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15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1933–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Defend the Bay v. City of Irvinegreen1 sentence2019(Long Beach Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Long Beach Redevelopment Agency (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 249, 259 ; Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1269 [improper to “arrogate to ourselves a policy decision which is properly the mandate of the City”].) We reject CARE’s claim that the City’s statement of overriding considerations is inadequate under CEQA. | 1 | 1 |
Lipscomb v. Krausegreen1 sentence2015This level of skill, knowledge, and care is sometimes referred to as ‘the standard of care.’ [¶] You must determine the level of skill and care that a reasonably careful Attorney would use in similar circumstances based only on the testimony of the expert witnesses who have testified in this case.” (See Lipscomb v. Krause (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 970, 976 [“Expert evidence in malpractice suit is conclusive as to proof of the prevailing standard of skill and learning in the locality and of the propriety of particular conduct by the practioner in particular instances because such standard and skill | 1 | 1 |
Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Centergreen1 sentence2014(See Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 112-113; see also Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 675, fn. 5 [using Rowland factors in determining shopping center did not owe a duty to a tenant's employee to provide security to patrol the common areas of a shopping center where the plaintiff was raped].) 1. | 1 | 1 |
Olmstead v. L.C.green2 sentences2000(Olmstead, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 603, fn. 14 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 2188 ].) We think Cable’s holding on the appropriateness of the treatment provided is best viewed in the context of the plaintiff’s other allegations—that the state was intentionally discriminating against the severely disabled, who were unable to object, by transferring them to community placements where they would receive inappropriate care. 2000(Olmstead, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 603, fn. 14 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 2188 ].) We think Cable’s holding on the appropriateness of the treatment provided is best viewed in the context of the plaintiff’s other allegations—that the state was intentionally discriminating against the severely disabled, who were unable to object, by transferring them to community placements where they would receive inappropriate care. | 1 | 1 |
Peri v. L.A. Junction Ry.green2 sentences1957Co., 22 Cal.2d 111, 127 [ 137 P.2d 441 ].) In Bixby v. Pickwick Stage Co., 131 Cal.App. 739 [ 21 P.2d 972 ], one of the cases cited with approval in the Peri case, *311 the court said at page 741: “It is almost uniformly the rule that whether the conduct of a person in driving into smoke, fog, dust or mist offends the doctrine of ordinary care, is ordinarily a question to be determined by the court or jury.” The question of respondent’s contributory negligence was properly left to the jury. 1957Co., 22 Cal.2d 111, 127 [ 137 P.2d 441 ].) In Bixby v. Pickwick Stage Co., 131 Cal.App. 739 [ 21 P.2d 972 ], one of the cases cited with approval in the Peri case, *311 the court said at page 741: “It is almost uniformly the rule that whether the conduct of a person in driving into smoke, fog, dust or mist offends the doctrine of ordinary care, is ordinarily a question to be determined by the court or jury.” The question of respondent’s contributory negligence was properly left to the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Langdale v. Citizens Bankgreen1 sentence1938A. 341, 344, 48 S. E. 708 ].)” But as pointed out in the authorities already cited, it is only a ease where there exists a special modifying agreement between the bank and its depositor that a savings bank is taken out of the operation of the rule of liability governing commercial banks and makes available to it the defense of ordinary care; and as will be noted, the language above quoted makes no mention of the element of a special modifying agreement as the basis for the application of the doctrine of ordinary care. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vincentgreen2 sentences1935People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 428 [ 30 Pac. 581 ]; People v. Methever ( 132 Cal. 326 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra. As was said, however, in People v. Suesser, ( 142 Cal. 354 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra, of the instruction regarding the care with which the defense of insanity should be regarded, so of this; so far as it cautions the jury that evidence of drunkenness shall be received with caution, ‘it would be better if such instruction were omitted altogether’. 1935People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 428 [ 30 Pac. 581 ]; People v. Methever ( 132 Cal. 326 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra. As was said, however, in People v. Suesser, ( 142 Cal. 354 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra, of the instruction regarding the care with which the defense of insanity should be regarded, so of this; so far as it cautions the jury that evidence of drunkenness shall be received with caution, ‘it would be better if such instruction were omitted altogether’. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cold Creek Compost, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2022This argument has been forfeited, first, because the argument is not raised in the City’s opening brief (Cold Creek Compost, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1469, 1486 ), and second because the City failed to set forth all the relevant evidence in its opening brief. 2022This argument has been forfeited, first, because the argument is not raised in the City’s opening brief (Cold Creek Compost, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1469, 1486 ), and second because the City failed to set forth all the relevant evidence in its opening brief. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Long Beach Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Long Beach Redevelopment Agency
green
1 sentence2019(Long Beach Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Long Beach Redevelopment Agency (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 249, 259 ; Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1269 [improper to “arrogate to ourselves a policy decision which is properly the mandate of the City”].) We reject CARE’s claim that the City’s statement of overriding considerations is inadequate under CEQA. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sierra Club v. County of Fresno
green
1 sentence2019In Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 513 , the Supreme Court addressed what standard of review to apply to a claim challenging the adequacy of an EIR’s discussion of environmental impacts. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
PAMELA L. v. Farmer
green
1 sentence2016In contrast, a Good Samaritan defendant who undertakes to help another — or a defendant who is obligated to help or protect the victim because of a special relationship with the victim — is liable for acting unreasonably (misfeasance) when he or she “has made the plaintiff’s position worse and has created a foreseeable risk of harm from the third person.” (Pamela L., supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 209 .) The defendant’s alleged misfeasance is assessed under the ordinary care standard, i.e., whether he or she knew or should have 9 known of the danger posed. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Rowland v. Christian
red
1 sentence2014(See Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 112-113; see also Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 675, fn. 5 [using Rowland factors in determining shopping center did not owe a duty to a tenant's employee to provide security to patrol the common areas of a shopping center where the plaintiff was raped].) 1. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. American Guaranty Life Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2000Life Ins., supra, 722 F.2d at p. 1500 .) Further, it is contrary to Olmstead’s later clarification that the integration mandate does not impose a standard of care requirement on the states, which are instead obligated to abide by the ADA’s nondiscrimination requirements when administering the services they provide. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Anderson v. City of Thousand Oaks
green
1 sentence1994Proc. § 437c, subd. (o)(2); Anderson v. City of Thousand Oaks, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at p. 87 ; Clarke v. Hoek, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at pp. 213-214.) As we have explained, Dye Creek’s duty is not limited merely to the question of fencing but encompasses the ordinary care principle of Civil Code section 1714. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Cole v. Ridings
green
2 sentences1961In so holding, the appellate court placed considerable reliance on its own prior decision in Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d 136 [ 212 P.2d 597 ], a case quite similar to the instant one. 1961In so holding, the appellate court placed considerable reliance on its own prior decision in Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d 136 [ 212 P.2d 597 ], a case quite similar to the instant one. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Bixby v. Pickwick Stage Co.
neutral
2 sentences1957Co., 22 Cal.2d 111, 127 [ 137 P.2d 441 ].) In Bixby v. Pickwick Stage Co., 131 Cal.App. 739 [ 21 P.2d 972 ], one of the cases cited with approval in the Peri case, *311 the court said at page 741: “It is almost uniformly the rule that whether the conduct of a person in driving into smoke, fog, dust or mist offends the doctrine of ordinary care, is ordinarily a question to be determined by the court or jury.” The question of respondent’s contributory negligence was properly left to the jury. 1957Co., 22 Cal.2d 111, 127 [ 137 P.2d 441 ].) In Bixby v. Pickwick Stage Co., 131 Cal.App. 739 [ 21 P.2d 972 ], one of the cases cited with approval in the Peri case, *311 the court said at page 741: “It is almost uniformly the rule that whether the conduct of a person in driving into smoke, fog, dust or mist offends the doctrine of ordinary care, is ordinarily a question to be determined by the court or jury.” The question of respondent’s contributory negligence was properly left to the jury. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller Desk Co.
green
2 sentences1940The rule enunciated in the instruction has been approved, in discussing factual situations, in Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller Desk Co., 197 Cal. 82 [ 239 Pac. 709 , 41 A. L. 1940The rule enunciated in the instruction has been approved, in discussing factual situations, in Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller Desk Co., 197 Cal. 82 [ 239 Pac. 709 , 41 A. L. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
People v. Methever
green
1 sentence1935People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 428 [ 30 Pac. 581 ]; People v. Methever ( 132 Cal. 326 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra. As was said, however, in People v. Suesser, ( 142 Cal. 354 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra, of the instruction regarding the care with which the defense of insanity should be regarded, so of this; so far as it cautions the jury that evidence of drunkenness shall be received with caution, ‘it would be better if such instruction were omitted altogether’. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
People v. Suesser
green
2 sentences1935People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 428 [ 30 Pac. 581 ]; People v. Methever ( 132 Cal. 326 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra. As was said, however, in People v. Suesser, ( 142 Cal. 354 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra, of the instruction regarding the care with which the defense of insanity should be regarded, so of this; so far as it cautions the jury that evidence of drunkenness shall be received with caution, ‘it would be better if such instruction were omitted altogether’. 1935People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 428 [ 30 Pac. 581 ]; People v. Methever ( 132 Cal. 326 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra. As was said, however, in People v. Suesser, ( 142 Cal. 354 [ 75 Pac. 1093 ]), supra, of the instruction regarding the care with which the defense of insanity should be regarded, so of this; so far as it cautions the jury that evidence of drunkenness shall be received with caution, ‘it would be better if such instruction were omitted altogether’. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Clinger v. Director General of Railroads
neutral
2 sentences1933(Marsh v. Burnham, 211 Mich. 675 [ 179 N. W. 300 ]; Upton v. Hines, 197 Iowa, 566 , [ 197 N. W. 453 ]; Clinger v. Payne, 271 Pa. 88 [ 113 Atl. 830 ] ; Seibert v. A. Goldstein Co., 99 N. J. 1933(Marsh v. Burnham, 211 Mich. 675 [ 179 N. W. 300 ]; Upton v. Hines, 197 Iowa, 566 , [ 197 N. W. 453 ]; Clinger v. Payne, 271 Pa. 88 [ 113 Atl. 830 ] ; Seibert v. A. Goldstein Co., 99 N. J. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Upton v. Hines
neutral
1 sentence1933(Marsh v. Burnham, 211 Mich. 675 [ 179 N. W. 300 ]; Upton v. Hines, 197 Iowa, 566 , [ 197 N. W. 453 ]; Clinger v. Payne, 271 Pa. 88 [ 113 Atl. 830 ] ; Seibert v. A. Goldstein Co., 99 N. J. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Marsh v. Burnham
neutral
2 sentences1933(Marsh v. Burnham, 211 Mich. 675 [ 179 N. W. 300 ]; Upton v. Hines, 197 Iowa, 566 , [ 197 N. W. 453 ]; Clinger v. Payne, 271 Pa. 88 [ 113 Atl. 830 ] ; Seibert v. A. Goldstein Co., 99 N. J. 1933(Marsh v. Burnham, 211 Mich. 675 [ 179 N. W. 300 ]; Upton v. Hines, 197 Iowa, 566 , [ 197 N. W. 453 ]; Clinger v. Payne, 271 Pa. 88 [ 113 Atl. 830 ] ; Seibert v. A. Goldstein Co., 99 N. J. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.