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18 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1961–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Karl L. Dahlstrom and Karla D. Dahlstromgreen2 sentences2009See United States v. Dahlstrom , 180 F.3d 677, 682 (5 th Cir. 1999). 2009See United States v. Dahlstrom, 180 F.3d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1999). | 3 | 3 |
Proctor v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2015See Proctor v. Dist. of Columbia, 74 F.Supp.3d 436, 451 (D.D.C.2014) (holding that teacher’s claims, including one based on age discrimination, must be dismissed under collateral estoppel because even though the prior suit by the Union had contained no allegation regarding age discrimination, the teacher’s age discrimination allegation simply “attempted] to pour new wine into old wine skins,” “precisely th[e] type of argumentation” “forbid[den]” by issue preclusion). 2015Opinion at 7; citing Proctor v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 13-00985, 2014 WL 6676232, at *6 (D.D.C. | 2 | 2 |
Serrano v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Serrano v. State, 123 S.W.3d 53, 58-59 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. filed). 2004See Serrano v. State , 123 S.W.3d 53, 58-59 (Tex. App.--Austin 2003, pet. filed). | 2 | 2 |
Town North National Bank v. Broaddusgreen2 sentences2003See Town N. Nat'l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex.1978) (holding that to prevail in asserting fraud as an affirmative defense to a promissory note, the defendant must show some “trickery, artifice, or device”). 2003See Town N. Nat’l Bank v. Broaddus , 569 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1978) (holding that to prevail in asserting fraud as an affirmative defense to a promissory note, the defendant must show some “trickery, artifice, or device”). | 2 | 2 |
Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLCgreen1 sentence2015Co. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. 1997); see also Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518 , 524–25 (Tex. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Burlington Northern Railroad v. TUCO Inc.green1 sentence2015Co. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. 1997); see also Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518 , 524–25 (Tex. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Ramey, Ex Parte Ker'sean Olajuwagreen1 sentence2014The State’s use of material false testimony violates a defendant’s due-process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.21 Therefore, in any habeas claim alleging the use of material false 18 Ex parte Ramey, 382 S.W.3d 396, 397 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Distributors Investment Co. v. Pattongreen2 sentences2003Patton, 130 Tex. 449 , 110 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1937) (holding that oral representations that conflict with the terms of a written contract are not admissible to show fraud because otherwise a written contract would be of no higher dignity than an oral one); Billington, et al. v. Vest, 268 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1954, no writ) (holding that attaching the label of fraud to the oral representations does not change their character as inadmissible parol evidence). [2] A slightly different analysis has been used in assessing the sufficiency of evidence of fraudulent inducement where the co 2003Patton, 130 Tex. 449 , 110 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1937) (holding that oral representations that conflict with the terms of a written contract are not admissible to show fraud because otherwise a written contract would be of no higher dignity than an oral one); Billington, et al. v. Vest, 268 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1954, no writ) (holding that attaching the label of fraud to the oral representations does not change their character as inadmissible parol evidence). [2] A slightly different analysis has been used in assessing the sufficiency of evidence of fraudulent inducement where the co | 1 | 1 |
Billington v. Vestgreen1 sentence2003Patton, 130 Tex. 449 , 110 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1937) (holding that oral representations that conflict with the terms of a written contract are not admissible to show fraud because otherwise a written contract would be of no higher dignity than an oral one); Billington, et al. v. Vest, 268 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1954, no writ) (holding that attaching the label of fraud to the oral representations does not change their character as inadmissible parol evidence). [2] A slightly different analysis has been used in assessing the sufficiency of evidence of fraudulent inducement where the co | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Frederick Mathewsred2 sentences1991Batson reminds us that “ ‘a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of a fact,’ entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court,” and that, “[sjince the trial judge’s findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.” Id. [106 S.Ct.] at 1724 n. 21. 1991For the purposes of appellate review this Court operates under a slightly different standard as was clarified in Whitsey II, and aptly stated in United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 330 (7th Cir.1986): ... | 1 | 1 |
McHugh v. Audetgreen1 sentence1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Taylor v. Sturgell
green
1 sentence2025Thus, even if a plaintiff brings “a slightly different claim [if] it is based on the same facts as the first proceeding [then] collateral estoppel would still apply.” Id. (citing Proctor v. Dist. of Columbia, 74 F. Supp.3d 436, 451 (D. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Missouri v. Seibert
green
2 sentences2006Justice Breyer joined in Justice Souter’s plurality entirely; he also wrote his own concurrence that partially joins Justice Kenney’s concurrence, but articulates a slightly different rule in that, "[cjourts should exclude the 'fruits’ of the initial unwarned questioning unless the failure to warn was in good faith.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Breyer, J., concurring). . 2006Justice Breyer joined in Justice Souter’s plurality entirely; he also wrote his own concurrence that partially joins Justice Kenney’s concurrence, but articulates a slightly different rule in that, "[cjourts should exclude the 'fruits’ of the initial unwarned questioning unless the failure to warn was in good faith.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Breyer, J., concurring). . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York
green
2 sentences1993The United States Supreme Court used a slightly different analysis in upholding a similar property tax exemption in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 , *558 90 S.Ct. 1409 , 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). 1993The United States Supreme Court used a slightly different analysis in upholding a similar property tax exemption in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 , *558 90 S.Ct. 1409 , 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Schueler v. Strelinger
green
2 sentences1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford 1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Duckworth v. Bennett
green
2 sentences1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford 1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Gresham v. Ford
green
2 sentences1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford 1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford | 1 | 1977–1977 |
McPeak v. Vanderbilt University Hospital
green
2 sentences1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford 1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company
green
2 sentences1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford 1977In McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 400 (M.D.Pa.1947), the court adopted a slightly different standard: “Where competent medical authority is divided a physician or surgeon will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his community.” [Emphasis added.] Accord, Fritz v. Parke Davis and Company, 277 Minn. 210 , 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967); Scheuler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330 , 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47 , 181 A. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Dallas County v. Miller
green
1 sentence1965There, the court held that abandonmentof an easement 'occurswhen the use for which property is dedicated becomes impossible, or so highly Improbableas to be practically impossible,or where the object of the use for which the property is dedi- cated wholly fails." In Dallas County v. Miller, 140 Tex. 242 , 166 S.W.2d 922 (1942), the Supreme Court appears to announce a slightly different rule when it refers to the "universallyrecognized rule that, while abandonmentmay be established, like any other facts, by circumstances,yet those circumstancesmust disclose some definite act showing an intentio | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Dallas County v. Miller
green
1 sentence1965There, the court held that abandonmentof an easement 'occurswhen the use for which property is dedicated becomes impossible, or so highly Improbableas to be practically impossible,or where the object of the use for which the property is dedi- cated wholly fails." In Dallas County v. Miller, 140 Tex. 242 , 166 S.W.2d 922 (1942), the Supreme Court appears to announce a slightly different rule when it refers to the "universallyrecognized rule that, while abandonmentmay be established, like any other facts, by circumstances,yet those circumstancesmust disclose some definite act showing an intentio | 1 | 1965–1965 |
City of Dallas v. Priolo
green
2 sentences1961City of Dallas v. Priolo, 150 Tex. 423 , 242 S.W.2d 176 . 1961City of Dallas v. Priolo, 150 Tex. 423 , 242 S.W.2d 176 . | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.