Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
15 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“It is axiomatic that everyone is presumed to know the law and ignorance thereof is not an excuse for its violation.” Taylor, 233 Ga. App. at 222 (1). 2014“It is axiomatic that everyone is presumed to know the law and ignorance thereof is not an excuse for its violation.” Taylor, 233 Ga. App. at 222 (1). | 2 | 2 |
Huckabee v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Given this conflicting evidence, the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, “was authorized to believe the testimony of trial counsel and reject any conflicting testimony from [Rembert’s mother and brother].” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hughes, ___ Ga. App. at ___ (4). 10 witness but failed to disclose her name to defense counsel until the day before trial, and the only excuse defense counsel offered for [his client’s] failure to notify him of the witness was that [the client] had ‘been in the system’”); Huckabee, 287 Ga. at 732 (3) (defendant acted in bad faith where “[d]uring th 2013See Freeman, 245 Ga. App. at 385 (2) (bad faith shown where defendant “presumably knew about the alleged alibi witness but failed to disclose her name to defense counsel until the day before trial, and the only excuse defense counsel offered for [his client’s] failure to notify him of the witness was that [the client] had ‘been in the system’ ”); Huckabee, 287 Ga. at 732 (3) (defendant acted in bad faith where “[d]uring the ten or eleven months” that lapsed between the defendant’s arrest and his trial, “he never advised his attorneys he had an alibi, and none of his proposed alibi witnesses ca | 2 | 2 |
Sullivan v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Freeman, 245 Ga. App. at 385 (2) (bad faith shown where defendant “presumably knew about the alleged alibi witness but failed to disclose her name to defense counsel until the day before trial, and the only excuse defense counsel offered for [his client’s] failure to notify him of the witness was that [the client] had ‘been in the system’ ”); Huckabee, 287 Ga. at 732 (3) (defendant acted in bad faith where “[d]uring the ten or eleven months” that lapsed between the defendant’s arrest and his trial, “he never advised his attorneys he had an alibi, and none of his proposed alibi witnesses ca 2013See Freeman, 245 Ga. App. at 385 (2) (bad faith shown where defendant “presumably knew about the alleged alibi witness but failed to disclose her name to defense counsel until the day before trial, and the only excuse defense counsel offered for [his client’s] failure to notify him of the witness was that [the client] had ‘been in the system’ ”); Huckabee, 287 Ga. at 732 (3) (defendant acted in bad faith where “[d]uring the ten or eleven months” that lapsed between the defendant’s arrest and his trial, “he never advised his attorneys he had an alibi, and none of his proposed alibi witnesses ca | 2 | 2 |
Martin v. Stategreen2 sentences1988“Everyone is presumed to know the law and ignorance thereof is not an excuse for its violation. [Cit.]” Martin v. State, 160 Ga. App. 275, 277 (1) ( 287 SE2d 244 ) (1981). “[T]he accused was nevertheless bound to know what the law was. 1988“Everyone is presumed to know the law and ignorance thereof is not an excuse for its violation. [Cit.]” Martin v. State, 160 Ga. App. 275, 277 (1) ( 287 SE2d 244 ) (1981). “[T]he accused was nevertheless bound to know what the law was. | 2 | 2 |
Freeman v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Freeman, 245 Ga. App. at 385 (2) (bad faith shown where defendant “presumably knew about the alleged alibi witness but failed to disclose her name to defense counsel until the day before trial, and the only excuse defense counsel offered for [his client’s] failure to notify him of the witness was that [the client] had ‘been in the system’ ”); Huckabee, 287 Ga. at 732 (3) (defendant acted in bad faith where “[d]uring the ten or eleven months” that lapsed between the defendant’s arrest and his trial, “he never advised his attorneys he had an alibi, and none of his proposed alibi witnesses ca | 1 | 1 |
Todd v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Under OCGA § 17-16-6, a trial court may prohibit a defendant from presenting a witness not properly disclosed, “upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith.” Freeman presumably knew about the alleged alibi witness but failed to disclose her name to defense counsel until the day before trial, and the only excuse defense counsel offered for Freeman’s failure to notify him of the witness was that Freeman had “been in the system.” Prejudice to the State in such a circumstance is clear: “[T]he [S]tate is denied the ten days authorized by law in which to investigate and refute the alleged alibi, and t 2000Under OCGA § 17-16-6, a trial court may prohibit a defendant from presenting a witness not properly disclosed, “upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith.” Freeman presumably knew about the alleged alibi witness but failed to disclose her name to defense counsel until the day before trial, and the only excuse defense counsel offered for Freeman’s failure to notify him of the witness was that Freeman had “been in the system.” Prejudice to the State in such a circumstance is clear: “[T]he [S]tate is denied the ten days authorized by law in which to investigate and refute the alleged alibi, and t | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Thus, the mere fact that [Taylor] may have been ignorant of the continued existence of his habitual violator status and the resultant consequences did not, in and of itself, afford him any defense to the . . . charge of which he was convicted.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Turner v. State, 210 Ga. App. 303, 304 (1) ( 436 SE2d 229 ) (1993). 2. 1998Thus, the mere fact that [Taylor] may have been ignorant of the continued existence of his habitual violator status and the resultant consequences did not, in and of itself, afford him any defense to the . . . charge of which he was convicted.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Turner v. State, 210 Ga. App. 303, 304 (1) ( 436 SE2d 229 ) (1993). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Connelly v. Stategreen2 sentences1993“It is axiomatic that ‘(e)veryone is presumed to know the law and ignorance thereof is not an excuse for its violation.’ [Cits.] Thus, the mere fact that the appellant may have been ignorant of the continued existence of his habitual violator status and the resultant consequences . . . did not, in and of itself, afford him any defense to the felony charge of which he was convicted.” Connelly v. State, 181 Ga. App. 261, 262 ( 351 SE2d 702 ) (1986). 1993“It is axiomatic that ‘(e)veryone is presumed to know the law and ignorance thereof is not an excuse for its violation.’ [Cits.] Thus, the mere fact that the appellant may have been ignorant of the continued existence of his habitual violator status and the resultant consequences . . . did not, in and of itself, afford him any defense to the felony charge of which he was convicted.” Connelly v. State, 181 Ga. App. 261, 262 ( 351 SE2d 702 ) (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Foygreen2 sentences1979See Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596 ( 6 SE2d 788 ) (1940); B. 1979See Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596 ( 6 SE2d 788 ) (1940); B. | 1 | 1 |
Etheridge v. Hoopergreen2 sentences1969If such were permissible then defendant might well have offered to show that people who drive vehicles along this street do so at speeds in excess of that allowed by law as an excuse for his violation on this occasion.” Etheridge v. Hooper, 104 Ga. App. 227, 230 ( 121 SE2d 323 ), and see to the same effect King v. Harmon, 97 Ga. App. 456 (1) ( 103 SE2d 428 ). 1969If such were permissible then defendant might well have offered to show that people who drive vehicles along this street do so at speeds in excess of that allowed by law as an excuse for his violation on this occasion.” Etheridge v. Hooper, 104 Ga. App. 227, 230 ( 121 SE2d 323 ), and see to the same effect King v. Harmon, 97 Ga. App. 456 (1) ( 103 SE2d 428 ). | 1 | 1 |
Levar v. Stategreen1 sentence1967Gurley v. State, 65 Ga. 157 ; Levar v. State, 103 Ga. 42, 43 (3) ( 29 SE 467 ); Fraser v. State, 112 Ga. 13 (5) ( 37 SE 114 ); Code § 102-105. | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. City of Griffingreen2 sentences1952Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123 *454 ( 189 S. E. 427 ); Ware v. State, 6 Ga. App. 578 ( 65 S. E. 333 ). 1952Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123 *454 ( 189 S. E. 427 ); Ware v. State, 6 Ga. App. 578 ( 65 S. E. 333 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2000Under OCGA § 17-16-6, a trial court may prohibit a defendant from presenting a witness not properly disclosed, “upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith.” Freeman presumably knew about the alleged alibi witness but failed to disclose her name to defense counsel until the day before trial, and the only excuse defense counsel offered for Freeman’s failure to notify him of the witness was that Freeman had “been in the system.” Prejudice to the State in such a circumstance is clear: “[T]he [S]tate is denied the ten days authorized by law in which to investigate and refute the alleged alibi, and t 2000Under OCGA § 17-16-6, a trial court may prohibit a defendant from presenting a witness not properly disclosed, “upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith.” Freeman presumably knew about the alleged alibi witness but failed to disclose her name to defense counsel until the day before trial, and the only excuse defense counsel offered for Freeman’s failure to notify him of the witness was that Freeman had “been in the system.” Prejudice to the State in such a circumstance is clear: “[T]he [S]tate is denied the ten days authorized by law in which to investigate and refute the alleged alibi, and t | 1 | 2000–2000 |
McRae v. State
green
2 sentences1981McRae v. State, 116 Ga. App. 407 (3) ( 157 SE2d 646 ) (1967). 1981McRae v. State, 116 Ga. App. 407 (3) ( 157 SE2d 646 ) (1967). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Morrison v. Roberts
green
2 sentences1979If plaintiff were to rely on the theory of misleading artifice or device as reasonably preventing him from reading the guaranty (an excuse from the requirement of reading which has been said to exist independently and apart from the confidential relationship excuse, Morrison v. Roberts, 195 Ga. 45 (1) ( 23 SE2d 164 ) (1942)), he could not prevail. 1979If plaintiff were to rely on the theory of misleading artifice or device as reasonably preventing him from reading the guaranty (an excuse from the requirement of reading which has been said to exist independently and apart from the confidential relationship excuse, Morrison v. Roberts, 195 Ga. 45 (1) ( 23 SE2d 164 ) (1942)), he could not prevail. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
King v. Harmon
neutral
2 sentences1969If such were permissible then defendant might well have offered to show that people who drive vehicles along this street do so at speeds in excess of that allowed by law as an excuse for his violation on this occasion.” Etheridge v. Hooper, 104 Ga. App. 227, 230 ( 121 SE2d 323 ), and see to the same effect King v. Harmon, 97 Ga. App. 456 (1) ( 103 SE2d 428 ). 1969If such were permissible then defendant might well have offered to show that people who drive vehicles along this street do so at speeds in excess of that allowed by law as an excuse for his violation on this occasion.” Etheridge v. Hooper, 104 Ga. App. 227, 230 ( 121 SE2d 323 ), and see to the same effect King v. Harmon, 97 Ga. App. 456 (1) ( 103 SE2d 428 ). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Gurley v. State
green
1 sentence1967Gurley v. State, 65 Ga. 157 ; Levar v. State, 103 Ga. 42, 43 (3) ( 29 SE 467 ); Fraser v. State, 112 Ga. 13 (5) ( 37 SE 114 ); Code § 102-105. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Miller v. McKinnon
green
1 sentence1967Gurley v. State, 65 Ga. 157 ; Levar v. State, 103 Ga. 42, 43 (3) ( 29 SE 467 ); Fraser v. State, 112 Ga. 13 (5) ( 37 SE 114 ); Code § 102-105. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Fraser v. State
green
2 sentences1967Gurley v. State, 65 Ga. 157 ; Levar v. State, 103 Ga. 42, 43 (3) ( 29 SE 467 ); Fraser v. State, 112 Ga. 13 (5) ( 37 SE 114 ); Code § 102-105. 1967Gurley v. State, 65 Ga. 157 ; Levar v. State, 103 Ga. 42, 43 (3) ( 29 SE 467 ); Fraser v. State, 112 Ga. 13 (5) ( 37 SE 114 ); Code § 102-105. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Ware v. State
green
2 sentences1952Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123 *454 ( 189 S. E. 427 ); Ware v. State, 6 Ga. App. 578 ( 65 S. E. 333 ). 1952Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123 *454 ( 189 S. E. 427 ); Ware v. State, 6 Ga. App. 578 ( 65 S. E. 333 ). | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Adkins v. State
green
1 sentence1942In Adkins v. State, 137 Ga. *455 81 (6) ( 72 S. E. 897 ), it was stated that “the doctrine of reasonable fears has no connection with the offense of voluntary manslaughter.” And in Cargile v. State, 137 Ga. 775 (4) ( 74 S. E. 621 ), with reference to a charge on voluntary manslaughter, it was said that the court “should not mingle with it a charge on the subject of justifiable homicide under the doctrine of reasonable fears.” Whether the contention made in behalf of the plaintiff in error is sound or sufficient, or whether, as in the Cargile case, in view of the entire charge it would not be c | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Cargile v. State
green
1 sentence1942In Adkins v. State, 137 Ga. *455 81 (6) ( 72 S. E. 897 ), it was stated that “the doctrine of reasonable fears has no connection with the offense of voluntary manslaughter.” And in Cargile v. State, 137 Ga. 775 (4) ( 74 S. E. 621 ), with reference to a charge on voluntary manslaughter, it was said that the court “should not mingle with it a charge on the subject of justifiable homicide under the doctrine of reasonable fears.” Whether the contention made in behalf of the plaintiff in error is sound or sufficient, or whether, as in the Cargile case, in view of the entire charge it would not be c | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Abbott v. State
green
1 sentence1942In Adkins v. State, 137 Ga. *455 81 (6) ( 72 S. E. 897 ), it was stated that “the doctrine of reasonable fears has no connection with the offense of voluntary manslaughter.” And in Cargile v. State, 137 Ga. 775 (4) ( 74 S. E. 621 ), with reference to a charge on voluntary manslaughter, it was said that the court “should not mingle with it a charge on the subject of justifiable homicide under the doctrine of reasonable fears.” Whether the contention made in behalf of the plaintiff in error is sound or sufficient, or whether, as in the Cargile case, in view of the entire charge it would not be c | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.