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6 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2000Illinois recognizes a difference between such agreements: in the latter, “the detrimental reliance ... is the defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial .. . whereas [in the case of the former], parties agree that the defendant’s cooperation is sufficient consideration for the government’s promise of immunity.” People v. Smith, 233 Ill.App.3d 342 , 174 Ill.Dec. 708 , 599 N.E.2d 492, 497 (1992), quoting Navarroli, 118 Ill.Dec. 414 , 521 N.E.2d at 896 , and U.S. v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 510, 512 (8th *274 Cir.1988). 2000Illinois recognizes a difference between such agreements: in the latter, “the detrimental reliance ... is the defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial .. . whereas [in the case of the former], parties agree that the defendant’s cooperation is sufficient consideration for the government’s promise of immunity.” People v. Smith, 233 Ill.App.3d 342 , 174 Ill.Dec. 708 , 599 N.E.2d 492, 497 (1992), quoting Navarroli, 118 Ill.Dec. 414 , 521 N.E.2d at 896 , and U.S. v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 510, 512 (8th *274 Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Starksgreen2 sentences2000See also People v. Starks, 106 Ill.2d 441 , 88 Ill.Dec. 35 , 478 N.E.2d 350, 354 (1985) (an agreement between the State and the defendant requiring the State to dismiss charges against defendant who took and passed a polygraph examination, enforceable). 2000See also People v. Starks, 106 Ill.2d 441 , 88 Ill.Dec. 35 , 478 N.E.2d 350, 354 (1985) (an agreement between the State and the defendant requiring the State to dismiss charges against defendant who took and passed a polygraph examination, enforceable). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Amy Frances Johnsongreen1 sentence2000Illinois recognizes a difference between such agreements: in the latter, “the detrimental reliance ... is the defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial .. . whereas [in the case of the former], parties agree that the defendant’s cooperation is sufficient consideration for the government’s promise of immunity.” People v. Smith, 233 Ill.App.3d 342 , 174 Ill.Dec. 708 , 599 N.E.2d 492, 497 (1992), quoting Navarroli, 118 Ill.Dec. 414 , 521 N.E.2d at 896 , and U.S. v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 510, 512 (8th *274 Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Kitt v. Stategreen1 sentence1968See Kitt v. State, 2 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Knox v. Stategreen2 sentences1964See also Knox v. State, 234 Md. 203 , 198 A. 2d 285 (1963). 1964See also Knox v. State, 234 Md. 203 , 198 A. 2d 285 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lowe v. State
green
1 sentence2001Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Navarroli
green
2 sentences2000Illinois recognizes a difference between such agreements: in the latter, “the detrimental reliance ... is the defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial .. . whereas [in the case of the former], parties agree that the defendant’s cooperation is sufficient consideration for the government’s promise of immunity.” People v. Smith, 233 Ill.App.3d 342 , 174 Ill.Dec. 708 , 599 N.E.2d 492, 497 (1992), quoting Navarroli, 118 Ill.Dec. 414 , 521 N.E.2d at 896 , and U.S. v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 510, 512 (8th *274 Cir.1988). 2000Illinois recognizes a difference between such agreements: in the latter, “the detrimental reliance ... is the defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial .. . whereas [in the case of the former], parties agree that the defendant’s cooperation is sufficient consideration for the government’s promise of immunity.” People v. Smith, 233 Ill.App.3d 342 , 174 Ill.Dec. 708 , 599 N.E.2d 492, 497 (1992), quoting Navarroli, 118 Ill.Dec. 414 , 521 N.E.2d at 896 , and U.S. v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 510, 512 (8th *274 Cir.1988). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Moore v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1977The Supreme Court had another occasion to consider what we may now term the Brady principle in Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786 (1972), reh. den. 409 U. S. 897 (1972). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Homart Development Co. v. Diamond
green
1 sentence1977The Supreme Court had another occasion to consider what we may now term the Brady principle in Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786 (1972), reh. den. 409 U. S. 897 (1972). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Hurley v. State
green
1 sentence1972App. 348 , 251 A. 2d 241 (1969). *217 PROSECUTORIAL INTERROGATION OF WITNESS CLAIMING FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AND PROSECUTORIAL CLOSING ARGUMENT COMMENTS Appellant’s third argument is actually bifurcated, i.e., the prosecutor denied the accused a fair trial by his persistent interrogation of a co-defendant who utilized his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and reference in the closing argument by the prosecutor to the same witness having “spilled the beans.” In an in-camera conference, Jack Ivory Johnson, the co-defendant, indicated that he was hesitant about testifying fo | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Watson v. State
green
1 sentence1968Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210 . 1 An accomplice is a competent witness; his testimony is admissible even though he has been found guilty, confessed his guilt or testifies under a promise of immunity. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.