number of relevant factors in California

2023(See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240 [court determines reasonable fee award under fee-shifting statutes including FEHA first “by deciding ‘the reasonable hours spent’ on the case and multiplying that number by ‘the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community’ ” and then may “adjust the lodestar figure in light of a number of relevant factors that weigh in favor of augmentation or diminution”]; see also Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 976, 985 [recognizing courts compute attorney fees awarded under the FEHA “based on the lodestar adjustment me

2023(See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240 [court determines reasonable fee award under fee-shifting statutes including FEHA first “by deciding ‘the reasonable hours spent’ on the case and multiplying that number by ‘the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community’ ” and then may “adjust the lodestar figure in light of a number of relevant factors that weigh in favor of augmentation or diminution”]; see also Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 976, 985 [recognizing courts compute attorney fees awarded under the FEHA “based on the lodestar adjustment me

2023(See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240 [court determines reasonable fee award under fee-shifting statutes including FEHA first “by deciding ‘the reasonable hours spent’ on the case and multiplying that number by ‘the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community’ ” and then may “adjust the lodestar figure in light of a number of relevant factors that weigh in favor of augmentation or diminution”]; see also Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 976, 985 [recognizing courts compute attorney fees awarded under the FEHA “based on the lodestar adjustment me

2023(See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240 [court determines reasonable fee award under fee-shifting statutes including FEHA first “by deciding ‘the reasonable hours spent’ on the case and multiplying that number by ‘the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community’ ” and then may “adjust the lodestar figure in light of a number of relevant factors that weigh in favor of augmentation or diminution”]; see also Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 976, 985 [recognizing courts compute attorney fees awarded under the FEHA “based on the lodestar adjustment me

2023(See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240 [court determines reasonable fee award under fee-shifting statutes including FEHA first “by deciding ‘the reasonable hours spent’ on the case and multiplying that number by ‘the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community’ ” and then may “adjust the lodestar figure in light of a number of relevant factors that weigh in favor of augmentation or diminution”]; see also Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 976, 985 [recognizing courts compute attorney fees awarded under the FEHA “based on the lodestar adjustment me

2023(See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240 [court determines reasonable fee award under fee-shifting statutes including FEHA first “by deciding ‘the reasonable hours spent’ on the case and multiplying that number by ‘the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community’ ” and then may “adjust the lodestar figure in light of a number of relevant factors that weigh in favor of augmentation or diminution”]; see also Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 976, 985 [recognizing courts compute attorney fees awarded under the FEHA “based on the lodestar adjustment me

1990As observed in a different context, “the rule ... is not mechanical. . . .” (Hart v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 496, 501 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 565 ].) A California case relied on by the People indicates that the amount of delay is but one of a number of relevant factors in ascertaining knock-notice compliance.

1990As observed in a different context, “the rule ... is not mechanical. . . .” (Hart v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 496, 501 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 565 ].) A California case relied on by the People indicates that the amount of delay is but one of a number of relevant factors in ascertaining knock-notice compliance.

1990However, such a mathematical formula would trivialize the policies behind the knock-notice rules. (4) As observed in a different context, "the rule ... is not mechanical...." ( Hart v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 496, 501 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 565 ].) A California case relied on by the People indicates that the amount of delay is but one of a number of relevant factors in ascertaining knock-notice compliance. *1226 In People v. Elder (1976) 63 Cal. App.3d 731 [ 134 Cal. Rptr. 212 ] (implicitly overruled on another ground in People v. Chapman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 98, 109-113 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 628

1990However, such a mathematical formula would trivialize the policies behind the knock-notice rules. (4) As observed in a different context, "the rule ... is not mechanical...." ( Hart v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 496, 501 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 565 ].) A California case relied on by the People indicates that the amount of delay is but one of a number of relevant factors in ascertaining knock-notice compliance. *1226 In People v. Elder (1976) 63 Cal. App.3d 731 [ 134 Cal. Rptr. 212 ] (implicitly overruled on another ground in People v. Chapman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 98, 109-113 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 628

2007(Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49 ; Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1171 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 ].) As summarized in Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th 1122 : “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors, including ... (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of s

2007(Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49 ; Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1171 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 ].) As summarized in Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th 1122 : “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors, including ... (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of s

1995Preliminarily, giving the guarantee a value of $250,000, which is the figure set forth in the settlement agreement, and estimating Mattco’s damages at $39 million, the figure used in Helmer & Neff’s moving papers, Helmer & Neff settled with Mattco for less than 1 percent of Mattco’s damages. 5 “A determination as to the good faith of a settlement, within the meaning of section 877.6, necessarily requires the trial court to examine and weigh a number of relevant factors, one of the most important of which is the settling party’s proportionate liability.” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Supe

1995Preliminarily, giving the guarantee a value of $250,000, which is the figure set forth in the settlement agreement, and estimating Mattco’s damages at $39 million, the figure used in Helmer & Neff’s moving papers, Helmer & Neff settled with Mattco for less than 1 percent of Mattco’s damages. 5 “A determination as to the good faith of a settlement, within the meaning of section 877.6, necessarily requires the trial court to examine and weigh a number of relevant factors, one of the most important of which is the settling party’s proportionate liability.” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Supe

1989For example, “The [lodestone] figure may be enhanced or diminished after the court considers matters such as those enumerated in Serrano III. . . .” (Italics added.) (Serrano v. Unruh, supra, 32 Cal.3d 621, 626, fn. 6 .) Or, “In Serrano III, this court listed a number of relevant factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar . . . .” (Italics added.) (Maria P. v. Riles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1294, fn. 8 .) *974 CRTM maintains that the trial court erred under California law by looking to the relative lack of success of its suit as a factor justifying reduction of the lodestar.

1989For example, “The [lodestone] figure may be enhanced or diminished after the court considers matters such as those enumerated in Serrano III. . . .” (Italics added.) (Serrano v. Unruh, supra, 32 Cal.3d 621, 626, fn. 6 .) Or, “In Serrano III, this court listed a number of relevant factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar . . . .” (Italics added.) (Maria P. v. Riles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1294, fn. 8 .) *974 CRTM maintains that the trial court erred under California law by looking to the relative lack of success of its suit as a factor justifying reduction of the lodestar.

1989For example, “The [lodestone] figure may be enhanced or diminished after the court considers matters such as those enumerated in Serrano III. . . .” (Italics added.) (Serrano v. Unruh, supra, 32 Cal.3d 621, 626, fn. 6 .) Or, “In Serrano III, this court listed a number of relevant factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar . . . .” (Italics added.) (Maria P. v. Riles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1294, fn. 8 .) *974 CRTM maintains that the trial court erred under California law by looking to the relative lack of success of its suit as a factor justifying reduction of the lodestar.

1980(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 652 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 537 P.2d 384 ]; In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, 300 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 425 P.2d 200 ].) While the use of a firearm could not have extended defendant’s minimum period of parole ineligibility in the absence of a clear legislative intention (People v. Walker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 243), it could reasonably be considered in the array of parole factors influencing the actual length of confinement.

1980(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 652 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 537 P.2d 384 ]; In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, 300 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 425 P.2d 200 ].) While the use of a firearm could not have extended defendant’s minimum period of parole ineligibility in the absence of a clear legislative intention (People v. Walker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 243), it could reasonably be considered in the array of parole factors influencing the actual length of confinement.

1980(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 652 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 537 P.2d 384 ]; In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, 300 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 425 P.2d 200 ].) While the use of a firearm could not have extended defendant’s minimum period of parole ineligibility in the absence of a clear legislative intention (People v. Walker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 243), it could reasonably be considered in the array of parole factors influencing the actual length of confinement.

1980(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 652 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 537 P.2d 384 ]; In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, 300 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 425 P.2d 200 ].) While the use of a firearm could not have extended defendant’s minimum period of parole ineligibility in the absence of a clear legislative intention (People v. Walker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 243), it could reasonably be considered in the array of parole factors influencing the actual length of confinement.

1980(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 652 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 537 P.2d 384 ]; In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, 300 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 425 P.2d 200 ].) While the use of a firearm could not have extended defendant’s minimum period of parole ineligibility in the absence of a clear legislative intention (People v. Walker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 243), it could reasonably be considered in the array of parole factors influencing the actual length of confinement.

1980(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 652 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 537 P.2d 384 ]; In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, 300 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 425 P.2d 200 ].) While the use of a firearm could not have extended defendant’s minimum period of parole ineligibility in the absence of a clear legislative intention (People v. Walker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 243), it could reasonably be considered in the array of parole factors influencing the actual length of confinement.

1980(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 652 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 537 P.2d 384 ]; In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ]; In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, 300 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 425 P.2d 200 ].) While the use of a firearm could not have extended defendant’s minimum period of parole ineligibility in the absence of a clear legislative intention (People v. Walker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 243), it could reasonably be considered in the array of parole factors influencing the actual length of confinement.