11 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1992–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Swansongreen2 sentences2020Minkoff, ¶ 9 (citing State v. Swanson, 222 Mont. 357, 360 , 722 P.2d 1155, 1157 (1986)). 2020Minkoff, ¶ 9 (citing State v. Swanson, 222 Mont. 357, 360 , 722 P.2d 1155, 1157 (1986)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Schmollgreen1 sentence2012The Idaho statutes do not define the phrase “under the influence.” ¶14 Young argues that the Montana and Idaho DUI statutes are not similar because the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Schmoll, 172 P.3d 555, 556 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007), defined “under the influence” as “impairment of driving ability to the slightest degree,” and this Court in State v. McNally, 2002 MT 160, ¶ 22 , 310 Mont. 396 , 50 P.3d 1080 , stated that in Montana, “a person simply may not be convicted for DUI if his or her ability is impaired ‘to the slightest degree.’ ” As support for his argument, Young quotes the followi | 1 | 1 |
Walk v. State, Dept. of Licensinggreen2 sentences2004Walk, 976 P.2d at 186 (“We conclude that WAC 448-13-040 does not require that the officer actually administering the BAC test personally observe the suspect during the required 15-minute observation period.” (emphasis added)). 2004Walk, 976 P.2d at 186 (“We conclude that WAC 448-13-040 does not require that the officer actually administering the BAC test personally observe the suspect during the required 15-minute observation period.” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Gentry v. State, Dept. of Justicegreen2 sentences1999See Gentry, 282 Mont. at 495-96 , 938 P.2d at 696 ; Blomeyer v. State (1994), 264 Mont. 414 , 871 P.2d 1338 . ¶ 13 Williams recognizes that the type of confusion discussed in Gentry and Blomeyer does not exist in this case. 1999See Gentry, 282 Mont. at 495-96 , 938 P.2d at 696 ; Blomeyer v. State (1994), 264 Mont. 414 , 871 P.2d 1338 . ¶ 13 Williams recognizes that the type of confusion discussed in Gentry and Blomeyer does not exist in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Bueling v. Swiftgreen2 sentences1999See Bueling v. Swift, 1998 MT 112, ¶ 24 , [ 288 Mont. 472, ¶ 24 ], 958 P.2d 694, ¶ 24 . ¶48 At trial, Mortensen contended that the test results of Wells’ blood alcohol content taken by the hospital shortly after the incident were not admissible because the standard for civil liability pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA, is “visible intoxication,” rather than “legal intoxication.” The District Court granted Mortensen’s motion in limine and refused evidence of the BAC test results. 1999See Bueling v. Swift, 1998 MT 112, ¶ 24 , [ 288 Mont. 472, ¶ 24 ], 958 P.2d 694, ¶ 24 . ¶48 At trial, Mortensen contended that the test results of Wells’ blood alcohol content taken by the hospital shortly after the incident were not admissible because the standard for civil liability pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA, is “visible intoxication,” rather than “legal intoxication.” The District Court granted Mortensen’s motion in limine and refused evidence of the BAC test results. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Armfield
red
2 sentences1997State v. Armfield (1984), 214 Mont. 229 , 693 P.2d 1226 . 1997State v. Armfield (1984), 214 Mont. 229 , 693 P.2d 1226 . | 2 | 1994–1997 |
Weer v. State
neutral
2 sentences2021This analysis may consider factors such as “the time of day, the location of the stop, and the [individual’s] driving behavior.” Weer v. State, 2010 MT 232, ¶ 10 , 358 Mont. 130 , 244 P.3d 311 (citations omitted). ¶23 A. Whether Trooper Sutherland had sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the crash investigation into a DUI investigation. ¶24 Bailey argues the Justice Court should have suppressed all inculpatory evidence, including but not limited to any statements against interest, the results of the field sobriety tests, any physical evidence observed or obtained from his vehicle, and 2021This analysis may consider factors such as “the time of day, the location of the stop, and the [individual’s] driving behavior.” Weer v. State, 2010 MT 232, ¶ 10 , 358 Mont. 130 , 244 P.3d 311 (citations omitted). ¶23 A. Whether Trooper Sutherland had sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the crash investigation into a DUI investigation. ¶24 Bailey argues the Justice Court should have suppressed all inculpatory evidence, including but not limited to any statements against interest, the results of the field sobriety tests, any physical evidence observed or obtained from his vehicle, and | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. McNally
green
2 sentences2012The Idaho statutes do not define the phrase “under the influence.” ¶14 Young argues that the Montana and Idaho DUI statutes are not similar because the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Schmoll, 172 P.3d 555, 556 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007), defined “under the influence” as “impairment of driving ability to the slightest degree,” and this Court in State v. McNally, 2002 MT 160, ¶ 22 , 310 Mont. 396 , 50 P.3d 1080 , stated that in Montana, “a person simply may not be convicted for DUI if his or her ability is impaired ‘to the slightest degree.’ ” As support for his argument, Young quotes the followi 2012The Idaho statutes do not define the phrase “under the influence.” ¶14 Young argues that the Montana and Idaho DUI statutes are not similar because the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Schmoll, 172 P.3d 555, 556 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007), defined “under the influence” as “impairment of driving ability to the slightest degree,” and this Court in State v. McNally, 2002 MT 160, ¶ 22 , 310 Mont. 396 , 50 P.3d 1080 , stated that in Montana, “a person simply may not be convicted for DUI if his or her ability is impaired ‘to the slightest degree.’ ” As support for his argument, Young quotes the followi | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. McGowan
green
2 sentences2008He argued that the State had failed to prove that his BAC was .08 or more at the time he was driving and that under State v. McGowan, 2006 MT 163 , 332 Mont. 490 , 139 P.3d 841 , four hours was not reasonable. 2008He argued that the State had failed to prove that his BAC was .08 or more at the time he was driving and that under State v. McGowan, 2006 MT 163 , 332 Mont. 490 , 139 P.3d 841 , four hours was not reasonable. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Strand
green
2 sentences2004Strand, 286 Mont. at 124 , 951 P.2d at 553 . 2004Strand, 286 Mont. at 124 , 951 P.2d at 553 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Blomeyer v. State
green
2 sentences1999See Gentry, 282 Mont. at 495-96 , 938 P.2d at 696 ; Blomeyer v. State (1994), 264 Mont. 414 , 871 P.2d 1338 . ¶ 13 Williams recognizes that the type of confusion discussed in Gentry and Blomeyer does not exist in this case. 1999See Gentry, 282 Mont. at 495-96 , 938 P.2d at 696 ; Blomeyer v. State (1994), 264 Mont. 414 , 871 P.2d 1338 . ¶ 13 Williams recognizes that the type of confusion discussed in Gentry and Blomeyer does not exist in this case. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Johnson v. Division of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences1994Johnson v. Division of Motor Vehicles (1985), 219 Mont. 310 , 711 P.2d 815 . 1994Johnson v. Division of Motor Vehicles (1985), 219 Mont. 310 , 711 P.2d 815 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Meyer v. State
green
2 sentences1994Meyer, 745 P.2d at 696 . 1994Meyer, 745 P.2d at 696 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Severino
green
2 sentences1994Beckey, 192 N.W.2d at 445 ; Severino, 537 P.2d at 1190 . 1994Beckey, 192 N.W.2d at 445 ; Severino, 537 P.2d at 1190 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State, Department of Highways v. Beckey
green
2 sentences1994Beckey, 192 N.W.2d at 445 ; Severino, 537 P.2d at 1190 . 1994Beckey, 192 N.W.2d at 445 ; Severino, 537 P.2d at 1190 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Horton v. State
green
2 sentences1992The District Court relied on this Court’s interpretation of § 61-5-208(2), MCA, in Horton v. State (1986), 221 Mont. 233 , 717 P.2d 1108 , in determining that a BAC violation within five years of a DUI violation mandates a one year driver’s license revocation. 1992The District Court relied on this Court’s interpretation of § 61-5-208(2), MCA, in Horton v. State (1986), 221 Mont. 233 , 717 P.2d 1108 , in determining that a BAC violation within five years of a DUI violation mandates a one year driver’s license revocation. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.