promise immunity in Illinois

2014Saletech claims this promise states a claim for promissory estoppel. -12- 1-13-2639 ¶ 32 In response, defendants argue Saletech cannot state a claim for promissory estoppel as a matter of law because promissory estoppel only applies in the absence of a contract. ¶ 33 “ ‘[P]romissory estoppel is a doctrine under which the plaintiff may recover without the presence of a contract.’ ” Newton, 233 Ill. 2d at 53 (quoting Illinois Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. J.F.

2014Saletech claims this promise states a claim for promissory estoppel. ¶ 32 In response, defendants argue Saletech cannot state a claim for promissory estoppel as a matter of law because promissory estoppel only applies in the absence of a contract. ¶ 33 “ ‘[P]romissory estoppel is a doctrine under which the plaintiff may recover without the presence of a contract.’ ” Newton, 233 Ill. 2d at 53 (quoting Illinois Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. J.F.

1975When the Supreme Court said ( 405 U.S. at 154 ): "To the extent this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures and regulations can be established to carry that burden * * *" (emphasis added), it was referring to its holding in the preceding sentence that the promise made by one particular government attorney must be attributed to the government.

1973In the recent case of People v. Kucala, 7 Ill.App.3d 1029, 1034 , 288 N.E.2d 622 , the court invoked Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , and held that failure of the prosecutor to produce a statement of a witness was prejudicial error “irrespective of [the prosecutor’s] good or bad faith.” In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , an Assistant United States Attorney made a promise of immunity to a witness; the trial assistant was unaware of the promise; the Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding at page 154: “To the extent this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures

1939(People v. Bogolowski, 317 Ill. 460 ; People v. Bogolowski, 326 Ill. 253 .) The ground on which immunity, where promised by the State, must be given, and where the party has testified as promised, is, that the dignity of the State requires that it keep faith with its promises.

1930(People v. Bogolowski, 317 Ill. 460 ; People v. Bogolowski, 326 id. 253.) It is, however, quite another thing to say that because the State’s attorney offers immunity the witness or the accused must give evidence which incriminates him, or to say that even though he had agreed so to do he is bound to keep that agreement.

2020The Schecter case is a published opinion, though it was initially filed as a Rule 23 order before being published as an opinion. - 14 - company’s “marketing was allegedly premised on a false promise in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.” Id. at 808 .

2020But as previously noted, the Lewises did not purposefully direct any marketing efforts toward Illinois consumers, and thus, plaintiffs’ reliance on Zazove is misplaced. ¶ 62 Finally, after the parties completed briefing on appeal, this court issued a decision in Dixon v. GAA Classic Cars, LLC, 2019 IL App (1st) 182416 , which warrants a brief discussion.

2015Such agreements differ from plea agreements “in that the detrimental reliance for a plea agreement is the defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial [citation], whereas [w]ith an agreement not to prosecute, parties agree that the defendant’s cooperation is sufficient consideration for the government’s promise of immunity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith, 233 Ill.

2009The Michigan Court of Appeals initially stated that “in most cases, a promise of immunity or other favorable treatment is relevant only to the issue of the credibility of the witness, and not to the admissibility or the immunized testimony.” Jones, 236 Mich. App. at 405 , 600 N.W.2d at 656 .

2009The Michigan Court of Appeals initially stated that “in most cases, a promise of immunity or other favorable treatment is relevant only to the issue of the credibility of the witness, and not to the admissibility or the immunized testimony.” Jones, 236 Mich. App. at 405 , 600 N.W.2d at 656 .

1992A “cooperation-immunity” agreement differs from a plea agreement in that the detrimental reliance for a plea agreement is the defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial (Navarroli, 121 Ill. 2d at 528 ), whereas “[w]ith an agreement not to prosecute, parties agree that the defendant’s cooperation is sufficient consideration for the government’s promise of immunity” (Johnson, 861 F.2d at 512 ).

1992A “cooperation-immunity” agreement differs from a plea agreement in that the detrimental reliance for a plea agreement is the defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial (Navarroli, 121 Ill. 2d at 528 ), whereas “[w]ith an agreement not to prosecute, parties agree that the defendant’s cooperation is sufficient consideration for the government’s promise of immunity” (Johnson, 861 F.2d at 512 ).

1992The benefits of a plea agreement include the “prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; *** avoiding] much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; *** protectpng] the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, *** enhancing] whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.” (Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 261 ,

1992The benefits of a plea agreement include the “prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; *** avoiding] much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; *** protectpng] the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, *** enhancing] whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.” (Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 261 ,

1987United States v. Nathan (2d Cir. 1973), 476 F.2d 456 , cert. denied (1973), 414 U.S. 823 , 38 L.

1987United States v. Nathan (2d Cir. 1973), 476 F.2d 456 , cert. denied (1973), 414 U.S. 823 , 38 L.

1987United States v. Nathan (2d Cir. 1973), 476 F.2d 456 , cert. denied (1973), 414 U.S. 823 , 38 L.

1987The court specifically referred to its previous holding that a promise of immunity made by a United States Attorney in one district cannot bind a United States Attorney in another district (United States v. Boulier (E.D.N.Y. 1972), 359 F. Supp. 165 , aff’d on other grounds sub nom.

1979Ed. 2d 706 , 83 S. Ct. 1681 .) Although such testimony is fraught with such weaknesses as the promise of immunity or the accomplice’s malice toward the accused, the question of whether it is a satisfactory basis for conviction is nevertheless one which goes to the weight of the evidence and is therefore within the province of the jury to decide.

1979(People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346 , 362 N.E.2d 291 .) We will not reweigh or set aside the jury’s determination of guilt unless it is palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence or so unsatisfactory as to cause a reasonable doubt as to guilt.

1979(People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346 , 362 N.E.2d 291 .) We will not reweigh or set aside the jury’s determination of guilt unless it is palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence or so unsatisfactory as to cause a reasonable doubt as to guilt.

1973In the recent case of People v. Kucala, 7 Ill.App.3d 1029, 1034 , 288 N.E.2d 622 , the court invoked Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , and held that failure of the prosecutor to produce a statement of a witness was prejudicial error “irrespective of [the prosecutor’s] good or bad faith.” In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , an Assistant United States Attorney made a promise of immunity to a witness; the trial assistant was unaware of the promise; the Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding at page 154: “To the extent this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures

1973In Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 , the defendant was found guilty of assault with intent to commit murder.

1973In the recent case of People v. Kucala, 7 Ill.App.3d 1029, 1034 , 288 N.E.2d 622 , the court invoked Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , and held that failure of the prosecutor to produce a statement of a witness was prejudicial error “irrespective of [the prosecutor’s] good or bad faith.” In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , an Assistant United States Attorney made a promise of immunity to a witness; the trial assistant was unaware of the promise; the Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding at page 154: “To the extent this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures

1973In the recent case of People v. Kucala, 7 Ill.App.3d 1029, 1034 , 288 N.E.2d 622 , the court invoked Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , and held that failure of the prosecutor to produce a statement of a witness was prejudicial error “irrespective of [the prosecutor’s] good or bad faith.” In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , an Assistant United States Attorney made a promise of immunity to a witness; the trial assistant was unaware of the promise; the Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding at page 154: “To the extent this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures

1960The other case in which the common-law scope of the plea was seemingly extended is People v. Finkelstein, 372 Ill. 186 .

1939(People v. Bogolowski, 317 Ill. 460 ; People v. Bogolowski, 326 Ill. 253 .) The ground on which immunity, where promised by the State, must be given, and where the party has testified as promised, is, that the dignity of the State requires that it keep faith with its promises.

1935In People v. Rockola, 339 Ill. 474 , we said that “where, in pursuance of a promise of immunity, an accused or witness has testified and by his testimony given incriminating evidence against himself, the State will be required to live up to the bargain as to immunity, and a conviction of the defendant of such crimes as his testimony discloses cannot be sustained.” Even if it may be said the trial court was not in error in sustaining the demurrer to the special plea in bar which set up the immunity, still, as a matter of evidence, the confession of the defendant, obtained under the circumstance

1931(People v. Looney, 324 Ill. 375 ; People v. Schallman, 295 id. 560; People v. Frankenberg, 236 id. 408; Juretich v. People, 223 id. 484.) The reason that such evidence is subject to suspicion and should be accepted with the utmost caution is that a reasonable inference arises that such testimony is given under a promise of immunity or a reasonable hope of escaping prosecution or of obtaining some leniency.