slightly different analysis in California

2017There, the lack of administrative support and scheduling and budgetary issues had to be considered along with the knowledge that the district planned to close the school to which plaintiff had been transferred. ( Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1390 , 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 .) Federal cases, while employing a slightly different standard, agree that administrative leave may constitute an adverse employment action.

2017There, the lack of administrative support and scheduling and budgetary issues had to be considered along with the knowledge that the district planned to close the school to which plaintiff had been transferred. ( Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1390 , 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 .) Federal cases, while employing a slightly different standard, agree that administrative leave may constitute an adverse employment action.

2017(See Dahlia v. Rodriguez (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3d 1060, 1078 , citing Coszalter v. City of Salem (9th Cir. 2003) 320 F.3d 968 , 975.) Here, plaintiff did not request the administrative leave, and it was not intended as a reward or accommodation to plaintiff, given that the County acknowledged the leave was for the purpose of investigating plaintiff’s alleged wrongdoing.

2017(See Dahlia v. Rodriguez (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3d 1060 , 1078, citing Coszalter v. City of Salem (9th Cir. 2003) 320 F.3d 968 , 975.) Here, plaintiff did not request the administrative leave, and it was not intended as a reward or accommodation to plaintiff, given that the County acknowledged the leave was for the purpose of investigating plaintiff's alleged wrongdoing.

2017(See Dahlia v. Rodriguez (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3d 1060, 1078 , citing Coszalter v. City of Salem (9th Cir. 2003) 320 F.3d 968 , 975.) Here, plaintiff did not request the administrative leave, and it was not intended as a reward or accommodation to plaintiff, given that the County acknowledged the leave was for the purpose of investigating plaintiff’s alleged wrongdoing.

2017(See Dahlia v. Rodriguez (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3d 1060 , 1078, citing Coszalter v. City of Salem (9th Cir. 2003) 320 F.3d 968 , 975.) Here, plaintiff did not request the administrative leave, and it was not intended as a reward or accommodation to plaintiff, given that the County acknowledged the leave was for the purpose of investigating plaintiff's alleged wrongdoing.

2026(Id. at p. 302.) In contrast, Fochtman v. Hendren Plastics, Inc. (8th Cir. 2022) 47 F.4th 638 (Fochtman) employed a slightly different test to conclude that participants who worked as part of a court- ordered substance abuse treatment program were not employees under Arkansas law, which incorporates the suffer or permit to work standard and looks to the FLSA for guidance.

2024Some decisions hold that a municipality’s interpretation of its ordinances is “ ‘entitled to great weight and should be respected by the courts unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized.’ ” (Anderson v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1336, 1343 ; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App4th 1068, 1087; Horwitz v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1354 ; Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 281, 290 ; City of Oakland Residential Rent Arbitration Bd. v.

2024(Symons Emergency Specialities v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583 , 593, fn. 5; see also Protect our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 667 , 678; Anderson First Coalition v. City of Anderson (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1193 ; Friends of Davis v. City of Davis (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1015 .) Still other decisions, treating municipalities construing ordinances enacted by them like administrative agencies construing statutes enacted by the Legislature, apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Ca

2024(Symons Emergency Specialities v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583 , 593, fn. 5; see also Protect our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 667 , 678; Anderson First Coalition v. City of Anderson (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1193 ; Friends of Davis v. City of Davis (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1015 .) Still other decisions, treating municipalities construing ordinances enacted by them like administrative agencies construing statutes enacted by the Legislature, apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Ca

2024Some decisions hold that a municipality’s interpretation of its ordinances is “ ‘entitled to great weight and should be respected by the courts unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized.’ ” (Anderson v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1336, 1343 ; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App4th 1068, 1087; Horwitz v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1354 ; Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 281, 290 ; City of Oakland Residential Rent Arbitration Bd. v.

2024Some decisions hold that a municipality’s interpretation of its ordinances is “ ‘entitled to great weight and should be respected by the courts unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized.’ ” (Anderson v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1336, 1343 ; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App4th 1068, 1087; Horwitz v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1354 ; Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 281, 290 ; City of Oakland Residential Rent Arbitration Bd. v.

2024Some decisions hold that a municipality’s interpretation of its ordinances is “ ‘entitled to great weight and should be respected by the courts unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized.’ ” (Anderson v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1336, 1343 ; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App4th 1068, 1087; Horwitz v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1354 ; Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 281, 290 ; City of Oakland Residential Rent Arbitration Bd. v.

2024(Symons Emergency Specialities v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583 , 593, fn. 5; see also Protect our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 667 , 678; Anderson First Coalition v. City of Anderson (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1193 ; Friends of Davis v. City of Davis (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1015 .) Still other decisions, treating municipalities construing ordinances enacted by them like administrative agencies construing statutes enacted by the Legislature, apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Ca

2023Whereas step one of the Lopez test would have the reviewing court consider whether, to the degree of certainty required by Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , all aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court would have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, Zabelle held the reviewing court need identify only a single aggravating factor that withstands such analysis.

2022(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 11 .) The courts in those cases employed a slightly different test focusing on the nature of the evidence establishing the valid theory.

2021A slightly different standard applies to this claim: “[W]hen deciding whether an error of instructional omission was prejudicial, the court must also evaluate (1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself that it was misled.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548 , 580- 581, fn. omitted.) As to the first factor, based on our analysis above, we find it weighs heavily in favor of ReadyLink.

2020However, it appears from Robinson’s briefing that he believes we should employ a slightly different framework articulated by the Court of Appeal in Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313 (Brown).

2019"We presume the jury understood and followed the instruction." ( People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816 , 873, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 289 P.3d 791 .) Defendant contends the limiting instructions were inadequate, and the court should instead have given a slightly different instruction that his attorney suggested.

2019"We presume the jury understood and followed the instruction." ( People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816 , 873, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 289 P.3d 791 .) Defendant contends the limiting instructions were inadequate, and the court should instead have given a slightly different instruction that his attorney suggested.

2014Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 461 .) To the extent Mohamed’s cause of action for declaratory relief sought a declaration “that the Association’s application of the CC&Rs and Rules & Regulations is unreasonable pursuant to [former] Civil Code section 1354,” a slightly different analysis is required, but the result is the same.

2012Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 ] (Manneck).) The difficulty of this task is “ ‘multiplied when the relief sought is a “sui generis” declaration [of rights] in which event the court is even deprived of the advantage of considering the prayer as an indication of whether or not the claim is addressed to equity.’ ” (Veale, supra, 206 Cal.App.2d at p. 561 .) Federal courts have employed a slightly different inquiry to aid in determining whether the right to a jury attaches in declaratory relief actions, asking “whether there would have been a right to a jury trial had t

2012Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 ] (Manneck).) The difficulty of this task is “ ‘multiplied when the relief sought is a “sui generis” declaration [of rights] in which event the court is even deprived of the advantage of considering the prayer as an indication of whether or not the claim is addressed to equity.’ ” (Veale, supra, 206 Cal.App.2d at p. 561 .) Federal courts have employed a slightly different inquiry to aid in determining whether the right to a jury attaches in declaratory relief actions, asking “whether there would have been a right to a jury trial had t

1998(U.S. v. McFarland (8th Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 316, 318 ; U.S. v. McCarty (10th Cir. 1996) 82 F.3d 943, 947 ; U.S. v. Coleman (7th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 126, 129 ; U.S. v. Hill, supra, 967 F.2d 902, 910-911 ; U.S. v. Giannetta (1st Cir. 1990) 909 F.2d 571, 581 ; Owens v. Kelley (11th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2d 1362, 1369 ; see also U.S. v. Martin (6th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 293, 296 [applying same standard to probation searches].) Several state courts have imposed a similar limitation.

1998(State v. West (1994) 185 Wis.2d 68, fn. 2 [ 517 N.W.2d 482, 484 ] [Wisconsin Administrative Code permits parole searches only on “reasonable grounds” to believe contraband is present]; State v. Boston (1994) 269 Mont. 300 [ 889 P.2d 814 , 817] [Montana statute permits parole searches only on reasonable suspicion]; State v. Ashley (S.D. 1990) 459 N.W.2d 828, 830 [South Dakota parole agreement permitted search “whenever reasonable cause is ascertained by a parole agent”]; see also People v. Eiland (1991) 217 Ill.App.3d 250 [ 160 Ill.Dec. 231 , 576 N.E.2d 1185, 1191 ] [Illinois statute permits p

1998(U.S. v. McFarland (8th Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 316, 318 ; U.S. v. McCarty (10th Cir. 1996) 82 F.3d 943, 947 ; U.S. v. Coleman (7th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 126, 129 ; U.S. v. Hill, supra, 967 F.2d 902, 910-911 ; U.S. v. Giannetta (1st Cir. 1990) 909 F.2d 571, 581 ; Owens v. Kelley (11th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2d 1362, 1369 ; see also U.S. v. Martin (6th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 293, 296 [applying same standard to probation searches].) Several state courts have imposed a similar limitation.

1998(U.S. v. McFarland (8th Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 316, 318 ; U.S. v. McCarty (10th Cir. 1996) 82 F.3d 943, 947 ; U.S. v. Coleman (7th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 126, 129 ; U.S. v. Hill, supra, 967 F.2d 902, 910-911 ; U.S. v. Giannetta (1st Cir. 1990) 909 F.2d 571, 581 ; Owens v. Kelley (11th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2d 1362, 1369 ; see also U.S. v. Martin (6th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 293, 296 [applying same standard to probation searches].) Several state courts have imposed a similar limitation.

1998(State v. West (1994) 185 Wis.2d 68, fn. 2 [ 517 N.W.2d 482, 484 ] [Wisconsin Administrative Code permits parole searches only on “reasonable grounds” to believe contraband is present]; State v. Boston (1994) 269 Mont. 300 [ 889 P.2d 814 , 817] [Montana statute permits parole searches only on reasonable suspicion]; State v. Ashley (S.D. 1990) 459 N.W.2d 828, 830 [South Dakota parole agreement permitted search “whenever reasonable cause is ascertained by a parole agent”]; see also People v. Eiland (1991) 217 Ill.App.3d 250 [ 160 Ill.Dec. 231 , 576 N.E.2d 1185, 1191 ] [Illinois statute permits p