discharge violation in Oregon

2021As the Court of Appeals previously has stated, the wrongful discharge tort is “designed to fill a gap where a discharge in violation of public policy would otherwise not be adequately remedied.” Dunwoody v. Handskill Corp., 185 Or App 605, 613 , 60 P3d 1135 (2003).

2021As the Court of Appeals previously has stated, the wrongful discharge tort is “designed to fill a gap where a discharge in violation of public policy would otherwise not be adequately remedied.” Dunwoody v. Handskill Corp., 185 Or App 605, 613 , 60 P3d 1135 (2003).

2004In Reinhart , the court confirmed that "[i]t must be conceded that in this state the inability of a jury in a criminal action to agree upon a verdict after mature deliberation is a sufficient reason for their discharge by the court, and that such a discharge is not a bar to a further prosecution for the same offense." 26 Or. at 474 , 38 P. 822 (citing State v. Shaffer, 23 Or. 555, 556-57 , 32 P. 545 (1893)). *746 However, the fact that a deadlocked jury annuls jeopardy as to the original charge does not automatically imply that it also annuls jeopardy as to new charges.

2004In Reinhart , the court confirmed that "[i]t must be conceded that in this state the inability of a jury in a criminal action to agree upon a verdict after mature deliberation is a sufficient reason for their discharge by the court, and that such a discharge is not a bar to a further prosecution for the same offense." 26 Or. at 474 , 38 P. 822 (citing State v. Shaffer, 23 Or. 555, 556-57 , 32 P. 545 (1893)). *746 However, the fact that a deadlocked jury annuls jeopardy as to the original charge does not automatically imply that it also annuls jeopardy as to new charges.

2022Cite as 320 Or App 406 (2022) 413 a qualifying mental disorder, or, if so affected, no longer presents a substantial danger to others * * * the superin- tendent * * * shall apply to the Psychiatric Security Review Board for an order of discharge * * *.” A discharge hearing can also be initiated if a per- son committed to a state hospital and under the jurisdiction of PSRB applies for an order of discharge.

2021Although plaintiff in this case brought both a statutory whistleblowing claim and a common-law wrongful discharge claim, a plaintiff could not do so today under the current statute.4 Although, in this case, the Court of Appeals cor- rectly concluded that whistleblowing in the public employ- ment context can give rise to a wrongful discharge claim, Walker, 299 Or App at 447 , it incorrectly suggested that the existence of that important public policy rests on a court’s legal determination of the plaintiff’s reasonable belief that her employer violated the law in the whistleblowing context.

2006Thus, recourse to wrongful termination is available only in the absence of a remedy "adequate to protect both the interests of society * * * and the *660 interests of employees * * *." Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 612-13 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (quoting Walsh, 278 Or. at 352 , 563 P.2d 1205 ) (first omission in Walsh ).

2006Thus, recourse to wrongful termination is available only in the absence of a remedy "adequate to protect both the interests of society * * * and the *660 interests of employees * * *." Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 612-13 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (quoting Walsh, 278 Or. at 352 , 563 P.2d 1205 ) (first omission in Walsh ).

2006Thus, recourse to wrongful termination is available only in the absence of a remedy "adequate to protect both the interests of society * * * and the *660 interests of employees * * *." Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 612-13 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (quoting Walsh, 278 Or. at 352 , 563 P.2d 1205 ) (first omission in Walsh ).

2006Thus, recourse to wrongful termination is available only in the absence of a remedy "adequate to protect both the interests of society * * * and the *660 interests of employees * * *." Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 612-13 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (quoting Walsh, 278 Or. at 352 , 563 P.2d 1205 ) (first omission in Walsh ).

2006However, I was taking this information and formally putting the information into a [SOP] format and that I would be passing this information onto [sic] NIOSH.” 5 It is a “well-settled principle that wrongful termination serves as ‘an interstitial tort, designed to fill a remedial gap where a discharge in violation of public *483 policy would be left unvindicated.’ ” Olsen v. Deschutes County, 204 Or App 7, 14 , 127 P3d 655 , rev den, 341 Or 80 (2006) (quoting Dunwoody v. Handskill Corp., 185 Or App 605, 612 , 60 P3d 1135 (2003)).

2006However, I was taking this information and formally putting the information into a [SOP] format and that I would be passing this information onto [sic] NIOSH.” 5 It is a “well-settled principle that wrongful termination serves as ‘an interstitial tort, designed to fill a remedial gap where a discharge in violation of public *483 policy would be left unvindicated.’ ” Olsen v. Deschutes County, 204 Or App 7, 14 , 127 P3d 655 , rev den, 341 Or 80 (2006) (quoting Dunwoody v. Handskill Corp., 185 Or App 605, 612 , 60 P3d 1135 (2003)).

2004In Reinhart , the court confirmed that "[i]t must be conceded that in this state the inability of a jury in a criminal action to agree upon a verdict after mature deliberation is a sufficient reason for their discharge by the court, and that such a discharge is not a bar to a further prosecution for the same offense." 26 Or. at 474 , 38 P. 822 (citing State v. Shaffer, 23 Or. 555, 556-57 , 32 P. 545 (1893)). *746 However, the fact that a deadlocked jury annuls jeopardy as to the original charge does not automatically imply that it also annuls jeopardy as to new charges.

2004In Reinhart , the court confirmed that "[i]t must be conceded that in this state the inability of a jury in a criminal action to agree upon a verdict after mature deliberation is a sufficient reason for their discharge by the court, and that such a discharge is not a bar to a further prosecution for the same offense." 26 Or. at 474 , 38 P. 822 (citing State v. Shaffer, 23 Or. 555, 556-57 , 32 P. 545 (1893)). *746 However, the fact that a deadlocked jury annuls jeopardy as to the original charge does not automatically imply that it also annuls jeopardy as to new charges.

1966Art III, § 2, of the United States Constitution, provides: “The judicial Power [of the federal courts] shall extend to all * * * Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; * * *.” 28 USC § 1333 implements this provision and provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the' courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction * * *.” Langnes v. Green, supra ( 282 US 531 ), and Ex parte Green, supra ( 286 US 437 ), settled the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal admiralty courts to hear the issue of limitation.

1966Art III, § 2, of the United States Constitution, provides: “The judicial Power [of the federal courts] shall extend to all * * * Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; * * *.” 28 USC § 1333 implements this provision and provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the' courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction * * *.” Langnes v. Green, supra ( 282 US 531 ), and Ex parte Green, supra ( 286 US 437 ), settled the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal admiralty courts to hear the issue of limitation.

1951The other debt is not discharged by the payment.” Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 392, says: “An application of a payment once rightfully made by one party, cannot thereafter be changed without the manifested assent of the other. * * * ” This court has held that one who owes more than one debt to a creditor may, upon making a payment to him, direct the application of the payment: Fatland v. Wentworth & Irwin, Inc., 149 Or. 277 , 40 P. 2d 68 , 97 A.L.R. 339 , and Anderson v. Griffith, 51 Or. 116 , 93 P. 934 .

1951The other debt is not discharged by the payment.” Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 392, says: “An application of a payment once rightfully made by one party, cannot thereafter be changed without the manifested assent of the other. * * * ” This court has held that one who owes more than one debt to a creditor may, upon making a payment to him, direct the application of the payment: Fatland v. Wentworth & Irwin, Inc., 149 Or. 277 , 40 P. 2d 68 , 97 A.L.R. 339 , and Anderson v. Griffith, 51 Or. 116 , 93 P. 934 .

1951The other debt is not discharged by the payment.” Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 392, says: “An application of a payment once rightfully made by one party, cannot thereafter be changed without the manifested assent of the other. * * * ” This court has held that one who owes more than one debt to a creditor may, upon making a payment to him, direct the application of the payment: Fatland v. Wentworth & Irwin, Inc., 149 Or. 277 , 40 P. 2d 68 , 97 A.L.R. 339 , and Anderson v. Griffith, 51 Or. 116 , 93 P. 934 .

1951The other debt is not discharged by the payment.” Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 392, says: “An application of a payment once rightfully made by one party, cannot thereafter be changed without the manifested assent of the other. * * * ” This court has held that one who owes more than one debt to a creditor may, upon making a payment to him, direct the application of the payment: Fatland v. Wentworth & Irwin, Inc., 149 Or. 277 , 40 P. 2d 68 , 97 A.L.R. 339 , and Anderson v. Griffith, 51 Or. 116 , 93 P. 934 .