the circuit court “seem[ed] to have forgotten that it did not have jurisdiction over the refusal anymore.” Specifically, Fischer asserted that under Town of Menasha v. Bastian, 178 Wis. 2d 191 , 503 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1993), the court had no jurisdiction to address the dismissal of the refusal charge because the City had not 3 Although the municipal court revoked Fischer’s operating privilege for a period of seven months as a sanction for her OWI violation, it is undisputed that the court did not revoke her operating privilege under WIS. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Griep
green
1 sentence2015Does it make a difference that the lab supervisor said it was 'his' opinion even though he did not perform any of the testing himself and simply noted that the unavailable analyst followed the proper protocol?" Petition for Certification at 1, Griep, 353 Wis. 2d 252 (No. 2009AP3073-CR), 2013 WL 1978568 (Petition denied). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Banks
green
2 sentences2014Hirsch was lawfully convicted of the two Illinois offenses, and there is nothing unfair about counting them now for sentence enhancement, making his current conviction his sixth offense. "[T]he purpose of general repeater statutes is to increase the punishment of persons who fail to learn to respect the law after suffering the initial penalties and embarrassment of conviction." State v. Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 49 , 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981). ¶ 18. 2014Hirsch was lawfully convicted of the two Illinois offenses, and there is nothing unfair about counting them now for sentence enhancement, making his current conviction his sixth offense. "[T]he purpose of general repeater statutes is to increase the punishment of persons who fail to learn to respect the law after suffering the initial penalties and embarrassment of conviction." State v. Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 49 , 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981). ¶ 18. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.