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15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cartergreen2 sentences2022We have previously held that preliminary hearing testimony is admissible under Evidence Code section 1291 “ ‘not because the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing is considered an exact substitute for the right of confrontation at trial [citation], but because the interests of justice are deemed served by a balancing of the defendant’s right to effective cross-examination against the public’s interest in effective prosecution.’ ” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 850 ; see People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1173 .) Although “a defendant’s motive in c 2014Appellant argues Sergeant Dunakin’s preliminary hearing testimony did not come within the section 1291 hearsay exception because trial counsel cross-examined Sergeant Dunakin at the preliminary hearing with a motive to “discover all the damaging evidence” against appellant, whereas “the defense at trial” was to “undermine the 14 credibility of the evidence of Davis’s accusations against [him] in the eyes of the jury.” We are not persuaded. “[A] defendant’s motive in cross-examining a witness at a preliminary hearing may differ somewhat from the motive at trial, but nevertheless the earlier tes | 2 | 3 |
Barber v. Pagegreen2 sentences1991The Supreme Court later opined, however, that when a court determines the witness is unavailable, “there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause.” (Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. at p. 725 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the high court found the confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of preliminary hearing testimony, when the unavailable witness was actually cross-examined b 1991The Supreme Court later opined, however, that when a court determines the witness is unavailable, “there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause.” (Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. at p. 725 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the high court found the confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of preliminary hearing testimony, when the unavailable witness was actually cross-examined b | 1 | 4 |
People v. Zapiengreen1 sentence2022We have previously held that preliminary hearing testimony is admissible under Evidence Code section 1291 “ ‘not because the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing is considered an exact substitute for the right of confrontation at trial [citation], but because the interests of justice are deemed served by a balancing of the defendant’s right to effective cross-examination against the public’s interest in effective prosecution.’ ” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 850 ; see People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1173 .) Although “a defendant’s motive in c | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pricegreen2 sentences2009(See People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 239 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 229 ] [victim’s hearsay statement to police narrating infliction of physical injury, which was admissible under Evid. 2009(See People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 239 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 229 ] [victim’s hearsay statement to police narrating infliction of physical injury, which was admissible under Evid. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McGeegreen2 sentences1983If official failure to comply with a statutory procedure should have an invalidating effect on subsequent governmental action, the statute is said to be mandatory; if not, it is said to be directory (People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 958 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 568 P.2d 382 ]). 1983If official failure to comply with a statutory procedure should have an invalidating effect on subsequent governmental action, the statute is said to be mandatory; if not, it is said to be directory (People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 958 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 568 P.2d 382 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Carroll v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1970(Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [ 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107, 111-112 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 , 19 A.L.R.3d 708 ]; People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 894 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 402 P.2d 834 ]; People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575, 580 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ].) No contention to the contrary is made by defendant. 4 Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719 , dealt with this precise question and noted: “While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminar 1970(Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [ 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107, 111-112 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 , 19 A.L.R.3d 708 ]; People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 894 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 402 P.2d 834 ]; People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575, 580 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ].) No contention to the contrary is made by defendant. 4 Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719 , dealt with this precise question and noted: “While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminar | 1 | 1 |
People v. Webbgreen2 sentences1970(Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [ 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107, 111-112 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 , 19 A.L.R.3d 708 ]; People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 894 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 402 P.2d 834 ]; People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575, 580 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ].) No contention to the contrary is made by defendant. 4 Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719 , dealt with this precise question and noted: “While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminar 1970(Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [ 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107, 111-112 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 , 19 A.L.R.3d 708 ]; People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 894 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 402 P.2d 834 ]; People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575, 580 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ].) No contention to the contrary is made by defendant. 4 Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719 , dealt with this precise question and noted: “While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminar | 1 | 1 |
People v. Burkegreen2 sentences1970(Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [ 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107, 111-112 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 , 19 A.L.R.3d 708 ]; People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 894 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 402 P.2d 834 ]; People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575, 580 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ].) No contention to the contrary is made by defendant. 4 Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719 , dealt with this precise question and noted: “While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminar 1970(Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [ 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107, 111-112 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 , 19 A.L.R.3d 708 ]; People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 894 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 402 P.2d 834 ]; People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575, 580 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ].) No contention to the contrary is made by defendant. 4 Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719 , dealt with this precise question and noted: “While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminar | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robinsongreen2 sentences1970(Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [ 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107, 111-112 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 , 19 A.L.R.3d 708 ]; People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 894 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 402 P.2d 834 ]; People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575, 580 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ].) No contention to the contrary is made by defendant. 4 Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719 , dealt with this precise question and noted: “While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminar 1970(Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [ 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107, 111-112 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 , 19 A.L.R.3d 708 ]; People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 894 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 402 P.2d 834 ]; People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575, 580 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ].) No contention to the contrary is made by defendant. 4 Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719 , dealt with this precise question and noted: “While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminar | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2026“We have made it clear,” we stated, “that the right to confrontation is a trial right that does not apply with full force at a preliminary hearing.” (Ibid.) In People v. Miranda (2000) 23 Cal.4th 340, 351 , we held that testimony by a qualified law enforcement officer relating single-level hearsay at a preliminary examination was “admissible as against hearsay, confrontation clause, and due process objections.” In Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1078 , we found it “doubtful that the federal confrontation clause operates to bar hearsay evidence offered at a preliminary hearing | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Whitman v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026“We have made it clear,” we stated, “that the right to confrontation is a trial right that does not apply with full force at a preliminary hearing.” (Ibid.) In People v. Miranda (2000) 23 Cal.4th 340, 351 , we held that testimony by a qualified law enforcement officer relating single-level hearsay at a preliminary examination was “admissible as against hearsay, confrontation clause, and due process objections.” In Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1078 , we found it “doubtful that the federal confrontation clause operates to bar hearsay evidence offered at a preliminary hearing | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Gonzales
green
1 sentence2026In People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1267 , we found no violation of the defendant’s federal confrontation rights when he was not permitted to confront a witness at a preliminary hearing. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
California v. Green
red
1 sentence2024(Barber, at p. 725.) Just two years later, the same court confirmed the same when the defendant’s attorney was not “significantly limited in any way in the scope or nature of his cross-examination of the witness . . . at the preliminary hearing.” (California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 166 .) And in Louis, the reviewing court observed in dicta that defense counsel’s cross-examination in the earlier proceeding 11 was focused on tying the witness down to one of three stories the witness had told earlier and the judge frustrated defense counsel’s attempt at cross-examination by imposing restric | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Samayoa
green
1 sentence2022We have previously held that preliminary hearing testimony is admissible under Evidence Code section 1291 “ ‘not because the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing is considered an exact substitute for the right of confrontation at trial [citation], but because the interests of justice are deemed served by a balancing of the defendant’s right to effective cross-examination against the public’s interest in effective prosecution.’ ” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 850 ; see People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1173 .) Although “a defendant’s motive in c | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Valencia
green
1 sentence2021(Ibid.) The court 31 acknowledged the language in Barber that a preliminary hearing “is ordinarily a less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial,” but noted that Barber also “recognized that ‘there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable . . . .’ ” (Green, at p. 166.) Consistent with Green, our Supreme Court has upheld the admission of preliminary hearing testimony when the witness is unavail | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences2014Appellant argues Sergeant Dunakin’s preliminary hearing testimony did not come within the section 1291 hearsay exception because trial counsel cross-examined Sergeant Dunakin at the preliminary hearing with a motive to “discover all the damaging evidence” against appellant, whereas “the defense at trial” was to “undermine the 14 credibility of the evidence of Davis’s accusations against [him] in the eyes of the jury.” We are not persuaded. “[A] defendant’s motive in cross-examining a witness at a preliminary hearing may differ somewhat from the motive at trial, but nevertheless the earlier tes 2014Appellant argues Sergeant Dunakin’s preliminary hearing testimony did not come within the section 1291 hearsay exception because trial counsel cross-examined Sergeant Dunakin at the preliminary hearing with a motive to “discover all the damaging evidence” against appellant, whereas “the defense at trial” was to “undermine the 14 credibility of the evidence of Davis’s accusations against [him] in the eyes of the jury.” We are not persuaded. “[A] defendant’s motive in cross-examining a witness at a preliminary hearing may differ somewhat from the motive at trial, but nevertheless the earlier tes | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Louis
green
1 sentence2014In Louis, for example, our Supreme Court observed that defense counsel at the preliminary hearing cross-examined the absent witness with an "interest and motive peculiar to that early stage in the proceedings – viz., to attempt to tie [the witness] down, in the interests of pretrial discovery . . . ." (People v. Louis, supra, at p. 983 .) Here, the testimony of Chavez used at the third trial was his testimony from the first trial. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ohio v. Roberts
red
2 sentences1991The Supreme Court later opined, however, that when a court determines the witness is unavailable, “there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause.” (Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. at p. 725 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the high court found the confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of preliminary hearing testimony, when the unavailable witness was actually cross-examined b 1991The Supreme Court later opined, however, that when a court determines the witness is unavailable, “there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause.” (Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. at p. 725 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the high court found the confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of preliminary hearing testimony, when the unavailable witness was actually cross-examined b | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences1986The trial court specifically acknowledged that it could “conjure up a case . . . where a defendant might be appointed cocounsel, but this was not one.” People v. Davis (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 796 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 846 ] held that a defendant with special expertise was entitled to cross-examine a witness at a preliminary hearing. 1986The trial court specifically acknowledged that it could “conjure up a case . . . where a defendant might be appointed cocounsel, but this was not one.” People v. Davis (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 796 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 846 ] held that a defendant with special expertise was entitled to cross-examine a witness at a preliminary hearing. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Gomez
green
2 sentences1975In People v. Gomez (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 225 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 80 ], the reviewing court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the testimony of a witness at a preliminary hearing where at the time of trial she was confined to a state hospital and two psychiatrists testified there was a strong possibility that her appearance in court would be detrimental to her mental health. 1975In People v. Gomez (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 225 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 80 ], the reviewing court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the testimony of a witness at a preliminary hearing where at the time of trial she was confined to a state hospital and two psychiatrists testified there was a strong possibility that her appearance in court would be detrimental to her mental health. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.