Assembly Committee analysis in California

2009Cooper relied on Culbertson v. Cizek (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 451, 473 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 548 ], in which the court permitted the unlicensed contractor to offset ‘as a defense against sums due the plaintiffs any amounts that would otherwise be due Cizek under his contract.’ This measure is intended to clearly state that those using the services of unlicensed contractors are entitled to bring an action for recovery of compensation paid. [][]... [f] “AB No. 678 constitutes an additional and consistent legislative determination that such deterrence can best be realized by compelling violators to return

2009Cooper relied on Culbertson v. Cizek (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 451, 473 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 548 ], in which the court permitted the unlicensed contractor to offset ‘as a defense against sums due the plaintiffs any amounts that would otherwise be due Cizek under his contract.’ This measure is intended to clearly state that those using the services of unlicensed contractors are entitled to bring an action for recovery of compensation paid. [][]... [f] “AB No. 678 constitutes an additional and consistent legislative determination that such deterrence can best be realized by compelling violators to return

2024Therefore, evidence that a particular defendant has such a propensity is especially probative . . . .’ ”]; Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1012 [it is reasonable to allow the jury to infer disposition based on evidence of other sex crimes]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915 [evidence that defendant committed other sex offenses is at least circumstantially relevant to the issue of defendant’s disposition or propensity to commit these offenses].) (See also People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 631 [propensity evidence is deemed objectionable not because it has no appreciable proba

2024Therefore, evidence that a particular defendant has such a propensity is especially probative . . . .’ ”]; Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1012 [it is reasonable to allow the jury to infer disposition based on evidence of other sex crimes]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915 [evidence that defendant committed other sex offenses is at least circumstantially relevant to the issue of defendant’s disposition or propensity to commit these offenses].) (See also People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 631 [propensity evidence is deemed objectionable not because it has no appreciable proba

2024Therefore, evidence that a particular defendant has such a propensity is especially probative . . . .’ ”]; Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1012 [it is reasonable to allow the jury to infer disposition based on evidence of other sex crimes]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915 [evidence that defendant committed other sex offenses is at least circumstantially relevant to the issue of defendant’s disposition or propensity to commit these offenses].) (See also People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 631 [propensity evidence is deemed objectionable not because it has no appreciable proba

2024Therefore, evidence that a particular defendant has such a propensity is especially probative . . . .’ ”]; Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1012 [it is reasonable to allow the jury to infer disposition based on evidence of other sex crimes]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915 [evidence that defendant committed other sex offenses is at least circumstantially relevant to the issue of defendant’s disposition or propensity to commit these offenses].) (See also People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 631 [propensity evidence is deemed objectionable not because it has no appreciable proba

2016(Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1120 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) An Assembly committee analysis of Senate Bill No. 1058 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) stated that the impetus for the bill was the issue addressed in Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th 948 : ‘“The 4-3 majority in Richards held that expert opinion stated at trial is ‘false evidence’ supporting . . . habeas relief if the expert’s conclusion is proved to be objectively untrue.” (Assem.

2016(Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1120 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) An Assembly committee analysis of Senate Bill No. 1058 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) stated that the impetus for the bill was the issue addressed in Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th 948 : ‘“The 4-3 majority in Richards held that expert opinion stated at trial is ‘false evidence’ supporting . . . habeas relief if the expert’s conclusion is proved to be objectively untrue.” (Assem.

2012(See, e.g., In re William F (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 252-253 [113 Cal.Rptr 170, 520 P.2d 986 ]; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 54 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Powell (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 178, 179 [ 221 P.2d 117 ]; People v. Martensen (1926) 76 Cal.App. 763, 766-767 [ 245 P. 1101 ].) An Assembly Committee analysis of Assembly Bill No. 158 explained that the amendment “makes no substantive change in the law” and was simply intended to “codify judicial decisions which have interpreted the term ‘public officers’ to include peace officers.” (Assem.

2012(See, e.g., In re William F (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 252-253 [113 Cal.Rptr 170, 520 P.2d 986 ]; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 54 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Powell (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 178, 179 [ 221 P.2d 117 ]; People v. Martensen (1926) 76 Cal.App. 763, 766-767 [ 245 P. 1101 ].) An Assembly Committee analysis of Assembly Bill No. 158 explained that the amendment “makes no substantive change in the law” and was simply intended to “codify judicial decisions which have interpreted the term ‘public officers’ to include peace officers.” (Assem.

2012(See, e.g., In re William F (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 252-253 [113 Cal.Rptr 170, 520 P.2d 986 ]; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 54 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Powell (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 178, 179 [ 221 P.2d 117 ]; People v. Martensen (1926) 76 Cal.App. 763, 766-767 [ 245 P. 1101 ].) An Assembly Committee analysis of Assembly Bill No. 158 explained that the amendment “makes no substantive change in the law” and was simply intended to “codify judicial decisions which have interpreted the term ‘public officers’ to include peace officers.” (Assem.

2012(See, e.g., In re William F (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 252-253 [113 Cal.Rptr 170, 520 P.2d 986 ]; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 54 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Powell (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 178, 179 [ 221 P.2d 117 ]; People v. Martensen (1926) 76 Cal.App. 763, 766-767 [ 245 P. 1101 ].) An Assembly Committee analysis of Assembly Bill No. 158 explained that the amendment “makes no substantive change in the law” and was simply intended to “codify judicial decisions which have interpreted the term ‘public officers’ to include peace officers.” (Assem.

2012(See, e.g., In re William F (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 252-253 [113 Cal.Rptr 170, 520 P.2d 986 ]; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 54 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Powell (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 178, 179 [ 221 P.2d 117 ]; People v. Martensen (1926) 76 Cal.App. 763, 766-767 [ 245 P. 1101 ].) An Assembly Committee analysis of Assembly Bill No. 158 explained that the amendment “makes no substantive change in the law” and was simply intended to “codify judicial decisions which have interpreted the term ‘public officers’ to include peace officers.” (Assem.

2012(See, e.g., In re William F (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 252-253 [113 Cal.Rptr 170, 520 P.2d 986 ]; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 54 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Powell (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 178, 179 [ 221 P.2d 117 ]; People v. Martensen (1926) 76 Cal.App. 763, 766-767 [ 245 P. 1101 ].) An Assembly Committee analysis of Assembly Bill No. 158 explained that the amendment “makes no substantive change in the law” and was simply intended to “codify judicial decisions which have interpreted the term ‘public officers’ to include peace officers.” (Assem.

2012(See, e.g., In re William F (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 252-253 [113 Cal.Rptr 170, 520 P.2d 986 ]; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 54 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Powell (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 178, 179 [ 221 P.2d 117 ]; People v. Martensen (1926) 76 Cal.App. 763, 766-767 [ 245 P. 1101 ].) An Assembly Committee analysis of Assembly Bill No. 158 explained that the amendment “makes no substantive change in the law” and was simply intended to “codify judicial decisions which have interpreted the term ‘public officers’ to include peace officers.” (Assem.

2012(See, e.g., In re William F (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 252-253 [113 Cal.Rptr 170, 520 P.2d 986 ]; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 54 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Powell (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 178, 179 [ 221 P.2d 117 ]; People v. Martensen (1926) 76 Cal.App. 763, 766-767 [ 245 P. 1101 ].) An Assembly Committee analysis of Assembly Bill No. 158 explained that the amendment “makes no substantive change in the law” and was simply intended to “codify judicial decisions which have interpreted the term ‘public officers’ to include peace officers.” (Assem.

1994(Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 370, 382, fn. 19 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 787 P.2d 976 ].) Here, the Assembly Committee analysis clearly indicates that “employer payments” mean actual payments, in addition to salary.

1994(Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 370, 382, fn. 19 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 787 P.2d 976 ].) Here, the Assembly Committee analysis clearly indicates that “employer payments” mean actual payments, in addition to salary.

1976Debates surrounding the enactment of a bill may illuminate its interpretation. {Sato v. Hall (1923) 191 Cal. 510, 519 [ 217 P. 520 ].) Consequently, the letter lends some support to the retroactive application of the amendment through the light it sheds upon legislative debates.

1976Debates surrounding the enactment of a bill may illuminate its interpretation. {Sato v. Hall (1923) 191 Cal. 510, 519 [ 217 P. 520 ].) Consequently, the letter lends some support to the retroactive application of the amendment through the light it sheds upon legislative debates.

1965(In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 327 [ 41 P.2d 161 , 42 P.2d 311 ] ; Boie-Hansen v. Sisters of Charity, 152 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 314 P.2d 189 ] ; Ex Parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 417 [ 117 P. 451 , Ann.Cas. 1913A 56].) In the light of these principles we are satisfied that Mulford’s testimony was not an expression of his own opinion as to the meaning of the statute, or of his own intention or motives with respect thereto, but a reiteration of the discussion and events which transpired in the Assembly committee hearing when the amendments to section 3077 were under consideration.

1965(In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 327 [ 41 P.2d 161 , 42 P.2d 311 ] ; Boie-Hansen v. Sisters of Charity, 152 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 314 P.2d 189 ] ; Ex Parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 417 [ 117 P. 451 , Ann.Cas. 1913A 56].) In the light of these principles we are satisfied that Mulford’s testimony was not an expression of his own opinion as to the meaning of the statute, or of his own intention or motives with respect thereto, but a reiteration of the discussion and events which transpired in the Assembly committee hearing when the amendments to section 3077 were under consideration.

1965(In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 327 [ 41 P.2d 161 , 42 P.2d 311 ] ; Boie-Hansen v. Sisters of Charity, 152 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 314 P.2d 189 ] ; Ex Parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 417 [ 117 P. 451 , Ann.Cas. 1913A 56].) In the light of these principles we are satisfied that Mulford’s testimony was not an expression of his own opinion as to the meaning of the statute, or of his own intention or motives with respect thereto, but a reiteration of the discussion and events which transpired in the Assembly committee hearing when the amendments to section 3077 were under consideration.

1965(In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 327 [ 41 P.2d 161 , 42 P.2d 311 ] ; Boie-Hansen v. Sisters of Charity, 152 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 314 P.2d 189 ] ; Ex Parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 417 [ 117 P. 451 , Ann.Cas. 1913A 56].) In the light of these principles we are satisfied that Mulford’s testimony was not an expression of his own opinion as to the meaning of the statute, or of his own intention or motives with respect thereto, but a reiteration of the discussion and events which transpired in the Assembly committee hearing when the amendments to section 3077 were under consideration.

1965(In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 327 [ 41 P.2d 161 , 42 P.2d 311 ] ; Boie-Hansen v. Sisters of Charity, 152 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 314 P.2d 189 ] ; Ex Parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 417 [ 117 P. 451 , Ann.Cas. 1913A 56].) In the light of these principles we are satisfied that Mulford’s testimony was not an expression of his own opinion as to the meaning of the statute, or of his own intention or motives with respect thereto, but a reiteration of the discussion and events which transpired in the Assembly committee hearing when the amendments to section 3077 were under consideration.

1965(In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 327 [ 41 P.2d 161 , 42 P.2d 311 ] ; Boie-Hansen v. Sisters of Charity, 152 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 314 P.2d 189 ] ; Ex Parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 417 [ 117 P. 451 , Ann.Cas. 1913A 56].) In the light of these principles we are satisfied that Mulford’s testimony was not an expression of his own opinion as to the meaning of the statute, or of his own intention or motives with respect thereto, but a reiteration of the discussion and events which transpired in the Assembly committee hearing when the amendments to section 3077 were under consideration.