17 California opinions name it 4 courts 1992–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2017Birchfield consented to a roadside breath test (a preliminary alcohol screening test), which showed Birchfield had a BAC of 0.254 percent. ( Ibid . ) After placing Birchfield under arrest for DUI, the state trooper advised Birchfield of his obligation under the North Dakota implied consent law to submit to further BAC testing, and that refusal to submit to a test would result in criminal penalties. ( Birchfield , supra , 579 U.S. at p. ---- [ 136 S.Ct. at p. 2170 ].) Birchfield refused to submit to a blood test, and subsequently pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of refusing to submit to a 2017Birchfield consented to a roadside breath test (a preliminary alcohol screening test), which showed Birchfield had a BAC of 0.254 percent. ( Ibid . ) After placing Birchfield under arrest for DUI, the state trooper advised Birchfield of his obligation under the North Dakota implied consent law to submit to further BAC testing, and that refusal to submit to a test would result in criminal penalties. ( Birchfield , supra , 579 U.S. at p. ---- [ 136 S.Ct. at p. 2170 ].) Birchfield refused to submit to a blood test, and subsequently pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of refusing to submit to a | 2 | 3 |
Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2014(Robertson v. Zolin (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 147, 151 ; Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 141-143.) Although Zehnder opined that breath testing in general had a margin of error of 20 percent “because of the variables involved in breath testing and calibrating an instrument,” he did not identify the variables involved in breath testing and calibrating an instrument, and he did not explain how any such variables resulted in a 20 percent margin of error in Alcotest 7410 Plus devices. 1992Since the court's ruling, however, appellate court decisions have *664 established that the first two bases are erroneous as a matter of law. ( Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal. App.4th 133, 140-143 [ 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 818 ]; Santos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 5 Cal. App.4th at p. 547; McKinney v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal. App.4th 519, 525-526 [ 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 18 ]; Burge v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal. App.4th 384, 389 [ 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 5 ]; Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 2 Cal. App.4th 809, 816-817 [ 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 4 | 1 | 2 |
Flonnory v. Stategreen1 sentence2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss | 1 | 1 |
People v. Roblesgreen2 sentences2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R 2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R | 1 | 1 |
Nix v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W 2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jose Francisco Andradegreen2 sentences2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W 2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Manuel Martinez-Gallegosgreen2 sentences2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W 2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rickie Lee Boatwrightgreen2 sentences2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W 2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hughstongreen2 sentences2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W 2016Even assuming respondent superior court properly determined that under the totality of the circumstances Katz had not voluntarily consented to submit to a blood test, we conclude that suppression of the BAC test results is not required based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ (Nix v. W | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Francis Joseph Reilly, AKA Ian MacCormick AKA Steven James Connergreen2 sentences2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R 2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R 2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Gourleygreen2 sentences2015(Baker v. Gourley, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273 [“After all, the usual symptoms of substantive intoxication — slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, etcetera — can manifest themselves at a blood-alcohol level below .08”].) But in arguing circumstantial evidence may lend support to the conclusion particular BAC test results are accurate because the motorist’s behavior is typical or commensurate with a high BAC, DMV simply misunderstands the standard of review. 2015(Baker v. Gourley, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273 [“After all, the usual symptoms of substantive intoxication — slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, etcetera — can manifest themselves at a blood-alcohol level below .08”].) But in arguing circumstantial evidence may lend support to the conclusion particular BAC test results are accurate because the motorist’s behavior is typical or commensurate with a high BAC, DMV simply misunderstands the standard of review. | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Barbagreen1 sentence2015The confrontation clause bars the admission of testimonial statements made outside of court against a defendant unless the declarant is unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ( Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 580-581; People v. Barba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 712, 721 (Barba).) In Barba, this division discussed in detail the recent case law addressing the intersection of the confrontation clause and forensic evidence, including Lopez and Dungo. | 1 | 1 |
| California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McKinney v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burge v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2024For example, all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a 14 condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk- driving offense. [Citation.] Such laws impose significant consequences when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist’s driver’s license is immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow the motorist’s refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.”7 ( McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at pp 2024For example, all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a 14 condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk- driving offense. [Citation.] Such laws impose significant consequences when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist’s driver’s license is immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow the motorist’s refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.”7 ( McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at pp | 5 | 2015–2024 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences2015In a recent opinion, People v. Harris (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671 [ 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 ] (Harris), the Court of Appeal held that warrantless blood draws are not limited to the exception of exigent circumstances under McNeely. 2015In a recent opinion, People v. Harris (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671 [ 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 ] (Harris), the Court of Appeal held that warrantless blood draws are not limited to the exception of exigent circumstances under McNeely. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Coffey v. Shiomoto
green
2 sentences2025(See Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 15 pp. 1214−1216 [concluding “non-chemical-test circumstantial evidence of intoxication may be admissible” in an administrative proceeding regarding the suspension or revocation of a driver’s license].) III. 2025(See Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 15 pp. 1214−1216 [concluding “non-chemical-test circumstantial evidence of intoxication may be admissible” in an administrative proceeding regarding the suspension or revocation of a driver’s license].) III. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Myers, D.
green
1 sentence2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State of Arizona v. Hon. butler/tyler B.
green
2 sentences2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss 2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Micah Abraham Wulff
green
2 sentences2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss 2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Yong Shik Won
green
2 sentences2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss 2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Modlin
green
1 sentence2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Romano
green
1 sentence2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss 2023(See, e.g., State v. Romano (N.C. 2017) 369 N.C. 678 [ 800 S.E.2d 644 , 652– 653] [implied consent statute “does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement” under Fourth Amendment]; Williams v. State (Ga. 2015) 296 Ga. 817 [ 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 ] [“[M]ere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant”]; State v. Yong Shik Won (Hawaii 2015) 137 Hawaii 330 [ 372 P.3d 1065, 1080 ] [“in order to legitimize submiss | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R 2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Limon
green
2 sentences2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R 2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Boyer
red
2 sentences2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R 2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 (Robles); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 (Green); People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 539 .) 5 exception. ([People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006)] 143 Cal.App.4th 1183 ,] 1215 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 831 ].) A violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be disregarded ‘ “simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.” [Citation.]’ (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30 [ 49 Cal.R | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
1 sentence2015Confrontation Clause Relying on Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), appellant contends his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violated when the court admitted 6 diagrams prepared during Cervantes’s autopsy and allowed Augustine to testify to Cervantes’s BAC results, given Augustine did not perform the autopsy or BAC analysis. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Christina T.
green
1 sentence2015(In re Christina T. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 630 , 9 638-639.) The juvenile court’s determination that mother was continuing to be dishonest did not turn, as mother alleges, on its knowledge and consideration of BAC test results. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Day
green
2 sentences2015It may, however, have limited relevance when the factors that underlie the shape of the concentration time curve [showing the level of alcohol absorption over time] are subject to conflicting testimony.” (State v. Day (2008) 143 N.M. 359 [ 176 P.3d 1091, 1100 ].) That is precisely how such evidence is relevant in this case. 2015It may, however, have limited relevance when the factors that underlie the shape of the concentration time curve [showing the level of alcohol absorption over time] are subject to conflicting testimony.” (State v. Day (2008) 143 N.M. 359 [ 176 P.3d 1091, 1100 ].) That is precisely how such evidence is relevant in this case. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Robertson v. Zolin
green
1 sentence2014(Robertson v. Zolin (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 147, 151 ; Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 141-143.) Although Zehnder opined that breath testing in general had a margin of error of 20 percent “because of the variables involved in breath testing and calibrating an instrument,” he did not identify the variables involved in breath testing and calibrating an instrument, and he did not explain how any such variables resulted in a 20 percent margin of error in Alcotest 7410 Plus devices. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.