7 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Paul Patz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Companygreen1 sentence1996Similarly, in Clare, where the Court expressly declined to address the applicability or application of the initial discharge rule, concluding that under the facts of the case the distinction was without consequence, the landfill was unlicensed for a period of time, and the plaintiff was on notice that it was contaminating groundwater, but nevertheless continued with its disposal. 446 Mich 4 -5. c None of the three cases relied on by the Court in Woodhaven in applying the initial discharge rule supports application of the rule to exclude coverage in the instant case. 12 *275 A review of case la | 1 | 1 |
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dingwellgreen1 sentence1996The Court concluded that the proper focus is on the initial discharge, dispersal, release, or escape into the atmosphere, and not the subsequent migration. *266 In announcing and applying the initial discharge rule in Woodhaven, id. at 162, the Court relied on three cases: In Travelers Indemnity Co v Dingwell, 414 A2d 220, 225 (Me, 1980), the Supreme Court of Maine held that “[t]he behavior of the pollutants in the environment, after release, is irrelevant to [the application of the pollution exclusion].” (Emphasis in original.) Similarly, in Technicon Electronics Corp v American Home Assuranc | 1 | 1 |
Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies v. Ex-Cell-O Corp.green1 sentence1996See also Fireman’s Fund Ins Cos v Ex-Cell-O Corp, 662 F Supp 71, 75 (ED Mich, 1987) (“[application of the pollution exclusion depends exclusively upon the process by which pollutants entered the environment”). | 1 | 1 |
Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.green2 sentences1996The Court concluded that the proper focus is on the initial discharge, dispersal, release, or escape into the atmosphere, and not the subsequent migration. *266 In announcing and applying the initial discharge rule in Woodhaven, id. at 162, the Court relied on three cases: In Travelers Indemnity Co v Dingwell, 414 A2d 220, 225 (Me, 1980), the Supreme Court of Maine held that “[t]he behavior of the pollutants in the environment, after release, is irrelevant to [the application of the pollution exclusion].” (Emphasis in original.) Similarly, in Technicon Electronics Corp v American Home Assuranc 1996The Court concluded that the proper focus is on the initial discharge, dispersal, release, or escape into the atmosphere, and not the subsequent migration. *266 In announcing and applying the initial discharge rule in Woodhaven, id. at 162, the Court relied on three cases: In Travelers Indemnity Co v Dingwell, 414 A2d 220, 225 (Me, 1980), the Supreme Court of Maine held that “[t]he behavior of the pollutants in the environment, after release, is irrelevant to [the application of the pollution exclusion].” (Emphasis in original.) Similarly, in Technicon Electronics Corp v American Home Assuranc | 1 | 1 |
First State Bank v. Zossgreen1 sentence1986See First State Bank v Zoss, 312 NW2d 127 (SD, 1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Jackson v. Thompson-McCully Co.
green
2 sentences2023City of Jackson v Thompson- McCully Co, LLC, 239 Mich App 482, 493 ; 608 NW2d 531 (2000) (citation omitted) (“An issue is moot if an event has occurred that renders it impossible for the court, if it should decide in favor of the party, to grant relief.”). 2023City of Jackson v Thompson- McCully Co, LLC, 239 Mich App 482, 493 ; 608 NW2d 531 (2000) (citation omitted) (“An issue is moot if an event has occurred that renders it impossible for the court, if it should decide in favor of the party, to grant relief.”). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Gosnell
green
2 sentences2002In re Gosnell, 234 Mich App 326, 333 ; 594 NW2d 90 (1999). 2002In re Gosnell, 234 Mich App 326, 333 ; 594 NW2d 90 (1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.
green
2 sentences1996The Court concluded that the proper focus is on the initial discharge, dispersal, release, or escape into the atmosphere, and not the subsequent migration. *266 In announcing and applying the initial discharge rule in Woodhaven, id. at 162, the Court relied on three cases: In Travelers Indemnity Co v Dingwell, 414 A2d 220, 225 (Me, 1980), the Supreme Court of Maine held that “[t]he behavior of the pollutants in the environment, after release, is irrelevant to [the application of the pollution exclusion].” (Emphasis in original.) Similarly, in Technicon Electronics Corp v American Home Assuranc 1996The Court concluded that the proper focus is on the initial discharge, dispersal, release, or escape into the atmosphere, and not the subsequent migration. *266 In announcing and applying the initial discharge rule in Woodhaven, id. at 162, the Court relied on three cases: In Travelers Indemnity Co v Dingwell, 414 A2d 220, 225 (Me, 1980), the Supreme Court of Maine held that “[t]he behavior of the pollutants in the environment, after release, is irrelevant to [the application of the pollution exclusion].” (Emphasis in original.) Similarly, in Technicon Electronics Corp v American Home Assuranc | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Auto-Owners Insurance v. City of Clare
green
1 sentence1996After Woodhaven , in Clare, supra, the Supreme Court declined to address the question of the applicability of the initial discharge rule in a case involving the escape of contaminants from a landfill and a pollution exclusion clause with “sudden and accidental” language. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Beebee v. Haslett Public Schools
green
2 sentences1980See also footnote 4, supra. 12 Subsection (2) of § 10 goes on to declare that: "It is the purpose of this amendatory act to reaffirm the continuing public policy of this state that the stability and effectiveness of labor relations in the public sector require, if such requirement is negotiated with the public employer, that all employees in the bargaining unit shall share fairly in the financial support of their exclusive bargaining representative by paying to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee which may be equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of t 1980See also footnote 4, supra. 12 Subsection (2) of § 10 goes on to declare that: "It is the purpose of this amendatory act to reaffirm the continuing public policy of this state that the stability and effectiveness of labor relations in the public sector require, if such requirement is negotiated with the public employer, that all employees in the bargaining unit shall share fairly in the financial support of their exclusive bargaining representative by paying to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee which may be equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of t | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Beebee v. Haslett Public Schools
green
2 sentences1980See also footnote 4, supra. 12 Subsection (2) of § 10 goes on to declare that: "It is the purpose of this amendatory act to reaffirm the continuing public policy of this state that the stability and effectiveness of labor relations in the public sector require, if such requirement is negotiated with the public employer, that all employees in the bargaining unit shall share fairly in the financial support of their exclusive bargaining representative by paying to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee which may be equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of t 1980See also footnote 4, supra. 12 Subsection (2) of § 10 goes on to declare that: "It is the purpose of this amendatory act to reaffirm the continuing public policy of this state that the stability and effectiveness of labor relations in the public sector require, if such requirement is negotiated with the public employer, that all employees in the bargaining unit shall share fairly in the financial support of their exclusive bargaining representative by paying to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee which may be equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of t | 1 | 1980–1980 |
In re Rhutassel
neutral
1 sentence1903It is well settled that the courts will look behind a note, a mortgage, or even a judgment, to ascertain the nature of the debt, and, if it is ascertained to be one which a discharge does not bar, it will be so adjudged.” • See, also, Howland v. Carson, 28 Ohio St. 625 ; In re Shutassel, 96 Fed. 597 . | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.