discharge hearing in Illinois

2022Our supreme court has explained a discharge hearing under section 104-25 is “an innocence only hearing, that is to say, a proceeding to determine only whether to enter a judgment of acquittal, not to make a determination of guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d 464, 470 , 851 N.E.2d 1210, 1214 (2006).

2022Our supreme court has explained a discharge hearing under section 104-25 is “an innocence only hearing, that is to say, a proceeding to determine only whether to enter a judgment of acquittal, not to make a determination of guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d 464, 470 , 851 N.E.2d 1210, 1214 (2006).

2022App. 3d 98, 108-09 , 581 N.E.2d 371, 379-80 (1991), the reviewing court found the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at a discharge hearing because counsel did not even argue a defense of insanity.

2022Thus, the court found “defense counsel failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing and that the result of the discharge hearing must therefore be presumed unreliable.” Id. at 107 . ¶ 57 In Manns, 373 Ill.

2014People v. Olsson, 2011 IL App (2d) 091351, ¶ 4 (“If the evidence presented at a discharge hearing is sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt, no conviction results; instead, the defendant is found ‘not not guilty.’ ”); see also 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2012) (defining “sexually violent person” as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it subs

2014People v. Olsson, 2011 IL App (2d) 091351, ¶ 4 (“If the evidence presented at a discharge hearing is sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt, no conviction results; instead, the defendant is found ‘not not guilty.’ ”); see also 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2012) (defining “sexually violent person” as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it subs

2022“Although a court’s determination at a discharge hearing that the State has proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not constitute a technical determination of guilt, the standard of proof is the same as that required for a criminal conviction.” People v. Williams, 312 Ill.

2021Third, the defendant in Williams was denied the opportunity to be present at a discharge hearing, which did not happen in this case. 312 Ill.

2006Accordingly, in keeping with due process requirements, a discharge hearing under section 104 — 25 is “an ‘innocence only’ hearing, that is to say, a proceeding to determine only whether to enter a judgment of acquittal, not to make a determination of guilt.” People v. Rink, 97 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (1983); see also People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189, 200 (1995) (“a defendant who is not acquitted at a discharge hearing has not gained a definitive resolution of the charges against him”).

2006Accordingly, in keeping with due process requirements, a discharge hearing under section 104B25 is Aan >innocence only= -5- hearing, that is to say, a proceeding to determine only whether to enter a judgment of acquittal, not to make a determination of guilt.@ People v. Rink, 97 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (1983); see also People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189, 200 (1995) (Aa defendant who is not acquitted at a discharge hearing has not gained a definitive resolution of the charges against him@).

2013App. 3d 714, 720 (1992), aff’d, 165 Ill. 2d 125 (1995)). ¶ 38 We lastly note that at a discharge hearing, if a defendant charged with first-degree murder is neither acquitted nor found not guilty by reason of insanity, the maximum extended treatment period that a trial court can impose is five years beyond the initial one-year treatment term. 725 ILCS 5/104-25(d)(2) (West 2008); Rink, 97 Ill. 2d at 538 .

2012The issue of guilt is “deferred until the defendant is fit to stand trial.” People v. Rink, 97 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (1983). ¶ 25 Although a defendant may not be convicted at the conclusion of a discharge hearing, the purpose of the hearing is the same as that of a criminal trial: “to test the sufficiency of the State’s evidence of his guilt of the charged crime.” In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 410 (1992). 2 We note that Orengo does not challenge the trial court’s finding that the testimony was sufficiently reliable under section 115-10.

2024As the record demonstrates valid reasons—and thus good cause—for the delays, even though the discharge hearing was held 131 days after the finding that defendant could not be restored to fitness, there is no violation of section 104-23. ¶ 51 Finally, People v. Lavold, 262 Ill.

2013Although lengthy delays in article 104 proceedings are frowned upon (see People v. Lavold, 262 Ill.

1999See People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189, 200 (1995) (differences between statutory schemes for defendants found unfit for trial but acquitted in a discharge hearing and defendants found unfit for trial but not acquitted in a discharge hearing were reasonably related to the different purposes each served); see also Raseaitis, 126 Ill.

1999See also Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d at 200 (no due process violation because differences between statutory scheme for defendants acquitted by reason of insanity and scheme for defendants found unfit to stand trial but not acquitted after a discharge hearing were reasonably related to purposes they served); Raseaitis, 126 Ill.

2019See In re Detention of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶¶ 71-76 (identifying the relevant discharge inquiry, which includes change in the committed person or in the evaluative or legal standards).

2017Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶¶ 62, 67 .

2024On appeal, this court held that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an insanity defense because “the accounts of defendant’s behavior at the time of the offense, statements he made in court, and his fitness evaluations demonstrate he was delusional at the time of the offense and lend support to the defense he was unable to appreciate the criminality - 13 - of his conduct.” Id. at 240 . ¶ 58 In Penn, defense counsel did not raise an insanity defense or introduce evidence thereof until the closing arguments of the discharge hearing.

2022“The question of guilt is deferred until the defendant is fit to stand trial.” Mayo, 2017 IL App (2d) 150390 , ¶ 3. ¶ 31 “At a discharge hearing, the trial court may make one of three findings.” People v. Manns, 373 Ill.

2013“Significantly, only if the State sustains its burden of proof at the discharge hearing may a defendant be remanded for a period of treatment longer than the one-year period from the finding of unfitness [provided] for in section 104-23.” McBrien, 144 Ill.

1990App. 3d 489, 493 , 494 N.E.2d 732 .) As previously noted, relator was remanded for an extended period of treatment because the court found him unfit to stand trial and, in the subsequent discharge hearing, not subject to acquittal on the attempted murder charge.

2013Id.

2012See Konetski, 233 Ill.2d at 200 , 330 Ill.Dec. 761 , 909 N.E.2d 783 (statutory enactments are presumed constitutional).

2021Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 (stating when an accused invokes this right to counsel, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present”).

2021Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 (stating when an accused invokes this right to counsel, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present”).

2006It “enables an unfit defendant to have the charges dismissed if there is not enough evidence to prove he committed the acts charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Christy, 206 Ill.

2006Christy, 206 Ill.

2012The issue of guilt is “deferred until the defendant is fit to stand trial.” People v. Rink, 97 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (1983). ¶ 25 Although a defendant may not be convicted at the conclusion of a discharge hearing, the purpose of the hearing is the same as that of a criminal trial: “to test the sufficiency of the State’s evidence of his guilt of the charged crime.” In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 410 (1992). 2 We note that Orengo does not challenge the trial court’s finding that the testimony was sufficiently reliable under section 115-10.

2012The issue of guilt is “deferred until the defendant is fit to stand trial.” People v. Rink, 97 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (1983). ¶ 25 Although a defendant may not be convicted at the conclusion of a discharge hearing, the purpose of the hearing is the same as that of a criminal trial: “to test the sufficiency of the State’s evidence of his guilt of the charged crime.” In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 410 (1992). 2 We note that Orengo does not challenge the trial court’s finding that the testimony was sufficiently reliable under section 115-10.

2024See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”). ¶ 71 At a discharge hearing, the burden is on the State to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2022Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶ 40 Last, defendant argues ineffective assistance of counsel where his counsel failed to (a) request a sanity evaluation of defendant and (b) raise the affirmative defense of insanity before the discharge hearing. ¶ 41 We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2022App. 3d at 239 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984)). - 15 - ¶ 55 Defendant argues defense counsel’s failure to (1) request a sanity evaluation of defendant and (2) raise the affirmative defense of insanity before the discharge hearing prejudiced him.

1991Ed. 2d at 666 , 104 S. Ct. at 2045 ; People v. Hattery (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 449, 461-65 .) The guidelines for determining when counsel has been ineffective have been developed primarily in the context of appeals from convictions after criminal trials (or guilty pleas), but we see no reason to apply a different standard to a discharge hearing, where counsel’s performance may determine whether a defendant will be exposed to lengthy confinement and the possibility of a criminal trial and conviction thereafter.

2021See People v. Braggs, 302 Ill.

2002In recognizing the appellate court’s instruction that “[i]n the event that motion [motion to suppress] is granted and the statements of defendant are suppressed, the circuit court shall conduct a new discharge hearing” (Braggs, 302 Ill.