discharge bar in Indiana

2016In support, the State cites Curtis, in which the Indiana Supreme Court held that an appellant forfeited his constitutional speedy-trial claim where the issue was not presented to the trial court but first raised on interlocutory appeal. 948 N.E.2d at 1147-48 .

2015Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1407 -08 (quoting Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 125 (2011)).

2007Wilhite “replied affirmatively, admitting the release but asserting that the sole consideration therefor was the settlement of his property damage claim and that the inclusion of a discharge of his claim for personal injuries in the release was the result of a mistake of fact.” Id. at 178-179 , 31 N.E.2d at 281 .

2007Wilhite “replied affirmatively, admitting the release but asserting that the sole consideration therefor was the settlement of his property damage claim and that the inclusion of a discharge of his claim for personal injuries in the release was the result of a mistake of fact.” Id. at 178-179 , 31 N.E.2d at 281 .

1994State v. Soucie (1955) 234 Ind. 98 , 123 N.E.2d 888 ; Hickman v. State (1989) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 537 N.E.2d 64, 67 .

1994State v. Soucie (1955) 234 Ind. 98 , 123 N.E.2d 888 ; Hickman v. State (1989) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 537 N.E.2d 64, 67 .

1994State v. Soucie (1955) 234 Ind. 98 , 123 N.E.2d 888 ; Hickman v. State (1989) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 537 N.E.2d 64, 67 .

1978In Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 588 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 200 , the Court held: “The statute does not require the trial court at the discharge hearing to relieve the successfully treated criminal sexual deviant from further incarceration for other offenses, even though as here, they occurred at the same time as the sexual offense and were partly or wholly motivated by a desire to carry out a plan to commit a sexual offense.” Accord, Warner v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 262 , 354 N.E.2d 178, 185 ; Critchlow v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 458, 473 , 346 N.E.2d 591, 600 .

1978In Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 588 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 200 , the Court held: “The statute does not require the trial court at the discharge hearing to relieve the successfully treated criminal sexual deviant from further incarceration for other offenses, even though as here, they occurred at the same time as the sexual offense and were partly or wholly motivated by a desire to carry out a plan to commit a sexual offense.” Accord, Warner v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 262 , 354 N.E.2d 178, 185 ; Critchlow v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 458, 473 , 346 N.E.2d 591, 600 .

1978In Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 588 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 200 , the Court held: “The statute does not require the trial court at the discharge hearing to relieve the successfully treated criminal sexual deviant from further incarceration for other offenses, even though as here, they occurred at the same time as the sexual offense and were partly or wholly motivated by a desire to carry out a plan to commit a sexual offense.” Accord, Warner v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 262 , 354 N.E.2d 178, 185 ; Critchlow v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 458, 473 , 346 N.E.2d 591, 600 .

1978In Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 588 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 200 , the Court held: “The statute does not require the trial court at the discharge hearing to relieve the successfully treated criminal sexual deviant from further incarceration for other offenses, even though as here, they occurred at the same time as the sexual offense and were partly or wholly motivated by a desire to carry out a plan to commit a sexual offense.” Accord, Warner v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 262 , 354 N.E.2d 178, 185 ; Critchlow v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 458, 473 , 346 N.E.2d 591, 600 .

1978In Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 588 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 200 , the Court held: “The statute does not require the trial court at the discharge hearing to relieve the successfully treated criminal sexual deviant from further incarceration for other offenses, even though as here, they occurred at the same time as the sexual offense and were partly or wholly motivated by a desire to carry out a plan to commit a sexual offense.” Accord, Warner v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 262 , 354 N.E.2d 178, 185 ; Critchlow v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 458, 473 , 346 N.E.2d 591, 600 .

1978In Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 588 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 200 , the Court held: “The statute does not require the trial court at the discharge hearing to relieve the successfully treated criminal sexual deviant from further incarceration for other offenses, even though as here, they occurred at the same time as the sexual offense and were partly or wholly motivated by a desire to carry out a plan to commit a sexual offense.” Accord, Warner v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 262 , 354 N.E.2d 178, 185 ; Critchlow v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 458, 473 , 346 N.E.2d 591, 600 .

1978In Adams v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 129 , 352 N.E.2d 490, 493 , we said: “Ind. Code § 35-11-3.1-3 (Burns 1975) provides that a conviction for a sex offense is a precondition to eligibility to petition thereunder.

1978In Adams v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 129 , 352 N.E.2d 490, 493 , we said: “Ind. Code § 35-11-3.1-3 (Burns 1975) provides that a conviction for a sex offense is a precondition to eligibility to petition thereunder.

1974Small v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 349 , 287 N.E.2d 334 .

1974Small v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 349 , 287 N.E.2d 334 .

1955See: Johnson v. State (1884), 42 Ohio St. 207 ; State v. Wear (1898), 145 Mo. 162 , 46 S. W. 1099 ; Critser v. State (1910), 87 Neb. 727 , 127 N. W. 1073 ; In re Edwards (1886), 35 Kan. 99 , 10 P. 539 ; Durham, v. State (1851), 9 Ga. 306 ; Vance v. Commonwealth (1819), 2 Va. Cases (4 Va.) 162; which hold that a discharge is a bar to further prosecution for the same offense; and State v. Garthwaite (1851), 23 N. J.

1955See: Johnson v. State (1884), 42 Ohio St. 207 ; State v. Wear (1898), 145 Mo. 162 , 46 S. W. 1099 ; Critser v. State (1910), 87 Neb. 727 , 127 N. W. 1073 ; In re Edwards (1886), 35 Kan. 99 , 10 P. 539 ; Durham, v. State (1851), 9 Ga. 306 ; Vance v. Commonwealth (1819), 2 Va. Cases (4 Va.) 162; which hold that a discharge is a bar to further prosecution for the same offense; and State v. Garthwaite (1851), 23 N. J.

1955See: Johnson v. State (1884), 42 Ohio St. 207 ; State v. Wear (1898), 145 Mo. 162 , 46 S. W. 1099 ; Critser v. State (1910), 87 Neb. 727 , 127 N. W. 1073 ; In re Edwards (1886), 35 Kan. 99 , 10 P. 539 ; Durham, v. State (1851), 9 Ga. 306 ; Vance v. Commonwealth (1819), 2 Va. Cases (4 Va.) 162; which hold that a discharge is a bar to further prosecution for the same offense; and State v. Garthwaite (1851), 23 N. J.

1955See: Johnson v. State (1884), 42 Ohio St. 207 ; State v. Wear (1898), 145 Mo. 162 , 46 S. W. 1099 ; Critser v. State (1910), 87 Neb. 727 , 127 N. W. 1073 ; In re Edwards (1886), 35 Kan. 99 , 10 P. 539 ; Durham, v. State (1851), 9 Ga. 306 ; Vance v. Commonwealth (1819), 2 Va. Cases (4 Va.) 162; which hold that a discharge is a bar to further prosecution for the same offense; and State v. Garthwaite (1851), 23 N. J.

1955See: Johnson v. State (1884), 42 Ohio St. 207 ; State v. Wear (1898), 145 Mo. 162 , 46 S. W. 1099 ; Critser v. State (1910), 87 Neb. 727 , 127 N. W. 1073 ; In re Edwards (1886), 35 Kan. 99 , 10 P. 539 ; Durham, v. State (1851), 9 Ga. 306 ; Vance v. Commonwealth (1819), 2 Va. Cases (4 Va.) 162; which hold that a discharge is a bar to further prosecution for the same offense; and State v. Garthwaite (1851), 23 N. J.

1955See: Johnson v. State (1884), 42 Ohio St. 207 ; State v. Wear (1898), 145 Mo. 162 , 46 S. W. 1099 ; Critser v. State (1910), 87 Neb. 727 , 127 N. W. 1073 ; In re Edwards (1886), 35 Kan. 99 , 10 P. 539 ; Durham, v. State (1851), 9 Ga. 306 ; Vance v. Commonwealth (1819), 2 Va. Cases (4 Va.) 162; which hold that a discharge is a bar to further prosecution for the same offense; and State v. Garthwaite (1851), 23 N. J.

1955See: Johnson v. State (1884), 42 Ohio St. 207 ; State v. Wear (1898), 145 Mo. 162 , 46 S. W. 1099 ; Critser v. State (1910), 87 Neb. 727 , 127 N. W. 1073 ; In re Edwards (1886), 35 Kan. 99 , 10 P. 539 ; Durham, v. State (1851), 9 Ga. 306 ; Vance v. Commonwealth (1819), 2 Va. Cases (4 Va.) 162; which hold that a discharge is a bar to further prosecution for the same offense; and State v. Garthwaite (1851), 23 N. J.

1937The court said (p. 465) : “We have examined the authorities, and are satisfied that in all cases of proceedings for alleged constructive contempts, except, perhaps, when they are to enforce a civil remedy, if the party charged fully answers all the charges against him he shall be discharged, as to the attachment, and that the court can not, after that, hear evidence to impeach or contradict him.” In the case of Stewart v. State (1895), 140 Ind. 7 , 39 N. E. 508 , it is stated (p. 14) : “It always has been the law in this State, even prior to the enactment of the statute referred to in construc

1937The court said (p. 465) : “We have examined the authorities, and are satisfied that in all cases of proceedings for alleged constructive contempts, except, perhaps, when they are to enforce a civil remedy, if the party charged fully answers all the charges against him he shall be discharged, as to the attachment, and that the court can not, after that, hear evidence to impeach or contradict him.” In the case of Stewart v. State (1895), 140 Ind. 7 , 39 N. E. 508 , it is stated (p. 14) : “It always has been the law in this State, even prior to the enactment of the statute referred to in construc

1925After holding that the giving of the note did not change the character of the debt, the court said: "It is well settled that the courts will look behind a note, a mortgage, or even a judgment, to ascertain the nature of the debt, and if it is ascertained to be one which a discharge does not bar, it will be so adjudged." To the same effect see Brown v. Hannagan (1911), 210 Mass. 246 , 96 N. E. 714 , where it was held that the original character of the liability was not lost by being reduced to judgment.

1925After holding that the giving of the note did not change the character of the debt, the court said: "It is well settled that the courts will look behind a note, a mortgage, or even a judgment, to ascertain the nature of the debt, and if it is ascertained to be one which a discharge does not bar, it will be so adjudged." To the same effect see Brown v. Hannagan (1911), 210 Mass. 246 , 96 N. E. 714 , where it was held that the original character of the liability was not lost by being reduced to judgment.

1888In Young v. Grau, supra, it was said : “ The statute looks back to the origin, and change of form is not change of origin.” In another case it was said : “ The fiduciary character of the debt does not depend upon its form, but the manner of its origin and the acts by which it is incurred.” Simpson v. Simpson, supra. Substantially the same statement of the rule was made by this court in Donald v. Kell, supra. The case of Sorden v. Gatewood, 1 Ind. 107 , carries the rule somewhat further, and declares that the party who relies on a discharge in bankruptcy must aver and prove that the debt was on

1888In Young v. Grau, supra, it was said : “ The statute looks back to the origin, and change of form is not change of origin.” In another case it was said : “ The fiduciary character of the debt does not depend upon its form, but the manner of its origin and the acts by which it is incurred.” Simpson v. Simpson, supra. Substantially the same statement of the rule was made by this court in Donald v. Kell, supra. The case of Sorden v. Gatewood, 1 Ind. 107 , carries the rule somewhat further, and declares that the party who relies on a discharge in bankruptcy must aver and prove that the debt was on

1888Donald v. Kell, 111 Ind. 1 , and cases cited; Wade v. Clark, 52 Iowa, 158 (35 Am.

1888In Young v. Grau, supra, it was said : “ The statute looks back to the origin, and change of form is not change of origin.” In another case it was said : “ The fiduciary character of the debt does not depend upon its form, but the manner of its origin and the acts by which it is incurred.” Simpson v. Simpson, supra. Substantially the same statement of the rule was made by this court in Donald v. Kell, supra. The case of Sorden v. Gatewood, 1 Ind. 107 , carries the rule somewhat further, and declares that the party who relies on a discharge in bankruptcy must aver and prove that the debt was on

1888Donald v. Kell, 111 Ind. 1 , and cases cited; Wade v. Clark, 52 Iowa, 158 (35 Am.