15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1945–1997 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Second Church of Christ, Scientist, of New York City v. Kaufmangreen2 sentences1997(See id. at pp. 142-144; Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at pp. 860-861; Estate of Robertson, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at pp. 868-869; see also Estate of Verdisson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135-1136 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 ] [court may consider circumstances surrounding creation of will, including statements of testator]; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Wills and Probate, §§ 245-246, pp. 280-283 [same]; see generally, Estate of Kime, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at pp. 261-265 [discussing use of extrinsic evidence in construing wills].) In Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d 854 , the Supreme C 1997(See id. at pp. 142-144; Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at pp. 860-861; Estate of Robertson, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at pp. 868-869; see also Estate of Verdisson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135-1136 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 ] [court may consider circumstances surrounding creation of will, including statements of testator]; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Wills and Probate, §§ 245-246, pp. 280-283 [same]; see generally, Estate of Kime, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at pp. 261-265 [discussing use of extrinsic evidence in construing wills].) In Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d 854 , the Supreme C | 6 | 11 |
Cuneo v. Mondanigreen2 sentences1968Respondents relied upon the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, i.e., they argued that the revocatory clause of the 1965 will was intended by the testatrix to be effective only if the later will made the same disposition of the bulk of her estate as did that of 1953 (Estate of Kaufman, 25 Cal.2d 854 [ 155 P.2d 831 ]; Estate of Cuneo, 60 Cal.2d 196 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 384 P.2d 1 , 7 A.L.R.Sd 1132]). 1968Respondents relied upon the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, i.e., they argued that the revocatory clause of the 1965 will was intended by the testatrix to be effective only if the later will made the same disposition of the bulk of her estate as did that of 1953 (Estate of Kaufman, 25 Cal.2d 854 [ 155 P.2d 831 ]; Estate of Cuneo, 60 Cal.2d 196 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 384 P.2d 1 , 7 A.L.R.Sd 1132]). | 4 | 8 |
In Re the Estate of Marxgreen2 sentences1966Page 3 of the 1962 will cannot be probated because it cannot be proven “to have been in [physical] existence at the time of the death of the testator. ” (§ 350.) Under such circumstances we see no reason to go into any lengthy discussion of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, the purpose of which is “to carry out the probable intention of the testator when there is no reason to suppose that he intended to revoke his earlier will if the later will became inoperative.” (Estate of Kaufman, 25 Cal.2d 854, 859 [ 155 P.2d 831 ]; Estate of Cuneo, 60 Cal.2d 196, 202 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 384 1966Page 3 of the 1962 will cannot be probated because it cannot be proven “to have been in [physical] existence at the time of the death of the testator. ” (§ 350.) Under such circumstances we see no reason to go into any lengthy discussion of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, the purpose of which is “to carry out the probable intention of the testator when there is no reason to suppose that he intended to revoke his earlier will if the later will became inoperative.” (Estate of Kaufman, 25 Cal.2d 854, 859 [ 155 P.2d 831 ]; Estate of Cuneo, 60 Cal.2d 196, 202 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 384 | 2 | 3 |
Salmonski v. Bardzinskigreen2 sentences1997Intestacy Under the Last Will The doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies where a “question arises as to the effectiveness of the second instrument, ... so that upon its failure to be operative for want of proper execution or other cause, the testator will be presumed to have intended the original instrument to stand to the extent that the later proves ineffective.” (Estate of Salmonski, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 212 , italics added; accord, Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at pp. 858-859.) Plainly, a will may prove “ineffective” if it results in total or partial intestacy, but that 1997Intestacy Under the Last Will The doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies where a “question arises as to the effectiveness of the second instrument, ... so that upon its failure to be operative for want of proper execution or other cause, the testator will be presumed to have intended the original instrument to stand to the extent that the later proves ineffective.” (Estate of Salmonski, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 212 , italics added; accord, Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at pp. 858-859.) Plainly, a will may prove “ineffective” if it results in total or partial intestacy, but that | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Verdissongreen2 sentences1997(See id. at pp. 142-144; Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at pp. 860-861; Estate of Robertson, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at pp. 868-869; see also Estate of Verdisson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135-1136 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 ] [court may consider circumstances surrounding creation of will, including statements of testator]; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Wills and Probate, §§ 245-246, pp. 280-283 [same]; see generally, Estate of Kime, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at pp. 261-265 [discussing use of extrinsic evidence in construing wills].) In Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d 854 , the Supreme C 1997(See id. at pp. 142-144; Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at pp. 860-861; Estate of Robertson, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at pp. 868-869; see also Estate of Verdisson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135-1136 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 ] [court may consider circumstances surrounding creation of will, including statements of testator]; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Wills and Probate, §§ 245-246, pp. 280-283 [same]; see generally, Estate of Kime, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at pp. 261-265 [discussing use of extrinsic evidence in construing wills].) In Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d 854 , the Supreme C | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Uhlgreen2 sentences1997We conclude that extrinsic evidence may be considered in determining whether Anderson intended to revoke article eighth of the 1982 will. “[A] will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator, and not his imperfect attempt to express it.” (Estate of Kime (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 246, 264 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 718 ].) “Any conclusion as to the testator’s intention must be considered in the light of his knowledge at the time he executed the will.” (Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 861.) “To constitute a valid revocation, acts of cancellation or interlineation must be done with 1997We conclude that extrinsic evidence may be considered in determining whether Anderson intended to revoke article eighth of the 1982 will. “[A] will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator, and not his imperfect attempt to express it.” (Estate of Kime (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 246, 264 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 718 ].) “Any conclusion as to the testator’s intention must be considered in the light of his knowledge at the time he executed the will.” (Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 861.) “To constitute a valid revocation, acts of cancellation or interlineation must be done with | 1 | 2 |
Estate of Dodgegreen2 sentences1997(See Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311, 318 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 491 P.2d 385 ].) The contestant argues that the trial court’s order should be reversed because (1) the revocation clause in the 1993 will encompassed article eighth of the 1982 will, (2) the elements of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation were not satisfied in this case as a matter of law, and (3) sufficient evidence does not support the application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. 1997(See Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311, 318 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 491 P.2d 385 ].) The contestant argues that the trial court’s order should be reversed because (1) the revocation clause in the 1993 will encompassed article eighth of the 1982 will, (2) the elements of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation were not satisfied in this case as a matter of law, and (3) sufficient evidence does not support the application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. | 1 | 2 |
Kime v. Barnardgreen2 sentences1997We conclude that extrinsic evidence may be considered in determining whether Anderson intended to revoke article eighth of the 1982 will. “[A] will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator, and not his imperfect attempt to express it.” (Estate of Kime (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 246, 264 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 718 ].) “Any conclusion as to the testator’s intention must be considered in the light of his knowledge at the time he executed the will.” (Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 861.) “To constitute a valid revocation, acts of cancellation or interlineation must be done with 1997We conclude that extrinsic evidence may be considered in determining whether Anderson intended to revoke article eighth of the 1982 will. “[A] will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator, and not his imperfect attempt to express it.” (Estate of Kime (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 246, 264 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 718 ].) “Any conclusion as to the testator’s intention must be considered in the light of his knowledge at the time he executed the will.” (Estate of Kaufman, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 861.) “To constitute a valid revocation, acts of cancellation or interlineation must be done with | 1 | 2 |
Church Home for Children of Protestant Episcopal Church v. Lawrencegreen2 sentences1997(See 2 Page on Wills (3d ed. 1960) Revocation, §21.57, pp. 449-450 [doctrine of dependent relative revocation should apply where testator revokes prior will based on material mistake].) “In the construction of wills the paramount rule, to which all others must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator, as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.” (Estate of Lawrence (1941) 17 Cal.2d 1, 6 [ 108 P.2d 893 ].) The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is simply one means of implementing this paramount rule: “[T]he 1997(See 2 Page on Wills (3d ed. 1960) Revocation, §21.57, pp. 449-450 [doctrine of dependent relative revocation should apply where testator revokes prior will based on material mistake].) “In the construction of wills the paramount rule, to which all others must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator, as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.” (Estate of Lawrence (1941) 17 Cal.2d 1, 6 [ 108 P.2d 893 ].) The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is simply one means of implementing this paramount rule: “[T]he | 1 | 2 |
Reed v. Haywardgreen2 sentences1956(Estate of Christensen, 135 Cal. 674 [ 68 P. 112 ]; see also Reed v. Hayward, 23 Cal.2d 336, 339 [ 144 P.2d 561 ].) But even if we were to assume that the order entered on *498 April 7, 1953, merely continued the hearing until the further order of the court, or if we assume that for some reason the March will was properly before the court when it made its order of March 11 the following year, we still would be compelled to reverse the case. [3a] It is quite apparent from petitioners' motion for a new trial that the proffered evidence which they sought to introduce could have taken the case com 1956(Estate of Christensen, 135 Cal. 674 [ 68 P. 112 ]; see also Reed v. Hayward, 23 Cal.2d 336, 339 [ 144 P.2d 561 ].) But even if we were to assume that the order entered on *498 April 7, 1953, merely continued the hearing until the further order of the court, or if we assume that for some reason the March will was properly before the court when it made its order of March 11 the following year, we still would be compelled to reverse the case. [3a] It is quite apparent from petitioners' motion for a new trial that the proffered evidence which they sought to introduce could have taken the case com | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Montgomerygreen2 sentences1951On the other hand, respondents contend that (1) the order admitting the will and codicil to probate reflects no attempt on the part of the court to construe those documents but only its determination that both constituted “the last expression of the testator’s intention” and “together express his desire that Theresa Bardzinski be the Executrix of his estate”; that (2) the codicil plainly disposed of the entire estate in absolute and independent terms, wholly contrary to the conditional tenor of the bequests under the language of the previously executed will, and distribution of the estate was 1951On the other hand, respondents contend that (1) the order admitting the will and codicil to probate reflects no attempt on the part of the court to construe those documents but only its determination that both constituted “the last expression of the testator’s intention” and “together express his desire that Theresa Bardzinski be the Executrix of his estate”; that (2) the codicil plainly disposed of the entire estate in absolute and independent terms, wholly contrary to the conditional tenor of the bequests under the language of the previously executed will, and distribution of the estate was | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Dunngreen2 sentences1951On the other hand, respondents contend that (1) the order admitting the will and codicil to probate reflects no attempt on the part of the court to construe those documents but only its determination that both constituted “the last expression of the testator’s intention” and “together express his desire that Theresa Bardzinski be the Executrix of his estate”; that (2) the codicil plainly disposed of the entire estate in absolute and independent terms, wholly contrary to the conditional tenor of the bequests under the language of the previously executed will, and distribution of the estate was 1951On the other hand, respondents contend that (1) the order admitting the will and codicil to probate reflects no attempt on the part of the court to construe those documents but only its determination that both constituted “the last expression of the testator’s intention” and “together express his desire that Theresa Bardzinski be the Executrix of his estate”; that (2) the codicil plainly disposed of the entire estate in absolute and independent terms, wholly contrary to the conditional tenor of the bequests under the language of the previously executed will, and distribution of the estate was | 1 | 1 |
Wolseley v. Murphygreen2 sentences1951On the other hand, respondents contend that (1) the order admitting the will and codicil to probate reflects no attempt on the part of the court to construe those documents but only its determination that both constituted “the last expression of the testator’s intention” and “together express his desire that Theresa Bardzinski be the Executrix of his estate”; that (2) the codicil plainly disposed of the entire estate in absolute and independent terms, wholly contrary to the conditional tenor of the bequests under the language of the previously executed will, and distribution of the estate was 1951On the other hand, respondents contend that (1) the order admitting the will and codicil to probate reflects no attempt on the part of the court to construe those documents but only its determination that both constituted “the last expression of the testator’s intention” and “together express his desire that Theresa Bardzinski be the Executrix of his estate”; that (2) the codicil plainly disposed of the entire estate in absolute and independent terms, wholly contrary to the conditional tenor of the bequests under the language of the previously executed will, and distribution of the estate was | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Cookgreen2 sentences1951On the other hand, respondents contend that (1) the order admitting the will and codicil to probate reflects no attempt on the part of the court to construe those documents but only its determination that both constituted “the last expression of the testator’s intention” and “together express his desire that Theresa Bardzinski be the Executrix of his estate”; that (2) the codicil plainly disposed of the entire estate in absolute and independent terms, wholly contrary to the conditional tenor of the bequests under the language of the previously executed will, and distribution of the estate was 1951On the other hand, respondents contend that (1) the order admitting the will and codicil to probate reflects no attempt on the part of the court to construe those documents but only its determination that both constituted “the last expression of the testator’s intention” and “together express his desire that Theresa Bardzinski be the Executrix of his estate”; that (2) the codicil plainly disposed of the entire estate in absolute and independent terms, wholly contrary to the conditional tenor of the bequests under the language of the previously executed will, and distribution of the estate was | 1 | 1 |
Blackford v. Andersongreen2 sentences1945(Estate of Marx, 174 Cal. 762, 766-767 [ 164 P. 640 , L.R.A. 1917F 234 ] ; Blackford v. Anderson, 226 Iowa 1138,1150-1151, 1175-1176 [ 286 N.W. 735 ]; Charleston Library Soc. v. Citizens & So. 1945(Estate of Marx, 174 Cal. 762, 766-767 [ 164 P. 640 , L.R.A. 1917F 234 ] ; Blackford v. Anderson, 226 Iowa 1138,1150-1151, 1175-1176 [ 286 N.W. 735 ]; Charleston Library Soc. v. Citizens & So. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Robertson
neutral
2 sentences1997Yet the overwhelming evidence here assures against that danger, and clearly brings the case within the established rule of dependent relative revocation . . . .” (266 Cal.App.2d at pp. 868-869, citations omitted.) The contestant seeks to distinguish Estate of Robertson, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 866 , by arguing that, under California law, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies only where (1) the decedent’s last will is wholly or partially invalid, resulting in intestacy and (2) the last will shows on its face that the revocation of the prior will was conditioned on the effectivenes 1997The high court rejected that finding as not supported by the evidence, stating: “All the testimony, including the testimony of [the trust officer] and of [the testator’s attorney] and his secretary, shows that the testator wanted no change in his will except for the naming of a California executor.” (Id. at p. 861.) Similarly, in Estate of Robertson, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 866 , the heirs at law of the decedent’s predeceased spouse argued that the court could not consider the testimony of the testator’s attorney in deciding whether to apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Estate of Helmar
green
2 sentences1980Thus, the typewritten portion was not only essential but was "physically incorporated," "tied to" the provisions of the handwritten portions by the decedent. ( Estate of Helmar, supra, 33 Cal. App.3d 109, 113 .) Our discussion concerning the cogency, applicability of the rules of law expressed in the Estate of Atkinson, supra , does not preclude dependent upon the nature of the findings of fact yet to be made as to authorship and intent with which the deletions, interlineations were made an application of yet other rules of law, including the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. 1980(Estate of Helmar, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d 109, 113 .) Our discussion concerning the cogency, applicability of the rules of law expressed in the Estate of Atkinson, supra, does not preclude— dependent upon the nature of the findings of fact yet to be made as to authorship and intent with which the deletions, interlineations were made—an application of yet other rules of law, including the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. | 2 | 1980–1980 |
In Re Estate of Thompson
green
1 sentence1984But allaying this concern is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, the majority view in Estate of Thompson, supra, 185 Cal. 763 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Atkinson v. Atkinson
green
1 sentence1980Thus, the typewritten portion was not only essential but was "physically incorporated," "tied to" the provisions of the handwritten portions by the decedent. ( Estate of Helmar, supra, 33 Cal. App.3d 109, 113 .) Our discussion concerning the cogency, applicability of the rules of law expressed in the Estate of Atkinson, supra , does not preclude dependent upon the nature of the findings of fact yet to be made as to authorship and intent with which the deletions, interlineations were made an application of yet other rules of law, including the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Estate of Christensen
neutral
2 sentences1956(Estate of Christensen, 135 Cal. 674 [ 68 P. 112 ]; see also Reed v. Hayward, 23 Cal.2d 336, 339 [ 144 P.2d 561 ].) But even if we were to assume that the order entered on *498 April 7, 1953, merely continued the hearing until the further order of the court, or if we assume that for some reason the March will was properly before the court when it made its order of March 11 the following year, we still would be compelled to reverse the case. [3a] It is quite apparent from petitioners' motion for a new trial that the proffered evidence which they sought to introduce could have taken the case com 1956(Estate of Christensen, 135 Cal. 674 [ 68 P. 112 ]; see also Reed v. Hayward, 23 Cal.2d 336, 339 [ 144 P.2d 561 ].) But even if we were to assume that the order entered on *498 April 7, 1953, merely continued the hearing until the further order of the court, or if we assume that for some reason the March will was properly before the court when it made its order of March 11 the following year, we still would be compelled to reverse the case. [3a] It is quite apparent from petitioners' motion for a new trial that the proffered evidence which they sought to introduce could have taken the case com | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Whitten v. La Plante
green
2 sentences1951Apt illustration of this principle is found in the case of Estate of Parsons, 196 Cal. 294 [ 237 P. 744 ], There a document had been admitted to probate as the will of the decedent. 1951Apt illustration of this principle is found in the case of Estate of Parsons, 196 Cal. 294 [ 237 P. 744 ], There a document had been admitted to probate as the will of the decedent. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Estate of Bourn
green
2 sentences1945(Estate of Pearsons, 99 Cal. 30 [ 33 P. 751 ]; Estate of Ladd, 94 Cal. 670 [ 30 P. 99 ]; Estate of Bourn, 25 Cal.App.2d 590 [ 78 P.2d 193 ].) The testator was not advised that he might provide in his 1941 will that the revocation of the charitable bequest by the revocation clause in the 1941 will was dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the 1941 will to carry out his bequest, nor was he advised that the same result would follow under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. 1945(Estate of Pearsons, 99 Cal. 30 [ 33 P. 751 ]; Estate of Ladd, 94 Cal. 670 [ 30 P. 99 ]; Estate of Bourn, 25 Cal.App.2d 590 [ 78 P.2d 193 ].) The testator was not advised that he might provide in his 1941 will that the revocation of the charitable bequest by the revocation clause in the 1941 will was dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the 1941 will to carry out his bequest, nor was he advised that the same result would follow under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
In re Estate of Ladd
green
2 sentences1945(Estate of Pearsons, 99 Cal. 30 [ 33 P. 751 ]; Estate of Ladd, 94 Cal. 670 [ 30 P. 99 ]; Estate of Bourn, 25 Cal.App.2d 590 [ 78 P.2d 193 ].) The testator was not advised that he might provide in his 1941 will that the revocation of the charitable bequest by the revocation clause in the 1941 will was dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the 1941 will to carry out his bequest, nor was he advised that the same result would follow under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. 1945(Estate of Pearsons, 99 Cal. 30 [ 33 P. 751 ]; Estate of Ladd, 94 Cal. 670 [ 30 P. 99 ]; Estate of Bourn, 25 Cal.App.2d 590 [ 78 P.2d 193 ].) The testator was not advised that he might provide in his 1941 will that the revocation of the charitable bequest by the revocation clause in the 1941 will was dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the 1941 will to carry out his bequest, nor was he advised that the same result would follow under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
In re Estate of Pearsons
green
2 sentences1945(Estate of Pearsons, 99 Cal. 30 [ 33 P. 751 ]; Estate of Ladd, 94 Cal. 670 [ 30 P. 99 ]; Estate of Bourn, 25 Cal.App.2d 590 [ 78 P.2d 193 ].) The testator was not advised that he might provide in his 1941 will that the revocation of the charitable bequest by the revocation clause in the 1941 will was dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the 1941 will to carry out his bequest, nor was he advised that the same result would follow under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. 1945(Estate of Pearsons, 99 Cal. 30 [ 33 P. 751 ]; Estate of Ladd, 94 Cal. 670 [ 30 P. 99 ]; Estate of Bourn, 25 Cal.App.2d 590 [ 78 P.2d 193 ].) The testator was not advised that he might provide in his 1941 will that the revocation of the charitable bequest by the revocation clause in the 1941 will was dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the 1941 will to carry out his bequest, nor was he advised that the same result would follow under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.