BAC test in Arizona

2024State v. Claybrook, 193 Ariz. 588, 590, ¶ 14 (App. 1998) (citation omitted); see also State v. White, 155 Ariz. 452, 455 (App. 1987) (holding that jury could infer that 16 STATE v. PADILLA Decision of the Court DUI defendant’s BAC test reading of .234 one hour after arrest showed intoxication at time of arrest).

2024State v. Claybrook, 193 Ariz. 588, 590, ¶ 14 (App. 1998) (citation omitted); see also State v. White, 155 Ariz. 452, 455 (App. 1987) (holding that jury could infer that 16 STATE v. PADILLA Decision of the Court DUI defendant’s BAC test reading of .234 one hour after arrest showed intoxication at time of arrest).

1991Compare, e.g., Desmond v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 522 , 779 P.2d 1261 (1989) (BAC test results must relate back to time of driving for criminal conviction under section 28-692) with State ex rel.

1991Compare, e.g., Desmond v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 522 , 779 P.2d 1261 (1989) (BAC test results must relate back to time of driving for criminal conviction under section 28-692) with State ex rel.

2024State v. Claybrook, 193 Ariz. 588, 590, ¶ 14 (App. 1998) (citation omitted); see also State v. White, 155 Ariz. 452, 455 (App. 1987) (holding that jury could infer that 16 STATE v. PADILLA Decision of the Court DUI defendant’s BAC test reading of .234 one hour after arrest showed intoxication at time of arrest).

2024State v. Claybrook, 193 Ariz. 588, 590, ¶ 14 (App. 1998) (citation omitted); see also State v. White, 155 Ariz. 452, 455 (App. 1987) (holding that jury could infer that 16 STATE v. PADILLA Decision of the Court DUI defendant’s BAC test reading of .234 one hour after arrest showed intoxication at time of arrest).

2015State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84, ¶ 13 , 302 P.3d 609, 612 (2013).

2015State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84, ¶ 13 , 302 P.3d 609, 612 (2013).

2015Id. at 563, ¶ 3 , 155 P.3d at 1087 . ¶ 10 Facing a second trial on the DUI-impaired charge, Bartolini argued — as Morgan argues here — that the acquittal on the per se DUI charge constituted a determination that the BAC test result was “unreliable.” Id. at 564, ¶ 10 , 155 P.3d at 1088 .

2015Id. at 563, ¶ 3 , 155 P.3d at 1087 . ¶ 10 Facing a second trial on the DUI-impaired charge, Bartolini argued — as Morgan argues here — that the acquittal on the per se DUI charge constituted a determination that the BAC test result was “unreliable.” Id. at 564, ¶ 10 , 155 P.3d at 1088 .

2015Ct., 183 Ariz. 113, 115 , 901 P.2d 461, 463 (App.1995). ¶ 6 Here, if the jury is erroneously instructed as to the reliability of the BAC test, the State has no adequate remedy by appeal.

2015Ct., 183 Ariz. 113, 115 , 901 P.2d 461, 463 (App.1995). ¶ 6 Here, if the jury is erroneously instructed as to the reliability of the BAC test, the State has no adequate remedy by appeal.

2014Ariz. State Hosp. v. Klein, 231 Ariz. 467, 473, ¶ 26 , 296 P.3d 1003, 1009 (App.2013).

2014Ariz. State Hosp. v. Klein, 231 Ariz. 467, 473, ¶ 26 , 296 P.3d 1003, 1009 (App.2013).

2007See State v. Klausner, 194 Ariz. 169, 172-73 , 978 P.2d 654, 657-58 (App.1998) (affirming use of BAC test results in DUI-impaired prosecution); see also Ariz. R. of Evid. 401 (defining “relevant evidence”). ¶ 10 Bartolini further contends that because her BAC test results were rejected as unreliable by the first jury when it acquitted her on the per se DUI charge, the test results cannot be used in the retrial on the DUI-impaired charge.

2007See State v. Klausner, 194 Ariz. 169, 172-73 , 978 P.2d 654, 657-58 (App.1998) (affirming use of BAC test results in DUI-impaired prosecution); see also Ariz. R. of Evid. 401 (defining “relevant evidence”). ¶ 10 Bartolini further contends that because her BAC test results were rejected as unreliable by the first jury when it acquitted her on the per se DUI charge, the test results cannot be used in the retrial on the DUI-impaired charge.

2007Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel requires that “the issue sought to be relitigated must be precisely the same as the issue in the previous litigation.” State v. Jimenez, 130 Ariz. 138, 140 , 634 P.2d 950, 952 (1981); see also Rodriguez, 198 Ariz. at 141, ¶ 5 , 7 P.3d at 150 (same). 3 ¶ 9 Collateral estoppel does not preclude the admission of Bartolini’s BAC test results in her second trial because the issue of impairment is not the same as the issue of per se DUI in the first trial.

2007Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel requires that “the issue sought to be relitigated must be precisely the same as the issue in the previous litigation.” State v. Jimenez, 130 Ariz. 138, 140 , 634 P.2d 950, 952 (1981); see also Rodriguez, 198 Ariz. at 141, ¶ 5 , 7 P.3d at 150 (same). 3 ¶ 9 Collateral estoppel does not preclude the admission of Bartolini’s BAC test results in her second trial because the issue of impairment is not the same as the issue of per se DUI in the first trial.

2007See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; see also Sullivan v. State, 235 Ga.App. 768 , 510 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1998) (affirming admission into evidence of BAC test results in trial on impairment offense even though jury in first trial found defendant not guilty of per se DUI offense). ¶ 11 Additionally, Bartolini cites State v. Superior Court (Hobson), 150 Ariz. 18 , 721 P.2d 676 (App.1986), for the proposition that the BAC test results should not have been admitted in the second trial.

2007See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; see also Sullivan v. State, 235 Ga.App. 768 , 510 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1998) (affirming admission into evidence of BAC test results in trial on impairment offense even though jury in first trial found defendant not guilty of per se DUI offense). ¶ 11 Additionally, Bartolini cites State v. Superior Court (Hobson), 150 Ariz. 18 , 721 P.2d 676 (App.1986), for the proposition that the BAC test results should not have been admitted in the second trial.

2007See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; see also Sullivan v. State, 235 Ga.App. 768 , 510 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1998) (affirming admission into evidence of BAC test results in trial on impairment offense even though jury in first trial found defendant not guilty of per se DUI offense). ¶ 11 Additionally, Bartolini cites State v. Superior Court (Hobson), 150 Ariz. 18 , 721 P.2d 676 (App.1986), for the proposition that the BAC test results should not have been admitted in the second trial.

2007See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; see also Sullivan v. State, 235 Ga.App. 768 , 510 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1998) (affirming admission into evidence of BAC test results in trial on impairment offense even though jury in first trial found defendant not guilty of per se DUI offense). ¶ 11 Additionally, Bartolini cites State v. Superior Court (Hobson), 150 Ariz. 18 , 721 P.2d 676 (App.1986), for the proposition that the BAC test results should not have been admitted in the second trial.

2007He also contends the Department of Public Safety (DPS) failed to collect and preserve a sample of his breath. 2 ¶ 10 We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress absent an abuse of discretion. 3 State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 284 , 908 P.2d 1062, 1069 (1996).

2007He also contends the Department of Public Safety (DPS) failed to collect and preserve a sample of his breath. 2 ¶ 10 We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress absent an abuse of discretion. 3 State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 284 , 908 P.2d 1062, 1069 (1996).

2007Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel requires that “the issue sought to be relitigated must be precisely the same as the issue in the previous litigation.” State v. Jimenez, 130 Ariz. 138, 140 , 634 P.2d 950, 952 (1981); see also Rodriguez, 198 Ariz. at 141, ¶ 5 , 7 P.3d at 150 (same). 3 ¶ 9 Collateral estoppel does not preclude the admission of Bartolini’s BAC test results in her second trial because the issue of impairment is not the same as the issue of per se DUI in the first trial.

2007Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel requires that “the issue sought to be relitigated must be precisely the same as the issue in the previous litigation.” State v. Jimenez, 130 Ariz. 138, 140 , 634 P.2d 950, 952 (1981); see also Rodriguez, 198 Ariz. at 141, ¶ 5 , 7 P.3d at 150 (same). 3 ¶ 9 Collateral estoppel does not preclude the admission of Bartolini’s BAC test results in her second trial because the issue of impairment is not the same as the issue of per se DUI in the first trial.

2007See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; see also Sullivan v. State, 235 Ga.App. 768 , 510 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1998) (affirming admission into evidence of BAC test results in trial on impairment offense even though jury in first trial found defendant not guilty of per se DUI offense). ¶ 11 Additionally, Bartolini cites State v. Superior Court (Hobson), 150 Ariz. 18 , 721 P.2d 676 (App.1986), for the proposition that the BAC test results should not have been admitted in the second trial.

2007See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 ; see also Sullivan v. State, 235 Ga.App. 768 , 510 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1998) (affirming admission into evidence of BAC test results in trial on impairment offense even though jury in first trial found defendant not guilty of per se DUI offense). ¶ 11 Additionally, Bartolini cites State v. Superior Court (Hobson), 150 Ariz. 18 , 721 P.2d 676 (App.1986), for the proposition that the BAC test results should not have been admitted in the second trial.

2004Our supreme court has clarified the “for any reason” language of § 28-1388(E) to mean that the blood must be drawn by medical personnel for “medical purposes.” State v. Codo, 147 Ariz. 277, 286 , 709 P.2d 1336, 1345 (1985). ¶ 7 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court suppressed the BAC test results from the blood sample, finding that § 28-673(A) did not apply.

2004Our supreme court has clarified the “for any reason” language of § 28-1388(E) to mean that the blood must be drawn by medical personnel for “medical purposes.” State v. Codo, 147 Ariz. 277, 286 , 709 P.2d 1336, 1345 (1985). ¶ 7 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court suppressed the BAC test results from the blood sample, finding that § 28-673(A) did not apply.

2000See State v. Soto, 195 Ariz. 429, 432 , 990 P.2d 23, 26 (App.1999) (“The warrant exceptions of inevitable discovery and independent source relate because they serve to purge the taint of impermissible law-enforcement activity, causally disconnecting the acquisition of the evidence from the illegality”). ¶ 22 The state’s argument has a ring of validity and squares with federal exclusionary rule jurisprudence.

2000See State v. Soto, 195 Ariz. 429, 432 , 990 P.2d 23, 26 (App.1999) (“The warrant exceptions of inevitable discovery and independent source relate because they serve to purge the taint of impermissible law-enforcement activity, causally disconnecting the acquisition of the evidence from the illegality”). ¶ 22 The state’s argument has a ring of validity and squares with federal exclusionary rule jurisprudence.

2000See State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181 , 911 P.2d 774, 778 (App.1995) (upholding suppression of state’s BAC test as appropriate remedy when police denied suspect’s request to telephone her attorney and held her incommunicado for unreasonable time after administering that test). ¶ 31 Nor do we find error in the trial court’s suppression of other, post-violation evidence.

2000See State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181 , 911 P.2d 774, 778 (App.1995) (upholding suppression of state’s BAC test as appropriate remedy when police denied suspect’s request to telephone her attorney and held her incommunicado for unreasonable time after administering that test). ¶ 31 Nor do we find error in the trial court’s suppression of other, post-violation evidence.

1998When a defendant’s BAC test does not occur within two hours of driving, however, the State may still meet its burden of proving that the defendant had a BAC of 0.10 or more within the two-hour period by using “evidence relating the defendant’s blood alcohol content back.” State v. Superior Ct. (Kankelfritz), 187 Ariz. 440, 441 , 930 P.2d 517, 518 (App. 1996). 3 This is referred to as retroactive extrapolation. ¶ 15 Retroactive extrapolation is a process through which a “minimal alcohol elimination rate of .015 percent an hour is used to determine what a blood alcohol rate was at a specified ti

1998When a defendant’s BAC test does not occur within two hours of driving, however, the State may still meet its burden of proving that the defendant had a BAC of 0.10 or more within the two-hour period by using “evidence relating the defendant’s blood alcohol content back.” State v. Superior Ct. (Kankelfritz), 187 Ariz. 440, 441 , 930 P.2d 517, 518 (App. 1996). 3 This is referred to as retroactive extrapolation. ¶ 15 Retroactive extrapolation is a process through which a “minimal alcohol elimination rate of .015 percent an hour is used to determine what a blood alcohol rate was at a specified ti

1998When a defendant’s BAC test does not occur within two hours of driving, however, the State may still meet its burden of proving that the defendant had a BAC of 0.10 or more within the two-hour period by using “evidence relating the defendant’s blood alcohol content back.” State v. Superior Ct. (Kankelfritz), 187 Ariz. 440, 441 , 930 P.2d 517, 518 (App. 1996). 3 This is referred to as retroactive extrapolation. ¶ 15 Retroactive extrapolation is a process through which a “minimal alcohol elimination rate of .015 percent an hour is used to determine what a blood alcohol rate was at a specified ti

1998When a defendant’s BAC test does not occur within two hours of driving, however, the State may still meet its burden of proving that the defendant had a BAC of 0.10 or more within the two-hour period by using “evidence relating the defendant’s blood alcohol content back.” State v. Superior Ct. (Kankelfritz), 187 Ariz. 440, 441 , 930 P.2d 517, 518 (App. 1996). 3 This is referred to as retroactive extrapolation. ¶ 15 Retroactive extrapolation is a process through which a “minimal alcohol elimination rate of .015 percent an hour is used to determine what a blood alcohol rate was at a specified ti

1998We disagree with Logan v. Brown, 151 Ariz. 96 , *591 725 P.2d 1130 (App.1986), to the extent that it finds that when a defendant's BAC test results equal or exceed 0.10, a rebuttable presumption exists that the defendant had a BAC of 0.10 or more at an earlier time.

1998We disagree with Logan v. Brown, 151 Ariz. 96 , *591 725 P.2d 1130 (App.1986), to the extent that it finds that when a defendant's BAC test results equal or exceed 0.10, a rebuttable presumption exists that the defendant had a BAC of 0.10 or more at an earlier time.